FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

# Daily Report

# East Europe

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# Daily Report
## East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-96-015* *23 January 1996*

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**Albania: Socialists Accused of 'Attacks' on 'West'**

*AU2301115096 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 20 Jan 96 p 1*

[Report by Muje Bucpapaj: "ZERI I POPULLIT Attacks the U.S. Republican Institute"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist Party [PS] is continuing to insult the American International Institute [Instituti Nderkombetar Amerikan] one of the most prestigious institutes in the democratic world, by casting doubt on the results of its poll carried out in Albania a few days ago, and in particular on the facts that only 3 percent of the population think there is a need for more human rights, and only 2 percent think that the country urgently needs a constitution. The attack on the U.S. institute in yesterday's ZERI I POPULLIT goes so far as to claim that "the results seem more like an attempt to obscure one of the Democratic Party's unkept promises."

In fact, successive attacks of this kind against the United States have appeared several times in the press and the topmost forums of the PS, recalling the dictator Hoxha's accusations about "the American danger to Albania." It must be stressed that in this period before the elections the PS has escalated its attacks on the West to an uncontrollable extent. After several statements against NATO's presence in Albania, the Socialists see nothing wrong in attacking and insulting many European political personalities that have seen in this party an authentic communist monster under a new name that must not under any circumstances take power again. This could also be the main reason for the PS's anti-Europeanism.

**Albania: PS Leader Admits To 'Splinters' in Party**

*AU2301115796 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 21 Jan 96 p 3*

[Report by A.C.: "A Few Splinters Cannot Destroy the Socialist Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—"There are also splinter elements in the Socialist Party [PS]." This unusual admission was made by Servet Pellumbi, the present leader of the largest opposition party, implying that something is amiss in his party. Pellumbi's words were heard and confirmed in Durres, the city where the PS held its first district conference. "But these splinters cannot take the party with them," Pellumbi reassured those attending the meeting.

Rumors of a possible split in the party seem to have obliged the senior Socialist leadership to explain the situation. As if to confirm what he said about "splinters," Pellumbi called his party a "steel block." Yesterday's conference assembled all the PS's members and local leaders in Durres. Speeches were made about the PS's policies and its electoral manifesto, which the PS will reveal at its forthcoming congress. Pellumbi said in Durres that the PS will be the leading political force in the next elections, but it must be remembered that in Durres the result of the referendum of 6 November 1994 was in favor of the draft constitution put forward by the Democratic Party and President Berisha.

**Albania: Socialist Politicians Said Linked to Mafia**

*AU2101183496 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 19 Jan 96 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Former Socialist Deputy Falls Into the Italian Police Net"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fatos Zotkaj, former Socialist deputy in the previous legislature, has ended up in the net of the Italian police because of prostitution. The former Socialist politician was seized by the Italian police under the charge of involvement in traffic exploiting prostitutes. Using his diplomatic passport, Zotkaj was mixed up in the murkiest currents of organized crime, to the amazement of the experts of the Italian criminal police. The former Socialist deputy was involved in the trade of Albanian girls who are sold in the Italian streets to obtain profits for their "patrons," which have turned out to include Zotkaj himself. As one instance of the involvement of Albanian Socialist politicians in the darkest machinations of the Mafia and in corruption and street crime, the Zotkaj case is not the first to implicate former communists in the filthiest networks of dirty money. Zotkaj's involvement in prostitution can be added to the scandal of the Albanian "connections," the corruption of the Socialist Party's "Progresi" firm, the Mafia activities of Bardhyl Fasko with his diplomatic passport as a former deputy, and dozens of sensational cases against leading Albanian Socialists at home and abroad.

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**Bulgaria: High-Level Meeting With Croatia Planned**

*AU2201195896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] An intergovernmental meeting with the Republic of Croatia is being prepared through diplomatic channels; the meeting is to be held at the highest possible level and is to cover the whole range of bilateral trade and economic relations. Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Khristov announced this today at a news conference devoted to Bulgaria's Balkan policy. According to Khristov, four, not twelve, agreements with Croatia are in the final stages of preparation. I cannot explain, he said, why President Zhelev claims that Bulgaria's Balkan policy is no longer balanced, pointing out that the president's visit should not be left out of the balance. Khristov announced that, in the near future, the Foreign Ministry is preparing to send an ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

From an answer given by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Karasimeonov to journalists' questions today, it emerged that the dialogue with the president regarding ambassadorial appointments had stalled. I have no information on what the Presidency's latest demands are, Karasimeonov said, adding that the Foreign Ministry continues to support its proposed candidates for ambassadorships and will defend them en bloc.

**Bulgaria: Zhelev, SDS Head Oppose Videnov Cabinet**

*AU2201195696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[Report by Silviya Velikova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's meeting between President Zhelev and Ivan Kostov, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], lasted for two hours. Ivan Kostov and President Zhelev found they held common views, not about the presidential elections, but about concerted action against the present government. They shared the conviction that the government is harmful and dangerous for Bulgaria and that, according to Ivan Kostov, it is connected with organized crime. They also agreed that the reforms have stopped; that there is a danger that the mass privatization may be turned into a mafia- and nomenklatura-type process; that Bulgaria is being distanced from NATO, which in turn distances it from the European Union; and that there has been a change in the accents of Bulgaria's Balkan policy, according to President Zhelev.

The opposition must act in unison and overthrow the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government, Ivan Kostov said. If things continue as they are now, it cannot be excluded that we may act together in the event of a parliamentary crisis, President Zhelev added, pointing out that his actions in this area will be within the limits of his constitutional powers.

We should react to the Democratic Left's rule in the new year from a common position, Ivan Kostov believes. We expect certain actions from the president in this direction, he added. What these actions may be remains within the realm of conjecture. What is certain, however, is that today Ivan Kostov and Zhelyu Zhelev established points of contact on all the basic issues discussed. What is more, it emerged that the SDS regards the presidential institution as a guarantor of the democratic changes in Bulgaria and considers that as an institution it belongs to the democratic forces in Bulgaria.

**Bulgaria: BSP Spokesperson Condemns Zhelev 'Attacks'**

*AU2201194496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] We have sought the view of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] regarding today's meeting between President Zhelev and SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] leader Ivan Kostov. We will hear the Socialists' reaction from Klara Marinova, spokesperson of the BSP Supreme Council.

[Begin Marinova recording] We regard this meeting as unprecedented: The incumbent president has included also in his election campaign direct threats of provoking a parliamentary crisis. By acting in this way, he evidently counts on success.

Is it not strange that the person who lies at the root of our motherland's economic, political, and social destabilization has today belatedly shown his concern for the reforms, privatization, the fight against organized crime, what he claims to be the destruction of the Bulgarian village, the destruction of the structures of our national security, and the blocking of the country's industry? He has less right than anyone to [words indistinct], not to mention foreign policy.

We have all witnessed a series of serious foreign policy blunders committed by the president and his advisers. Especially grave are the consequences of his latest statement as head of state on Bulgaria's problems and the conflicts in the region. He is really running the risk of worsening our relations in the long term with a number of neighboring states. No one has given the president the right to predetermine our country's participation or not in any military political blocs. This question lies solely within the competence of the supreme sovereign body—the Bulgarian people.

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Today, the president also launched crude attacks against the coalition of the Democratic Left, which has made immense efforts to lead Bulgaria out of the profound crisis, for which Mr. Zhelev is specifically to blame and cannot be excused. By his statement today, Mr. Zhelev really confirms that he will remain in Bulgaria's modern history as a symbol of confrontation and destruction, not of creative work and consensus. [end recording]

**Bulgaria: New Ministers Shivarov, Paparizov 'Sworn In'**

*AU2301104996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Assembly had an extraordinary session today. The agenda included only one item—debating and voting on the personnel changes in the cabinet proposed by the prime minister and endorsed by the Democratic Left parliamentary faction. Our correspondent Mariya Tsankova reports:

[Tsankova] Prime Minister Zhan Videnov proposed to the National Assembly to relieve Kiril Tsochev and Vasil Chichibaba of their posts and appoint Deputy Prime Minister Svetoslav Shivarov to the post minister of agriculture and food industry, and Atanas Paparizov—minister of trade and foreign economic cooperation. Zhan Videnov described the changes as an expression of the Democratic Left's striving toward a more successful development of agriculture and trade, a higher degree of engagement, a more rapid completion of the land reform, and joining the new world and European reality.

The vote was secret and en bloc. As a protest against this procedure, which deprived the deputies of the opportunity of expressing their opinions individually on the resignations and appointments, the deputies of the parliamentary factions of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], the People's Union, and the Rights and Freedoms Movement, and three independent deputies boycotted the vote.

The results: Some 124 deputies participated in the vote. Some 122 voted for and two against the prime minister's proposal.

Svetoslav Shivarov and Atanas Paparizov were sworn in as new ministers.

In his statement after the voting, Zhan Videnov thanked the participants in the vote and described their action as an expression of statesmanlike wisdom, political responsibility, and real parliamentarism.

Having in mind the meeting between President Zhelyu Zhelev and SDS leader Ivan Kostov, which took place yesterday, the prime minister said: The obvious irresponsibility of certain politicians and statesmen leads them to seek an opportunity to destabilize the general situation in the country. They will not be the ones who will dictate to us the trends of our development, the prime minister said and declared the vote a guarantee for the success of the cabinet's future work.

The extraordinary National Assembly session has ended.

**Bulgaria: Videnov Skill in BZNS Relations Praised**

*AU2301115996 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19 Jan 96 p 16*

[Commentary by Rumyana Strugarova: "In Ally's Field"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The upcoming appointment of new ministers became a convenient occasion for Videnov to check whether in the future he could enjoy the same control over developments in the government, parliamentary faction, and party headquarters that he enjoyed in the past.

Clearly, Videnov controls the situation in the parliamentary faction. On 18 January, his proposal to appoint Deputy Prime Minister Svetoslav Shivarov minister of agriculture was adopted by the Democratic Left parliamentary faction. Despite the fact that, prior to that, the leadership of the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian Agrarian National Union [BZNS] [Shivarov's party] had adopted a similar decision, it is clear that it was not the BZNS decision that influenced the Democratic Left deputies. Thus, the prime minister was able to kill three birds with one stone: First, he thwarted the attempts of his party members to impose the appointment of Kosta Andreev, a person who does not hide his concern about the government's present policy, but whose candidacy was launched by certain Democratic Left deputies. Second, he prevented an increase in tension between the coalition members, because the Agrarians categorically insisted on their ministerial quota. Third, by giving the hitherto deputy prime minister responsibility for agriculture Videnov involved the coalition partners in sharing the actual burden of governing. Passing the ball at a later moment to the field of the ally could prove an important and crucial move in sharing party responsibility for governing between the coalition partners.

**Bulgaria: Cabinet Trouble May Lead to Videnov Ouster**

*AU2201155796 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 18 Jan 96 p 6*

[Article by Svetlana Belousova: "Cabinet Troubles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After Kiril Tsochev [former deputy prime minister and minister of trade and foreign

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economic relations] surprised Prime Minister Videnov with his resignation, and most of all with the explanation that he had been offended by the lack of confidence in his work, a rapid attempt was made to prevent the issue from becoming a political matter, by using the old and well-known trick of diverting people's attention. Thus the resignation of Vasil Chichibaba [former minister of agriculture] emerged.

Now the talk is not about Tsochev's motives, but rather about the moral value of both resignations. The work of the two ministers was all right, the party spokesperson Klara Marinova quickly pointed out. Deputy Prime Minister Doncho Konakchiev informed the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Sofia members that the resignations "were not a part of a script prepared by the Council of Ministers." (As if anyone thought of something like this!] In order to shut Tsochev's mouth on time, in the last few days rumors have been spread by the BSP deputies about how well Tsochev took care of his own business, and how weakly he performed as a statesmen. The goal of the deputies is to create a preconceived opinion about Tsochev, so that if he opens his mouth afterward, people will not attribute too much importance to what he says. The principle "those who are not with us are against us," emerges again.

In forming his cabinet Videnov selected the ministers in accordance with their professional qualities, and the degree and effect of lobbying on the part of various groups within the BSP. The presence or absence of statesmanlike thinking in such cases becomes evident later on. If the prime minister decides to reshuffle his cabinet in the spring, he should opt for statesmen who have already proven their qualities, because this will be the last reshuffle he will make. The one after that could possibly include the prime minister himself.

**Bulgaria: SDS Efforts To Topple Cabinet Ineffective**

*AU2301105296 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19 Jan 96 p 16*

[Commentary by Konstantin Subchev: "Whose Merit?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Obviously inspired by the resignation of Ministers Kiril Tsochev and Vasil Chichibaba, the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] began to work out a strategy of toppling Zhan Videnov's cabinet, trying to rally the entire parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition for the decisive attack.

Perhaps the people at No. 134 Rakovski Street [SDS headquarters] are still living with the memories of the glorious 1990, when the street storm toppled both the president and the prime minister. However, now we are living in 1996. The time of the cities of truth, the night vigils (with and without candles), and the living chains already is history. The cabinet is backed by an absolute majority in parliament and the municipal power in the provinces.

It is a completely different question whether this cabinet, including Prime Minister Videnov, are the most appropriate governing team that could lead Bulgaria out of the crisis and implement the preelection promises of the Democratic Left. In other words, if something could prompt the collective resignations of the inhabitants of No. 1 Dondukov Street [the cabinet building], this could only be the infighting between the various currents within the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the economic interests behind those currents.

However, even such a development would not mean automatically early parliamentary elections. When faced with the risk to lose their parliament seat the members of the parliamentary majority will always prefer to compromise and form a new cabinet.

Thus, if the cabinet falls, this will not be the SDS merit.

**Bulgaria: SDS Head on Duty To Push Early Elections**

*AU2201145096 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 18 Jan 96 p 9*

[Interview with SDS leader Ivan Kostov by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "Protecting Democratic Alternative is the Prime Goal in Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Veleva] Mr. Kostov, the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] has announced that one of its tasks is to topple the cabinet by creating a parliamentary crisis. How do you think you can bring this about?

[Kostov] The answer to your question is the answer to the most important domestic political issue within the SDS. It is the task of every opposition to provoke early parliamentary elections. This could happen by attacking the cabinet in all cases of antipeople policy. For example, the cases of the "Orion" circle, which is so close to Videnov, Topenergy and its transfer from Andrey Lukanov's hands to the hands of Gasprom, and the selling of national interests by Lyubomir Kolarov [chairman of the Commission on Posts and Communications] through Bulphone [a telephone system]. Those are the basic affairs of the cabinet and the most important figures in the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] that we intend to utilize.

[Veleva] Your attempts to topple the cabinet appear absurd against the background of the fact that the cabinet is supported by an iron majority.

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[Kostov] It might appear impossible at present. However, we are politicians who are looking forward and envisage what could happen. The grain crisis will develop. In two months there will be a shortage of grain in Bulgaria. Its price will reach the international standard and this will be exceptionally hard for the people. The foreign debts accumulated during the current year will equal our foreign currency reserve, which means that we will have a foreign currency crisis and the lev will be devalued. In a few months there will be a shortage of meat and prices will increase. Banks will go bankrupt. When all this happens the opposition will become the striking force. If the BSP does not want this to happen it should give up power and allow a new political leadership to cope with the situation. [passage omitted]

[Veleva] Are you not shifting your attention to early parliamentary elections now, when we are facing the presidential elections?

[Kostov] The SDS's main priority is the struggle against the BSP. This must always be remembered. The political aspect of the presidential elections is important, but it is not the most important one. Let us imagine that there could be a contradiction between the two elections. Let us consider the variant in which a "democrat" president is elected, something for which the SDS pays with a split, and stops being a real alternative to the BSP.

[Veleva] Are you sure that something like this could happen?

[Kostov] Would you agree to pay such a price if you are in the SDS leadership, or are merely a SDS member? It means turning our backs on our basic value—the faith that the SDS is the alternative to the power that is ruling the country. Now we are at the top of our ability to concentrate our cadre potential and resolve the country's important political problems. The SDS, together with the People's Union, the Rights and Freedoms Movement and the Bulgarian Business Bloc—smaller political formations—do form a serious political alternative. [passage omitted]

**Bulgaria: Policy Differences Between Zhelev, Cabinet**

*AU2201152596 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 18-24 Jan 96 p 26*

[Commentary by Stefan Voynov: "Schizodiplomacy While Looking at Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgaria will miss out on the business around the reconstruction of Bosnia, at least to the extent that we deserve because of the damage that we suffered as a result of the embargo. Our diplomats do not think that either NATO or the United Nations are benevolently disposed toward those of our companies that have applied for a license.

There will be a week between the visits of Zhelev and Clinton to Bosnia—this is the second miss. Both visits are unofficial and mark the unofficial beginning of their second presidential election campaigns.

The third miss is in the attitudes of our two top leaders, who have recently developed a socialist competition between themselves on all issues, including Bosnia.

So far the government cannot boast of any major successes in the distribution of the Bosnian pie—I mean in the reconstruction orders. We have only one offer from Brussels, to send an engineering batallion of about 350 men, who will participate in the repair of bridges and will clear up snow in the southeastern part of the Serb Republic, where the railroad passes close to the so-called English zone. We are also to specify whether we will be sending sappers to remove the mines planted by the Serbs.

Those are lossmaking enterprises. The engineering batallion alone will cost us 3 billion leva and, for the time being, it is not known who will pay this to us. Prime Minister Videnov promised to negotiate with the NATO states on covering our expenses and transferring the amount in advance to our country. We will also be proposing sending our policemen, tempered by the tough Bulgarian traffic.

Against the background of these modest successes, Mr. Zhelev would have liked to request something more, but, unfortunately, he will miss Clinton. On 19 January, he hopes to obtain the personal support of Bosnian President Izetbegovic for indirect compensation for our losses. Thus Zhelev hopes to be able to win a round in the competition with Videnov.

However, since this is not at all certain, the people around Zhelev are reminiscent of our beating around the bush on anything related to NATO. We do not receive any orders because they do not like us and they do not like us because of our cabinet. The National Assembly members are also guilty to certain degree, because they prompted an international scandal in connection with the convoy of water tankers and armored cars for the UN troops in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

It also has not been forgotten that our Foreign Ministry denounced the NATO air strikes. For his part, Zhelev had already called for such strikes three years ago.

The picture is rather schizophrenic. However, a certain benefit could be gained, if Videnov plays footsie with Serbia, while Zhelev does the same with Bosnia.

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**Bulgaria: Cabinet Not Supporting Zhelev Balkan Policy**

*AU2201151096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 18 Jan 96 p 6*

[Commentary by Georgi Apostolov: "Words, Words, Words"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The assurance of Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Khristov that the government fully shares the goals of President Zhelev's visit to Croatia is hanging in the air, simply because no free minister could be found who could travel to Zagreb and sign the prepared agreements.

The visit to Zagreb and signing of the intergovernmental treaty are important steps in and support of Bulgaria's striving to become a factor of stability and a serious political and economic partner in the Balkans. The exceptionally benevolent attitude demonstrated by Croatia testifies to the existence of broad possibilities in developing bilateral relations in all areas. Developing relations with Croatia, while certain neighboring countries are making sporadic efforts to discredit Bulgaria, will significantly increase Bulgaria's political weight and prestige. The proximity of the two countries opens a broad field for mutually beneficial economic activity.

Neither the resignation of Kiril Tsochev [former deputy prime minister and minister of trade and foreign economic relations] nor any other technical problems could justify the postponement of the agreements, which could give an impetus to the sluggish Bulgarian economy. In addition, let us be aware of the impression that the imprudent attempts of our politicians to outwit each other in foreign policy have created for who knows how long already, among our political partners.

**Bulgaria: Cabinet's European Priorities 'Shrinking'**

*AU2301115896 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 19 Jan 96 p 1*

[Article by Ivo Indzhev: "Shrinking Horizon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our ruling team is trying to explain the essence of their foreign policy. Where are the priorities of Bulgaria's foreign policy hidden?

For example, Zhan Videnov refused to travel to Madrid to convey Bulgaria's request to join the EU. This means that almost all West European countries have been dropped from the cabinet's European priorities.

In the Balkans, Turkey cannot hope for a benevolent attitude on the part of Bulgaria's socialist government. The same applies to Croatia. After all, the Bulgarian Socialist Party boycotted President Zhelev's official visit to Zagreb. Albania is not only ruled by opponents of our leaders' ideology, but they even dared to seriously shake the red heritage. This means that Albania also does not figure in our cabinet's European priorities. This leaves fraternal Serbia, Russia (together with Siberia), Uzbekistan, Mongolia, China....

**Bulgaria: Zhelev Views NATO, Bosnian Reconstruction**

*AU2201150696 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 18-24 Jan 96 pp 26-27*

[Interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Tatyana Vasileva; place and date not given: "Zhelev: 'NATO Could Possibly View Us With Mistrust'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vasileva] Mr. President, is Bulgaria sufficiently active in its initiatives related our participation in the reconstruction of Bosnia?

[Zhelev] Bulgaria has the moral and political right to participate much more actively in the reconstruction work in Bosnia. It suffered great losses as a result of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. We became guilty through no fault of ours and suffered great damage. By this I mean not only the dollars that we did not earn or the plans that we did not implement, but also the moral damage. The fact that Bulgaria is in the Balkans included us by the force of generalization in the Balkan conflict and potential investors did not come here and did not invest. In addition, semicriminal groups emerged in Bulgaria, which utilized the embargo to make a lot of money.

[Vasileva] Could we be dropped from the list of countries that will be participating in the reconstruction of Bosnia, as was the case with the Schengen visa alleviations?

[Zhelev] I do not believe that such a radical situation could emerge. However, Bulgaria must conduct a much more active policy and categorically demand participation in the reconstruction work. Certain political and practical steps in this respect have already been made. I am departing for Croatia and, eventually, for Sarajevo with a whole team of businessmen, who could check on the spot the possibilities for our companies' participation.

[Vasileva] What other goals do you have in Bosnia? Has your meeting with Alija Izetbegovic been confirmed?

[Zhelev] The meeting has not been confirmed as yet. We do not know what the weather is like there. Sarajevo is in a valley, precisely like Sofia, and its airport has only two runways. If it is cloudy or foggy, landing will be risky or impossible. The navigation is also not secure.

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[Vasileva] Do you think that our unclear position on NATO could hinder our participation in the reconstruction plan?

[Zhelev] This could have an influence. Bulgaria has demonstrated reservations over regular NATO membership. It refrains from or hesitates about submitting its candidacy like all the other postcommunist states. Therefore, NATO could possibly view us with mistrust, regardless of all the sacrifices and deprivation that we suffered as a result of the embargo.

**Bulgaria: Zhelev Meeting With Intellectuals Criticized**

*AU2201170696 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 18 Jan 96 p 7*

[Commentary by Yasen Borislavov: "Intellectuals Construct Bridge Between Dondukov, Rakovski Streets"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidential election campaign has began. Dr. Zhelev has already made three moves. The first was his paternal care for the protesting radio journalists and the interpellation to the Constitutional Court as to what constitutes freedom of speech. The second was his New Year's message in which he reproached his people for being too slow in constructing democracy. The third was made on Tuesday [16 January], when 50 intellectuals from the newly established "Consensus for Bulgaria" Association came to the Presidency to talk with their president about democracy and promise him support in the upcoming elections. The association is chaired not by an accidental figure, but by the noted Bulgarian student-intellectual Emil Koshlukov.

Actually, the name the 50 presidential supporters have selected for their association implies that people outside the association, regardless of whether they are intellectuals or not, have an anti-Bulgarian attitude. The other suggestion is that anyone who does not like Zhelev cannot be an intellectual. The whole thing is a sly trick—if someone falls for it.

The journalists were admitted to the meeting in an extremely selective manner, something that does not entirely fit the presidential commitment to free speech.

Judging by the stenographic record of the meeting, published in the only newspaper whose reporters were allowed to attend, the basic theme developed by the president during the meeting was: "I have never tried to foil the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]" and "the Boyana fields [where Zhelev had a news conference in August 1992 which led to the toppling of the SDS cabinet] never happened." In his confession to the intellectuals Zhelev explained how strongly he wanted to keep the helm of state in the hands of the SDS, but the cabinet fell on its own despite his efforts. Of course, I will seek contact with the SDS, and will ask for its support, but not on a basis devoid of any principles, Zhelev said. From his confession one also learns that the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] is not that treacherous parliamentary partner who facilitated the fall of the blue [SDS] cabinet, but rather a constructive force in which the president believes.

It is clear that the presidential guests were not merely intellectuals, but a bridge by which Zhelev will try to cross the gap between No. 2 Dondukov Street [the Presidency] and No. 134 Rakovski Street [the SDS headquarters]. He again seeks the SDS' love and affection, and asks it to forgive and nominate him candidate president, or at least support his candidacy. Obviously, Zhelev is expecting a favor or two also from the DPS. It is also absolutely clear that not every intellectual is prepared to offer his back so that politicians could advance on it. Let us recall that recently a similar group of intellectuals visited No. 134 Rakovski Street in order to sound out the situation there.

In recent years there often were initiatives of intellectuals in support of various politicians. In January 1922 there was the "Zhelev or Civil War" initiative. Recently 101 intellectuals invited Simeon to return to Bulgaria. Some people were quick to call them the 101 Dalmatians.

Such political operations in which not only noted personalities of the artistic world, but any sort of people are afforded the attribute of being an "intellectual" do not always appear dignified.

Seven years ago the dissident of yore, Zhelyu Zhelev, published in the newspaper of yore, NARODNA KULTURA, an article entitled "Great Time of Intelligence." The current flirtation of the current President Zhelyu Zhelev with a selected part of the Bulgarian intellectuals is a sad sign that the "great time" has passed without even arriving first.

**Bulgaria: Vuchev Discusses Defense Industry 'Revival'**

*AU1601215196 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 12 Jan 96 p 6*

[Interview with Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev by Toni Tonchev; place and date not given: "We Are Reestablishing the Manufacture of Special Products With Russia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Tonchev] Mr. Vuchev, could you explain what phase our relations are in with

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the states of the former eastern bloc regarding special products?

[Vuchev] People in Russia have long been pressing us to form a trading organization similar to their Rosvooruzheniye concern. On the basis of the former Main Engineering Administration, we formed Armimex, which existed as an inefficient organization dealing in reexport. At the end of last year, we replaced the management of Armimex and converted it into a joint stock company, with the participation of Bulgarian defense manufacturers. The mixed Bulgarian-Russian commission decided that Armimex should be registered as an organization that establishes contacts in the military field with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the CIS countries. I believe that we will be successful.

[Tonchev] Are any other companies licensed to trade in arms?

[Vuchev] Metalkhim holds a number of licensing agreements. Due to lack of investment funds, the products themselves are manufactured, but not in the manner required. At the moment, we are seeking finance so as to be able to manufacture them completely, because the products are extremely effective. As an example, I can mention the Igla ["Needle"] ground-to-air missile system.

[Tonchev] What relations do we have with other states, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia?

[Vuchev] Since Slovakia is a major manufacturer of the T-72 tank, we have arranged that if they commence production, we will bring in our own military plants to supply equipment to fit out the tank. We are also holding active talks on building naval vessels. Part of the construction work is to be carried out in the Varna shipyards, but the vessels will be fitted out in the yard that is run by the Defense Ministry—the Navy Arsenal. The reactivation of former links within the framework of the former Warsaw Pact is likely to bring about the revival of certain Bulgarian plants.

[Tonchev] We are we selling our military products at the moment?

[Vuchev] At the moment, some companies in the military complex are working with the Arab market. They are selling their end products.

[Tonchev] Do we have no other markets?

[Vuchev] We have also resumed active talks with India, but the competition there is fierce; if we do not get into the market, others will.

[Tonchev] What will be the fate of the companies in the military-industrial complex?

[Vuchev] At the moment, they are being converted into joint stock companies. If we are delaying this process, it is only because we want to get the mass privatization over first. We waited until the list of companies to be privatized was amended so that we can expand Metalkhim Holdings by adding a number of companies that used to form part of it. Despite the serious situation, our sales of military products rose by about 40 percent as compared to 1994. We are stepping up our activities and have quite a number of new products in military electronics. Moreover, many of them have been developed using our own resources, which prompts us to seek active talks with the Defense Ministry. In any case, however, the situation in the military-industrial complex cannot be resolved within a day or two, because the problems are grave.

[Tonchev] How high are the firms' debts?

[Vuchev] They are in a serious position, but it would be wrong for me to give figures that are not up-to-date. Indebtedness is the most serious problem, not only in the defense industry, but in other industrial sectors as well. We are unable to stop the debts rising, because the interest on them accumulates. However often it is said that the interest rate is low, it is actually 40 percent. No firm, and that includes the defense industry, can operate efficiently enough to pay the interest and end up with a profit. [passage omitted]

[Tonchev] What is your ministry's attitude toward assisting private business?

[Vuchev] We are trying. For example, our Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Fund exists solely for private manufacturing units. The fund holds 48 million leva—not a large amount, but we can offer support to private manufacturers. We have had meetings with the Bulgarian Economic Chamber, the Alliance for Citizens' Economic Initiative, and the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. They have representatives on the fund's Governing Council who are well acquainted with the private manufacturers and have more information than us. However, we still do not know who the private manufacturers are. We have a system for submitting applications for grants; they can show up, defend their projects, and receive preferential loans. In some cases, we even track them down. From studying companies' annual balance sheets, I hope to find them and call them in to establish an understanding with them. However, one thing must be made clear: We will grant preferential loans only to manufacturing firms. There are thousands of private companies to which we will not grant money because our funds are earmarked for production.

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[Tonchev] Yet you yourself said that you have very good working relations with private trading organizations, did you not?

[Vuchev] Yes, this is true. We use their services for exporting our major products to international markets. Exports of chemicals are made through these firms, we also import petroleum through them, and export steel. We are even accused of having links with certain groups. We are striving to establish hard and fast rules in the plants—tendering arrangements, and optimum conditions for sales and purchases. I believe that now we are succeeding in this. Even the old state foreign trade organizations with famous names, like Khimimport, have in practice been privatized. Rudmetal is in the process of being privatized, and we work with them as well. Strictly speaking, only the only firms licensed to sell weapons are former state foreign trade organizations. There are four or five of them.

[Vuchev] Do you have any conditions regarding private trading groups?

[Tonchev] None at all, except for one—we will not agree to process other people's materials and products. For example, we have banned the processing of other's products in our petroleum refineries. We are trying to shake off the burden of working on foreign firms' materials in the light industry sector. We guarantee loans through the Industry Fund and make wholesale purchases of cotton, hides, and wool, so that the people who do the work can obtain their materials and be freed from this burden—when the merchant stands at the entrance, gives the worker the cotton, collects the finished product, and keeps him on a starvation wage of 3,500 leva a month. Last year, we were not able to overcome this problem, but we will solve it this year. [passage omitted]

[Tonchev] Why are new structures being formed in industry, such as holding companies, consortia, and so on?

[Vuchev] At the moment, we have a total of eight consortia in Bulgaria. We in the ministry want to formulate a general policy for each particular subsector, without returning to the old postulates of rigid structures that we followed in the past. The consortia are wholly voluntary associations of enterprises that either produce the same type of products or are in one and the same branch. These structures are producing results. No matter what kind of team operates the ministry, it cannot control thousands of companies. For this reason, the consortia formulate their own decisions. If they do not succeed, then I make the decision. [passage omitted]

**Bulgaria: Videnov Adviser Comments on Topenergy**

*AU2201145396 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 17 Jan 96 p 6*

[Interview with Krasimir Nikolov, member of Supervisory Board of Topenergy and chief of the Prime Minister's Office, by Veselka Marinova; place and date not given: "Topenergy's Competitors Have Little Chance of Success"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marinova] Mr. Nikolov, was there really a dispute concerning Topenergy and what was it about?

[Nikolov] The row developed on 17 May, on the eve of Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit to Bulgaria, when Prime Minister Videnov was informed about the shareholdings on the Bulgarian side in the future Topenergy gas company. At that time, Bulgargaz held a one-third share, while the remaining two-thirds belonged to Multigroup. An attempt was made to present the Bulgarian and Russian Governments with a fait accompli, when an international treaty was in existence that stated that this company would be formed by state companies.

The present government regarded this as an encroachment upon its own sovereignty. Especially during the present difficult economic period, it could not accept that firms like Multigroup should protect our national interests.

[Marinova] Is the situation any different now?

[Nikolov] In May, the glass manufacturers, chemical firms, construction companies, and metallurgy plants were not paying for their supplies of natural gas. It was natural for the Bulgarian side to want to exercise its responsibilities over important sectors of the economy. Now things are somewhat different, because the economic revival in 1995 is a real fact. The glass and chemical industries are now starting to pay for their supplies, although problems still remain in the metallurgy sector and especially in the district heating industry. It is true that, as regards the utilization of natural gas, the companies must operate in a normal economic environment.

[Marinova] Do you mean that they should pay their bills?

[Nikolov] Naturally. For example, the director of Kremikovtsi has been talking about great successes, but he did not say that he had not paid a cent for natural gas supplies. This is both ridiculous and sad, because it is the logic of the absurd.

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[Marinova] Is everything in order now at Topenergy?

[Nikolov] The understanding that we reached with Gazprom in 1995 concerning the policy and strategy in this field was a substantial success. We have specific programs for joint work and an understanding that a long-term program is needed for natural gas supplies to Bulgaria. We achieved this because, however much it is said that Gazprom is a private joint stock company, Vyakhirev is nonetheless a member of the Russian Government.

[Marinova] Why is Bulgaria of interest to the Russian partner?

[Nikolov] Our country, with its particular importance for west Europe, is an attractive partner for Gazprom. We are also interested in the opportunities for Bulgargaz to win construction contracts on Russian and Bulgarian territory. At present, we can transport a maximum of 11 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually through Bulgaria. The programs for the transit of natural gas through Bulgaria are much more ambitious: 29 billion cubic meters per year, which means building a further 600 km of gas pipelines.

[Marinova] How will our existing 600 km of pipelines, which date from 1972, be divided up within Topenergy?

[Nikolov] The Bulgarian state owns the entire gas supply network in Bulgaria and no one can do anything without Bulgargaz, which manages the system. If the government decides one day to sell a concession for a gas pipeline or part of one, that is another matter. This might happen some time, but a concession has to be paid for. The state will not renounce its ownership rights. If anyone is hoping at some time under some other government to get as a present something that the state has built, this will not happen under the present government. If any of the new shareholders and partners in Topenergy think that they can adopt an unethical attitude and be a poor partner vis-a-vis the company's founders, Gazprom and Topenergy, I can tell them that this will not be allowed. Topenergy's founders have enough rights and a good understanding of how to protect their company.

[Marinova] Why did the last general meeting approve changes in the Supervisory Board?

[Nikolov] The changes were a sign of goodwill and ethics on the part of the founders, following the entry of new shareholders into the company. The companies that hold the largest shares were given the right to have their own representatives on the Supervisory Board. No other considerations played any part.

[Marinova] People say that Sasho Donchev will be leaving the Topenergy Board of Directors.

[Nikolov] The Supervisory Board has decided that this question is be decided in 10 days, so it would not be proper for me to comment now.

[Marinova] How do you regard your competitor Gazenergo?

[Nikolov] In principle, the appearance of competitors should be welcomed. However, I am skeptical about their future activity, because without Bulgargaz they have no chance of success and Bulgargaz is in Topenergy.

[Marinova] When will Topenergy have its business program ready?

[Nikolov] I hope by the end of the month. What is particularly important is that all the conditions under which Topenergy will function should be made absolutely clear. We are working on six or seven very important questions, such as tax allowances, changes in investment conditions, and so on, but until the budget is passed it is too early to tell you anything more specific.

[Marinova] What is your impression of the private investors in the joint company?

[Nikolov] As of yesterday, they are legitimate.

[Marinova] Are you sure that they will always work in conformance with the state's interests?

[Nikolov] Look, Bulgargaz's capabilities are so much greater than those of the other Bulgarian participants. The founders will also evaluate every project in which Topenergy may show an interest. In this respect I am an optimist, because I see no reason for any conflict of interests between Bulgargaz and Gazprom, which have been working together for 20 years.

**Bulgaria: Subsidies of Nuclear Safety Work Urged**

*AU2201152396 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 17 Jan 96 p 9*

[Article by Docent Todor Dimchev, nuclear industry consultant: "The Government Is Refusing To Subsidize Safety Improvements at Kozloduy Nuclear Power Station Out of the Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Parliamentary Commission on the Energy Industry and Energy Resources has proposed that the 1996 State Budget Law should include a separate paragraph providing a subsidy of 4.35 billion leva [Lv] to improve the safety of the nuclear reactor units at Kozloduy Nuclear Power Station. According to

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the committee, the money is also "undoubtedly needed" for the so-called major reconstruction of the four old WWER-440/230 units [water-cooled, water-moderated power reactors], which is due to be carried out in 1991 and 1997 and whose total cost will be at least Lv8-9 billion. Russian specialists have also confirmed that the reconstruction is essential to ensure nuclear and radiation safety: "Unless subsidies are provided from the budget, the old No. 1 and 2 units are unlikely to remain in service in 1996."

However, the draft 1996 budget bill submitted to parliament does not include the "undoubtedly necessary funds" for safety improvements, mainly of the older reactors Nos. 1-4, nor does the expenditure side include the requested Lv4.35 billion. It is clear that the National Electricity Company [NEC] cannot provide this money even if electricity prices are increased as planned in 1996. The NEC owes over Lv700 million in taxes to the state and its financial deficit in 1995 alone was Lv1.481 billion. It is financing the "small reconstruction" of the Nos. 1-4 reactors, which is being completed with help from funds provided by G-7.

The 24 million ECUs expected from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] has not been handed over, because the Bulgarian share has not been deposited. In addition, the EBRD will invest only in reactors Nos. 3 and 4, in equipment for simulators and supplies of equipment and materials for installation work. According to some authorities, some $280-300 million will be needed solely for safety improvements and to update the WWER-1000 Nos. 5 and 6 reactors at Kozloduy, so the subsidy (amounting to about $40 million) for safety improvements that the government has vetoed is, to put it mildly, the minimum amount possible.

In my view, the other sensible alternative is gradually to withdraw Nos. 1 and 2 reactors from service and to attract investment to build gas-fired power stations and implement energy efficiency programs, because it should not be forgotten that Bulgaria is a signatory to the Vienna Nuclear Safety Convention. On 13 July 1995 the Bulgarian Government asked the National Assembly to ratify this convention. The cabinet has not withdrawn this proposal and the convention is expected to be ratified in 1996. The Vienna convention declares that the state is responsible for nuclear safety and obliges it to establish the basic principles for nuclear safety. If this cannot be achieved, plans have to be set in motion to shut down the nuclear equipment as soon as is practicable.

Bulgaria has also signed the European Energy Charter, the protocol on energy efficiency and has assumed the obligations relating to ecology and stable development that stem from it. The fulfillment of all these obligations also depends on maintaining an acceptable level of risk of radiation emissions from nuclear power stations in service. In normal operating conditions, the discharge of radionuclides as a rule should not exceed the permissible limits. However, in the event of an uncontrollable accident (the probability of which is between 0.001 and 0.01 for each of the old reactors, according to some assessments), the discharges and the consequences for the biosphere are unpredictable.

Accordingly both the government and parliament guaranteeing the safety of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Station is not merely a problem of diplomatic ethics and moral duty within the context of the signed international agreements. The subsidizing of the safe operation of the nuclear power station out of the budget is an absolute necessity.

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**Czech: Republic Applies for EU Membership**

*AU2201210596 Paris AFP in English 2015 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome, Jan 22 (AFP)—Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus on Monday handed his country's bid for membership of the European Union to Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli.

"I stress that the presentation of our request for membership now is not a symbolic act. We are presenting it because we now feel ready for membership," he said after talks with her.

The bid was handed over here because Italy currently holds the rotating EU presidency.

Asked about his past criticisms of the European Union, Klaus said that "no institution in the world is perfect, and it would be a miracle if one of them, the European Union, was (perfect)."

Agnelli said a friendship treaty and accord on protecting investments had been signed by Italy and the Czech Republic and that there were "virtually no problems" between them.

Klaus is due to meet Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, Pope John Paul II and Prime Minister Lamberto Dini on Tuesday before returning in the evening to Prague.

**Czech: Prime Minister Klaus Interviewed in Rome**

*LD2301113596 Rome RAI Radio Uno Network in Italian 0900 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus is in Italy to submit his country's application for membership in the European Union. Klaus is from the only eastern [European] country in which the postcommunists have not returned to power. Carlo Napoli interviewed him:

[Begin recording] [Napoli] The Czech Republic is an island of market freedom, free competition, and Thatcherite philosophy, but why has the old communist party, the strongest party in the east, not won in Prague?

[Klaus in English fading to Italian translation] I would say that, first, you are right, that it is true. I recently discovered that I am the only noncommunist prime minister in all of eastern Europe and the only one who has not been a member of the party. I think the main reason is not the weakness of our left but the strength of the center and center-right parties. If you look around, you will not find one liberal leader of any stature in eastern Europe. There is a lack of leadership. I also think that we owe our success to the clarity with which we have spoken to the people, the transparency of our program, our farsightedness. We have not believed in flirting or marriage between communism and the free market, and our line has paid dividends. [end recording]

On the great problem of NATO's expansion to the east, Klaus is optimistic, but not in the short term. As far as we are concerned, he says, we would be the first to join NATO because we do not share a border with Russia, but for now we are interested in belonging to Europe, and it is for this reason that we have submitted our application to [Italian Foreign Minister Susanna] Agnelli.

**Czech: Contribution to Bosnia Mission**

*96CH0020A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 12 Dec 95 p 1*

[Article by Robert D. Gray: "Up to 1,000 Czech Soldiers To Join NATO's Bosnia Mission"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech government has decided to put its might and its money where its mouth is, by offering to deploy up to 1,000 troops for one year, with the possibility of an extended stay, as part of a 60,000-strong, NATO-led peace-monitoring force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The gesture is seen as a big step toward full NATO membership and an opportunity for the country to carve out its identity in the new Europe, even as Russia warily watches its former ally submitting soldiers to NATO command.

The government, following President and Commander in Chief Vaclav Havel's lead, publicly announced its commitment to the expedition force following its November 29 meeting. The measure is supported by the four coalition parties, which have a majority in parliament, as well as by the opposition Social Democrats, and is expected to receive parliamentary approval by December 15.

Parliament will also consider the government's proposal to lift economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This action follows the UN Security Council's November 22 decision to end sanctions after the Bosnian peace accord was signed.

Lt. Col. Petr Fuzak, an official with the Czech Defense Ministry, said a plan has been drafted for deploying the troops—the first Czechs to serve on a combat mission since World War II—as soon as parliament gives its approval.

The Army will contribute a mechanized battalion to the Bosnian mission. According to Fuzak, additionally, members of the republic's Fourth Rapid Reaction Brigade will be dispatched. Officers and professional

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soldiers will constitute 25 percent of the force, while the other 75 percent are to be conscripts.

The Czech government has not only committed soldiers to this mission. It will also fund the 1.25 million Kc ($48 million) endeavor over a three-year period through 1998. Jiri Pehe, director of research and analysis at the Open Media Research Institute, calls the Czech pledge a "political investment."

"The symbolism is clear," Pehe explained. "The Czechs are not doing this for the sake of Bosnia itself, but clearly because they feel that it's very necessary to participate in this kind of mission, which is led by NATO.

"It goes beyond the Partnership for Peace initiative, it's one step further that will serve as a springboard for possible full NATO membership."

While Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' stated long-term objective is membership in both NATO and the European Union, not everyone shares this sentiment. Jaroslav Ortman, chairman of the opposition Left Bloc, said his party opposes the costly initiative and the idea of subordinating Czech military operations to NATO command.

A recent poll conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research found that only 39 percent of Czechs favor NATO membership, while 33 percent oppose it.

It remains to be seen how Moscow hardliners, who still view the Western alliance as a security threat aligned against Russia, will react, since Russian troops are also involved in the Bosnian plan.

"Russia cannot really object to (Czech participation)," said Pehe. "They may be a little bit hostile about it, but on the other hand, it's an international force...so they'll just have to accept it."

Vladimir Suman, chairman of parliament's security and defense committee, asserted that "there has been no contact (with Moscow), and there won't be any. I don't expect them to object, and I don't care (if they do.)"

The Klaus government hopes its demonstration of commitment will reinforce its bid to enter NATO and the EU through action rather than dialogue. Pehe said, "It's clear that you score and win a lot of points (by participating), because you are seen as part of the club. For a country this size—10 million people—to send 1,000 soldiers is quite a lot...it's certainly a very important statement."

**Czech: Klaus on Developments in Czech-German Talks**

*AU2201170996 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 19 Jan 96 p 3*

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Ladislav Jakl; place and date not given: "No New Complications"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The talks on a joint interparliamentary declaration between the Czech and German foreign ministers have reached an impasse. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus does not see any drama in Czech-German relations.

[Jakl] Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec is complaining about the gradually increasing demands from the German side. Nonetheless, the German claims are legitimate, Germany has its democratic representation that defends its legitimate interests. Is it that Minister Josef Zieleniec believes the German side is violating some formal requirements in the talks?

[Klaus] I would not put it like that at all. It certainly is not the formal side of the issue but exclusively a matter of content. I am somewhat taken aback when I read the headlines in all our media and see the following phrases: Accuses, increasing demands, new demands, etc.

[Jakl] Do you consider them inappropriately strong words?

[Klaus] Yes. These are strong words that could cause complications in Czech-German relations if the other side were to respond with equally strong words. For myself, having held numerous talks with the German side on this topic over the past few years, I can say that I do not see any new complications. We are holding an ongoing discussion on whether to have a word more or a word less. None of it includes any new formulations; there are no sentences we have not heard before. Nevertheless, a dialogue has been conducted continually in this fastidious process of balancing statements, for which the foreign minister of this or the other party will be praised either at home or abroad. I perceive all this as only one of the substages of the entire, for myself more-or-less perennial Czech-German problem.

[Jakl] An observer of practical life and normal Czech-German contacts would not perceive any fundamental problems. Is it not that before the elections your government feels the need to address some strong words to our—after all, a little anti-German feeling—public?

[Klaus] I would not use the term your government. You know very well that I myself neither address such words to anyone, nor do I use them. I am trying not to create any drama in Czech-German relations and rather

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describe it as one of dozens of steps on the long road to perfecting good-neighborly Czech-German relations.

**Czech: Klaus on Czech-German Relations, Other Issues**

*AU2201183096 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 19 Jan 96 p 3*

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Vaclav Musilek; place and date not given: "Talks With Germany Will Always Be Complicated"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Musilek] The talks on the Czech-German declaration apparently are getting a bit complicated. Minister Zieleniec sees the reason for this in the German side reopening the questions of the past. Do you consider these complications aggravating?

[Klaus] I would disagree with your thesis that the talks are getting complicated. These talks have been complicated from the very beginning, and, as I see them and take part in them, I would say that not a millimeter of complications has been added to those existing at the beginning. If a change has occurred, it is to the contrary. The complications existing at the beginning could not be eliminated so far, although one formulation has always been found among the 20, 10, or five disputed sentences, which seemed acceptable to both parties, and it looked as if another little step forward was made. No new complications have appeared, however, and because I know that the existing ones are almost specific, I am not at all worried about it.

[Musilek] Will you touch upon these questions also during the Bertelsmann Forum, or is it going to be about something completely different?

[Klaus] This forum discusses the expansion of Europe, and, therefore, the key speakers are European Union President Jacques Santer, new NATO Secretary General Solana, and several other politicians, including myself. The topic of bilateral relations with Germany certainly is not on the agenda there. This does not mean that if I sit next to German President Herzog or Foreign Minister Kinkel during breakfast, lunch, or supper, we would not mention these things, but it is not on the agenda of this meeting.

[Musilek] The dispute continues concerning the powers of the Supreme Control Office regarding the control in the Investicni a Postovni Banka. Do you believe it worthwhile to return to the legal definition of the powers of the Supreme Control Office and make it explicit?

[Klaus] It certainly would be worthwhile, but it is absolutely evident that this cannot be done within this election period. Therefore it is no burning issue for me.

[Musilek] Since we mentioned the Investicni a Postovni Banka, it founded a joint venture with a Russian financial institution. Do you believe Russia, in the current state of affairs, to be a relatively safe territory for business operations of this type?

[Klaus] I would not deliberate about the categories of Russia—yes or no. We must speak about that particular Russian partner with whom the Investicni a Postovni Banka agreed on something. I believe that the link between Russia in its entirety and this specific instance is relatively insignificant; and there are dozens of joint ventures between our entities and Russian ones, and we do not see anything wrong with that. [passage omitted]

**Czech: Kwasniewski, Czech-Polish Relations Viewed**

*96CH0020B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 12 Dec 95 p 11*

[Article by Daniel Kumermann: "Czech Press Completes Glossy Makeover of New Polish President"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Is the new Polish president, Aleksander Kwasniewski, really a former member of the highest communist circles? It's impossible to judge by what many so-called right-wing newspapers are saying these days. One can just remember the tantrum these papers raised when the left won elections in Hungary and even when Kwasniewski's own party won parliamentary elections in Poland.

This time, the same writers who not so long ago spoke about "the return of the dinosaurs to the Polish scene" are stroking Kwasniewski's head and speaking of the bright future for Czech-Polish relations under his leadership. Of course, one explanation might be that he has transformed himself so radically that today's Kwasniewski has nothing in common with the man of the same name whose party won the last general elections in Poland. The other and more realistic explanation is that the Czech scene has changed radically in the meantime.

Czech-Polish relations have always been ambiguous. As a fellow Western Slavonic language, Polish is the closest language to Czech except for Slovak. Given a little practice and basic education, a Czech and a Pole can comprehend each other's speech, and yet the two nations have very rarely tried to understand each other.

In the past, educated Czechs almost invariably spoke German, while educated Poles spoke French. The Polish nobility survived almost until the present day, but few of the Czech noble families made it beyond the 17th century. These two circumstances are the basis for two common generalizations: Czechs have tended

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to view Poles as lofty, good-for-nothing gallants and saber rattlers, while Poles would speak of Czechs as uncultured barbarians. At the same time, the Czech lands were traditionally the most industrialized part of Central Europe, earning Czechs a reputation (in previous days, at least) for diligence, but also causing them to be looked down upon for selling out to comfort. One could easily come up with further reasons for misunderstanding—Polish Catholicism versus Czech "free thinking," for example.

However gross these generalizations may be, they did influence each nation's view of the other. And however stupid the communist regiments might have been, they never failed to make use of the basest human feelings to their best advantage. Many people here must still remember the communist propaganda of the late '70s and early '80s describing Poles as bums who went on strike not because they were against the communist system, but because they were too lazy to work, forcing poor Czechs and Slovaks to work that much harder to support the world's socialist system. Polish friends have told me that Polish propaganda of those days suggested that Czechs were mere clay in Soviet hands.

After the fall of communism, a short period of courtship ended when the ruling ex-dissidents on both sides were voted out of office. The new Czechoslovak—and later Czech—government concluded that its country was the best in the region and that too close a relationship with its neighbors would only hold it back from joining European and transatlantic structures. Traditional myths about Poles suited its purpose, and a new one now offered itself: On top of everything else, Poles were voting for the left, if not for an outright return to communism. For what else could be expected from political parties that stemmed directly from the old communist nomenclature?

Western politicians and diplomats kept suggesting that, while every applicant from Eastern Europe would be considered on its own merit, better regional cooperation would enhance the chances for everyone. For several years, these suggestions just ricocheted off the firm wall of the Czech government's self-assurance. It was only NATO's unequivocal interest in Poland, with its size and human resources, that finally forced the Czechs to reconsider their attitude. Suddenly, top Czech officials began adding Poland to their travel plans. (Who knows—maybe Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec even dusted off his old Polish passport.) In a miraculous transformation, Kwasniewski changed from leftist devil into a serious young man and acceptable partner—hinting that the Czech leadership can, however belatedly, wise up to the current reality.

With a bit of luck, Czechs can learn another lesson from their newfound friend. Many experts claim that Kwasniewski defeated his opponent in part by displaying decency and modesty. That's just the opposite of what we saw in Prague recently, when Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus attacked the Social Democratic Party for wanting to return this country to pre-November '89 (that is, communist) days. The head of the Social Democrats, Milos Zeman, countered by saying (quite truthfully, if not very fairly) that Klaus cooperated with the communist regime until the very last day. To that, Klaus added that it was Zeman who was once a member of the Communist Party (forgetting that he himself once applied, but was not accepted). There, fortunately, this round of the pre-election mutual slander campaign ended.

If the willingness to accept Kwasniewski as partner proved that political reality can win in the end, it also showed how long it takes. I'm afraid the move from Kwasniewski the friend to Kwasniewski the teacher or model will take too long to influence next summer's elections here. We should therefore brace ourselves for much more activity from the political gutter.

**Czech: Ingolstadt Pipeline Begins Transporting Oil**

*96CH0021A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 19 Dec 95 pp 1, 3*

[Article by Siegfried Mortkowitz: "Pipeline Ends Oil Dependence on Russia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech Republic reached a milestone in its dramatic shift from East to West by opening the long-awaited oil pipeline from Ingolstadt, Germany, and ending its total dependence on Russian oil.

On December 3, the new IKL (Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvinov) oil pipeline, which runs between the Germany city of Ingolstadt and Kralupy in central Bohemia, began transporting oil to the Czech Republic. The first oil crossed the border December 8.

The purpose of the new pipeline, which is to become fully operational by April 1996, is to lessen Czech dependence on Russia (which until now has supplied all of the Czech Republic's crude oil), safeguard Czech oil supplies from the threat of political instability and, perhaps most important, offer Czech industry the economic advantage of being able to choose its oil supplier according to cost.

"This was not so much a political as a strategic decision," affirmed Frantisek Kubelka, head of the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade's department of industry.

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According to Kubelka, the new pipeline is to supply 2 million tons of the 7 million tons of crude oil needed by the Czech Republic in 1996. "After that, we will buy our oil according to where we can purchase it more cheaply," he said.

The decision to go ahead with the project was made in February 1992. The budget for construction of the 345-kilometer (214-mile) stretch of pipeline was 14 billion Kc ($540 million). One-tenth of that amount was provided by Czech companies Kaucuk Kralupy and Chemopetrol Litvinov. The National Property Fund (FNM) contributed another 7.8 billion Kc, while less than 1 billion Kc came from the state budget via the Administration of State Material Reserves. The rest of the money was raised through bank loans as part of the plan approved by the Czech government in early 1993.

The pipeline, which is connected at the Ingolstadt refinery to the TAL pipeline leading from Trieste, Italy, will be able to carry 10 million tons of oil annually when functioning at full capacity. MERO CR, a Czech company, owns and operates the IKL pipeline.

In April 1994, a Czech-Bavarian treaty was signed on guarantees for damages caused by the pipeline to private property in the Bavarian region of Germany. The Czech government has allocated 80 million Kc for that purpose.

Krysti Brice, investment officer at the International Finance Corporation, which is affiliated with the World Bank, views the new pipeline as an essential hedge against any abuse of power on the part of Russia. "With all the oil coming from Russia, that country has had enormous power over the Czech Republic," she explained. "This power was never abused, but it could have been. This potential has now been eliminated."

Furthermore, political instability in Russia and the Ukraine, through whose territory the Russian pipeline passes, has in the past interrupted the Czech supply of crude oil. In January 1995, the flow of oil was cut off by Ukraine on two occasions due to arguments between that country and Russia over transfer tariffs.

The economic benefits may be the most significant. "Of course, in one way this signifies a political turning away from the East," Kubelka said. "But, more important, we want to diversify economically. We want to be able to choose our suppliers."

This point is seconded by Miroslav Lizal, a researcher at the Prague-based Center for Economic Research. While conceding that the new pipeline serves as insurance against problems stemming from political instability in Russia, he went on to say that "the significance of this event lies in the future. Though Russian oil has always been quite cheap, in the long term it will probably stabilize near the level of Western prices."

Jan Martinek, press spokesman for Chemopetrol, does not see the new pipeline as a primary source of oil for the Czech Republic. "It is important to have this alternative, however, so that Russia cannot dictate prices," he said. "For example, because Poland was able to import oil via the North Sea, this allowed them to bargain with Russia and purchase oil for $0.60 a ton less than the Czech Republic paid."

Both Martinek and Kubelka insist that under no foreseeable circumstances will the Czech Republic stop purchasing oil from Russia.

Nonetheless, the new pipeline is a significant development, according to Egon T. Lansky, former Czechoslovak ambassador to the Council of Europe.

"Making a country less dependent on one line of supply is always important and positive," Lansky said. "This is a question of strategic importance, and strategy always means taking into account both political and economic factors."

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**Slovakia: Meciar, Ukraine's Marchuk Discuss Cooperation**

*AU2201145496 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 19 Jan 96 p 4*

[Unattributed report from Poprad: "Let Us Match Our Clocks?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Ukrainian and Slovak prime ministers, Yevhen Marchuk and Vladimir Meciar, are starting a two-day working meeting in the Slovak town of Poprad. In Poprad, it is planned to discuss the situation with the implementation of accords, signed during V. Meciar's official visit to Ukraine last June. It is also planned to sign an intergovernmental convention on avoidance of double taxation, a declaration on the principles and trends of cooperation between Ukraine and Slovakia in the sphere of external economic activi , and a number of departmental accords.

**Slovakia: Meciar, Ukraine's Marchuk Comment on Talks**

*LD2201202696 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A two-day working meeting of governments of the Slovak Republic and Ukraine started at Strbske Pleso today. Apart from the prime ministers of the two countries, Vladimir Meciar and Yevheniy Marchuk, eight Slovak ministers and seven Ukrainian ministers have come to the meeting, as well as representatives of financial, industrial, and trade spheres. Pavol Sveton reports on the talks:

[Passage omitted] [Sveton] At the end of the talks, the two prime ministers met journalists and assessed the results as follows:

[Begin Meciar recording] During the visit in Kiev we could build the basic program of Slovak-Ukrainian cooperation. To fulfill the conclusions from these talks, Prime Minister Marchuk told us today that he would personally supervise the fulfillment on the Ukrainian side, and I made a similar pledge on the Slovak side. [words indistinct]

We are noting with satisfaction that the situation in trade turnover is improving. We can see that, thanks to the resolute steps of Prime Minister Marchuk's government, the situation in the economic life of Ukraine is gradually becoming more stable. That is why it can now progress further and we can discuss joint investments, common privatization projects, joint enterprises, and other cooperation. We are discussing questions of payments relations, financial relations, the power industry, transport, cultural cooperation, and cooperation in education; we are reassessing cooperation in engineering; and, above all, we are ready to expand cooperation in the sphere of science and technology.

Ukraine is not only 52 million people, but also a large territory and extensive market. It is good news for us that we can note that we have no controversial political questions, that Slovakia, as a chairing country of CEFTA [Central European Fre Trade Association], is initiating the development of CEFTA. Within these concrete steps, work on the preparation of agreement on the free trade zone will start. [end recording]

[Sveton] Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk stressed the advantages of cooperation between the Slovak Republic and Ukraine. He said, among other things, that he had discussed with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar the system that would enable meetings of neighboring countries and suggested that it would be good if a club of Central European prime ministers was formed, which could help in solving questions going beyond the framework of official meetings. This idea needs to be seriously worked out, but, in his view, it can be a stabilizing factor in Central Europe.

**Slovakia: Meciar Rejects Idea of Praying With Kovac**

*AU2301114896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Jan 96 p 1*

[Report by "PA": "Prime Minister Will Make Arrangements for His Talk With God Without Michal Kovac"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After President Michal Kovac's meeting with church representatives the day before yesterday, the idea was floated that the president and the prime minister could meet at regular joint prayers in various Slovak cities. As was stated in yesterday's Radio Twist Journal, President Michal Kovac agreed to this proposal. Yesterday Radio Twist also asked for the opinion of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, who said:

"I have not received any such proposal and do not know about it. It is inappropriate to hold talks about me when I am not present. I do not think that only Michal Kovac and I should go and pray. I see no reason for that. I believe we all should pray and do so together. And, then, I have something of a grievance. When in December 1994 the government went to church to pray before assuming office, how many offensive remarks and how much screaming there was, and no expression of support from the church. I think that religiousness is a relationship between God and man that should not be the subject of any commanded presentation. No one should exhibit his kneeling in front of the altar for admiration and to gain political or other capital out of it. This is exactly why I think that what is being proposed

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is not good and why I consider it unnecessary that the president and the prime minister be counterposed [davat do kontrapunktu], that only they should pray. I will make arrangements for my talk with God even without Michal Kovac."

**Slovakia: Kovac, Schenk Meet To Coordinate Visits**

*AU2201170796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 19 Jan 96 p 1*

[Article by "bap": "President Kovac and Minister Schenk Have 90-Minute Meeting Alone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—President Michal Kovac yesterday met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Juraj Schenk. They met alone for 90 minutes, 30 minutes longer than planned. The meeting, as the chief of Slovak diplomacy told reporters at his New Year's news conference last week, was to coordinate foreign trips by the highest state officials of the Slovak Republic this year. Asked by NARODNA OBRODA immediately after yesterday's meeting whether he was satisfied with it, Juraj Schenk said: "I do not know with what I am supposed to be satisfied." NARODNA OBRODA: "With your meeting with the president." Juraj Schenk: "I attended the presentation of credentials (by the Thai ambassador—editor's note) and thereafter I had a normal working conversation with the president." NARODNA OBRODA: "Have you agreed on anything?" Juraj Schenk: "We had a normal working conversation; that is all." The Office of the President of the Slovak Republic also refused to provide any details on yesterday's meeting on the grounds that it was a working meeting between just the two of them.

The frozen relations between Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and the entire Government of the Slovak Republic are negatively reflected not only in the domestic political situation, but also in Slovakia's position abroad. With the exception of the pastoral visit by Pope John Paul II, our Republic was not a destination for any top foreign representative last year. As a result of the absence of normal relations between the president and the executive, Michal Kovac did not pay a single official state visit abroad, either, during the whole of last year.

**Slovakia: Kovac Jr's Extradition Request Denied**

*AU2301115396 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 19 Jan 96 p 2*

[CTK report: "Michal Valo: 'General Prosecutor's Office Will Not Request Michal K. Jr.'s Extradition to Slovakia'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The General Prosecutor's Office of the Slovak Republic will not meet the request of the president's abducted son that it ask Vienna for his extradition. If no reasons exist for taking him into custody, we cannot propose to the court that a warrant for his arrest be issued. And, if there is no warrant, we cannot request his extradition," Michal Valo, prosecutor general of the Slovak Republic, told CTK in an interview, adding that neither the investigator nor the prosecutor overseeing the investigation of the case sees any reason to take Kovac Jr. into custody.

As he went on to say, under the European Extradition Treaty it is possible to request a citizen's extradition only if a Slovak court issues a warrant for his arrest or if it pronounces a legally valid verdict.

None of these conditions applies to the president's son, whom unknown perpetrators abducted to Austria five months ago.

The Slovak chief prosecutor also does not believe that the government or Slovak diplomacy could request Kovac's extradition on the basis of some international legal norm.

He admits, however, that in international law it is possible to proceed according to custom. However, it is up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not up to him to assess this issue.

Michal Kovac Jr. will have to be questioned in the Technopol case. According to Valo, conditions for his testimony are the same in Austria, where he is currently staying, as they are in Germany, which demands his extradition.

Even so, Valo does not believe that a court hearing would be possible without Kovac's presence. "This is a question of the distant future, however, and Austria, too, will have to decide shortly whether to extradite him to Germany," he observed.

The prosecutor general vigorously rejected the view that two investigators of the Kovac Jr. case have been dismissed only because they "started to knock" on the doors of the secret service, which is suspected of having participated in the abduction. "The reason was, rather, that they arrived at conclusions too quickly and unequivocally, albeit they had nothing on which to base them," Valo said.

The prosecution's work has also been complicated somewhat by the decision of President Michal Kovac to grant pardon to secret service agent Oskar Fegyveres, who declared in the media that he had "unknowingly participated in the abduction."

While the Slovak Constitution entitles the president to take this step, since the founding of Czechoslovakia

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in 1918 there probably has not been a single case, according to Valo, of a pardon being granted before the start of criminal prosecution and without the legal qualification [pravna kvalifikacia] and the place and manner of committing the act being stated.

"I am convinced that neither the president nor anyone else knows for what he had granted Oskar F. pardon and what he could have done during that time," Valo said.

**Slovakia: HZDS Meeting Views Current Issues**

*LD2201231196 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The political executive of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] met at its regular session in Bratislava today. The meeting assessed the course of the district meetings and discussed the situation in privatization by state bonds.

In the foreign political sphere, the HZDS political executive stressed the results of [words indistinct] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar at the international conference in Bonn. In the sphere of internal politics, it praised the reassessment of the Slovak National Party's attitude toward the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian state treaty.

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**Hungary: Keleti on Talks With Yugoslav Defense Minister**

*LD2201231296 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 2000 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today a Ministry of Defense delegation, led by Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, held talks in Belgrade at the invitation of Yugoslav Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic.

[Begin Keleti recording] First and foremost, I suggested to the minister that we should try and find military confidence-building opportunities, such as liaison between corps or advance notification about military exercises near the border, and similar things which could bring about improvement in the relations between the two countries.

Secondly, we have to examine in what fields we can work together, taking into consideration the international sanctions against the Yugoslav successor states, concerning, for example arms shipment, which are still in effect. It is expected, though, that they will be lifted. I think while observing these sanctions certain preparations for cooperation may begin. [passage omitted] [end recording]

**Hungary: Keleti Awaits Adoption of FRY Amnesty Law**

*LD2201222296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Szilveszter Varga reports on Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti's talks in Belgrade.

[Varga] [Passage omitted] After his talks with Yugoslav Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, Keleti said that he will sign a Yugoslav-Hungarian statement of intention of military confidence-building together with his Yugoslav counterpart in Budapest at the end of February or at the beginning of March. [passage omitted]

The Yugoslav defense minister informed Keleti that the Supreme Defense Council has initiated the adoption of an amnesty law in Yugoslavia.

[Begin Keleti recording] I consider this extremely important since it is well-known that there was a large number of young [ethnic] Hungarian people in Vojvodina who did not want to become involved in the armed conflict between the nationalities and ignored the draft call and came across to Hungary. Their fate was uncertain in the past few years because they could be punished under the law. If the Yugoslav federal parliament adopts the amnesty law, then this hindrance that made their return impossible will cease to exist. [passage omitted]

**Hungary: Romanian Proposals for Reconciliation Assessed**

*AU2301115196 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Jan 96 p 3*

[Article by Laszlo M. Lengyel: "European Integration: Together or Not at All?—It Is Difficult To Evaluate the Chances of Historic Reconciliation With Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the viewpoint of professional politics and science, it is obvious that [Romanian] President Iliescu's rapprochement documents emerged out of necessity, because Romania has come under pressure to act, both on the issue of European integration and the national minority issue, as well as on contacts with its neighbors. Following the failure to sign the basic treaty, Romania had to face the possibility of becoming isolated.

The creation of this pressure to act is a result of the Hungarian foreign policy, a diplomatic success, albeit, one that is extremely difficult to make use of, because it does not predict anything good precisely for the ethnic Hungarian minority living in Romania. However, this does not mean that we should not take seriously and turn into a tangible result the three Romanian documents that emerged out of necessity, documents announced in August and officially handed over in September last year.

The first among the aforementioned three documents would be the joint declaration on the framework and advantages of rapprochement. This declares that the two countries mutually support each other's integration efforts, because "naturally they have a place together" in the united Europe. However, nothing forces Hungary to accept this logic of "either together, or not at all." It is much closer to the truth that, in the current situation, Romania does not have any possibility to veto Hungary's integration. On the other hand, in view of the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, it is not in Hungary's interest to assert its position advantages.

The second document, the draft treaty, stipulates foreign policy, economic, and military cooperation, but it includes political norms, rather than legal ones, and wants to make them lasting. This is dangerous, if we take seriously the possibility of working out a future coordinated and even common foreign, economic, foreign trade, and defense policy. This is because there is no proposal for creating a conflict-preventing or conflict-managing mechanism; here too, the principle of "either together or not at all" is used as a basis.

The third document, the minority behavior code, seems to be the most complex one, because it does not settle the situation of national minorities and, at the same time,

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it expects the Hungarian side to give up the possibility of settling this issue in exchange for mutual obligations affecting state and national security. However, in this respect, Hungary has never threatened Romania, and it was Bucharest that stubbornly called the minority issue "a threat to its national unity and territorial integrity." In addition, Hungary must stick to the declaration of the inviolability of borders because, while Budapest has no territorial claims on Romania and—given the ethnic situation in Transylvania and the geographic deployment of Hungarians—Budapest cannot have such claims, Bucharest has such claims on Ukraine and Moldova and, politically, on Russia, and Bucharest displays a preventive attitude toward the Bulgarian demands that can emerge any time. Therefore, Hungary has indeed nothing to do with formulas excluding the "threatening of the other side's national unity and territorial integrity" but separatism, the violation of the unity and integrity of the nation and its state, and the demand to avoid nationalist propaganda do not find a target on the Hungarian side either. [sentence as published]

Following a thorough analysis of Iliescu's documents, it transpires that they serve the creation of correct, and even allied interstate relations, rather than a historic reconciliation. There can be excellent interstate and intergovernmental relations between Hungary and Romania without any kind of historic reconciliation, simply on the basis of the basic treaty (not preferred by the Romanian side) and the protocol stipulating the interstate actions, a protocol that has already been signed. (Of course, these things do not automatically solve the issue of consulates, deadlines, or other relevant issues.)

Historic reconciliation should exceed the frameworks offered by the Romanian side. We are talking here primarily about eliminating the lack of confidence between the two nations, the mutual suspicions, the harmful stereotypes, and the unfounded prejudices. The means to achieve this is to carry out a common and correct scientific analysis of our common history, readiness to accept the scientific facts that have been ignored for political reasons and to propagate them at a state level, to make the borders really traversable, mutually to accept each other's school diplomas, deliberately to develop young people's tourism, to coordinate the activity of each other's labor market, to develop the systems of language instruction, and many similar things.

In its current form, therefore, the Iliescu proposal cannot serve as the basis for reconciliation. However, reconciliation is indeed necessary, so Hungarian diplomacy must supplement and modify it, rather than reject it. This activity has already begun, albeit, rather uncertainly for the time being.

However, the demands and memoranda of the Hungarian opposition published so far must and should affect the reconciliation itself, rather than the questions regarding the basic treaty and the reorganization of interstate relations, or even the government policy toward national minorities. The Hungarian side can make conditions to all this rightfully and with good reason, while signing the initial documents must be a national cause, primarily because of the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, irrespective of the subjective evaluation of these documents by the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania.

### Hungary: Roundtable Views NATO Integration

*AU2301113596 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 19 Jan 96 p 7*

["Excerpts" from roundtable discussion with various Hungarian foreign affairs officials held by the Italian geopolitical journal LIMES in Budapest; date not given: "Foreign Capital Is a Security Guarantee"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the participation of the Security Policy and Defense Research Center, the Italian geopolitical journal LIMES organized a roundtable discussion in Budapest on the determining reasons and chances of Hungary's NATO integration efforts. The following participated in the roundtable: Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, political state secretary at the Hungarian Foreign Ministry; Bela Gyuricza, deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly; Janos Hajdu, member of the EU Integration Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly; Peter Deak, director of the aforementioned Security Policy and Defense Research Center (BHKK); Gyorgy Granasztoi, general director of the Central Europe Institute of the Teleki Foundation; Tamas Csapodi, representative of the pacifist Alba Circle; and Laszlo Tolnay, staff member of the BHKK. The following are excerpts from the roundtable discussion.

[LIMES] Did the previous Antall cabinet or the current Horn cabinet consider an alternative to Western integration membership? Austria, a country that is formally maintaining its neutrality, provides an example.

[Tolnay] As far as I participated in such activity as an adviser to the previous defense minister, I can say that the Antall cabinet automatically followed the Western orientation, and it did not deal much with seeking an alternative. Neutrality as a real possibility has never come up, definitely not at the government level, not in 1991 either. The group of analysts at that time were wrong in presuming a much more rapid pace of integration. In my view, in its various diplomatic statements, the present government is still counting on a shorter waiting period than the one that seems realistic.

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[Szent-Ivanyi] The present government does not mention precise dates of integration; instead, it speaks of a schedule, a process. The Madrid summit confirmed to us that the process of joining the European integration must commence within six months following the end of the EU intergovernmental conference. In my view, in the optimal case, we can join by the year 2000 or 2002. In the case of NATO membership, we are talking primarily of a political will, a political decision. Of course, the results of the Russian and the U.S. presidential elections might influence this but, in my opinion, it is not an unrealistic expectation to see the first phase of NATO enlargement take place by the 50th anniversary of the creation of NATO, namely, by 4 April 1999.

[Gyuricza] As a participant in the first broad security policy forum organized in the Defense Ministry in November 1990, I can say that the main trends of thought in this issue continue to be the same; no serious alternative to joining the European integration organizations emerged either in 1990 or at present. I can only envisage an answer to the political, security, economic, and environmental security challenges of the 21st century in a functioning Western system of institutions. However, I would be cautious in speaking about timetables.

**"Inside" and "Outside" at the Same Time?**

[Hajdu] I think in terms of formal and informal membership and, based on this, I think that it has now become the interest of the NATO community to find a formula for Hungary that is adequate in the sense that it does not harm Hungary's national self-awareness and, at the same time, it provides sufficient guarantees to the West that both the internal and external stability here will reach the adequate security demands, even if this formula is not full EU or NATO membership.

[LIMES] Even if temporarily, functioning NATO bases were set up in Hungary, namely, deployment and logistics background bases for IFOR [Implementation Force] troops, this is a historic turn. However, the question arises whether this development will postpone the timing of Hungary's membership, because NATO received what it needed in the present situation from Budapest even without offering membership.

[Gyuricza] I do not see it as a real problem that, from the NATO point of view, "we are inside" because it can set up a base here and, at the same time, "we have been left outside" because Brussels did not make any membership promises in exchange. For me, this situation is the peace partnership in "real action."

[Deak] This is a special status, when we are "inside" in the sense that the protection umbrella is activated, something that is good for us, but we are still outside NATO. It can emerge from the political side that NATO cannot maintain these bases lastingly in the form of "renting" them, so the situation has to be systematized. In such a situation, a delay in membership might not even be harmful, because this would give time and opportunity not only for Hungary but also for the others to fulfill the admission requirements. However, an exaggerated delay in membership could have negative consequences, like domestic policy and foreign policy insecurity and rivalry among the countries in the region. If the feeling of diminishing chances is becoming stronger in some country, it might hit back and slow down the democratization process, and this could strengthen the efforts to seek an alternative solution.

[LIMES] Several NATO officials say that only countries that do not have tensions with their neighbors can become new NATO members. The Greek-Turkish conflict was enough. According to another NATO viewpoint, the united Germany should not be the organization's eastern border. Thus, Poland and the Czech Republic could be the first candidates to NATO enlargement. However, it would be unjust to leave Hungary out of the first circle, especially in view of its recent IFOR role. Suppose that NATO will take this into consideration. If the IFOR action concludes successfully in a year and the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty becomes valid, and even a Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty emerges, it is possible that five countries will appear on the list of NATO enlargement. However, this could really have a negative psychological effect on the Baltic states and on Bulgaria because, with such a broad first circle, the NATO expansion might end for a long time.

[Hajdu] I would dissuade the Hungarian Government from getting involved in a useless competition over who would be the first NATO member. Given their geopolitical position, Poland and the Czech Republic have greater chances for a formalized NATO membership, because they can be deployment territories against the Russian steppe. From another viewpoint, however, it is a fact that AWACS aircraft have been flying through Hungary's airspace for years, and one does not have to be a military expert in order to understand the importance of this fact. From here, the relevant U.S. officials can see not only Sarajevo, but also the soft belly of the collapsed Soviet Union, including Ukraine. This interest will persist no matter what the future relations between Russia and Ukraine will be. In my view, however, it is even more important that almost $12 billion worth of foreign working capital has flowed into Hungary since the change in the regime here. Especially in the wake of the privatization wave at the end of 1995, Hungary brought the West into an owner situation, so

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much so that we are now approaching a critical point, something unparalleled in Hungary's previous history. Foreign capital played a smaller role in Hungary's economy between the two world wars than today. It derives from the nature of private property that this property is generally defended. This collective Western ownership presence will not end even if, as a result of the Yugoslav situation calming down, there will no longer be a need for Western, especially U.S. military presence, on Hungarian territory, in the current framework of IFOR troops. This again offers Hungary a fortunate position, because it increases in importance as a transit country in the direction of post-Yugoslav eastern areas.

**For the Vojvodina Hungarians**

[Szent-Ivanyi] I do not know of any NATO decision; so far, only the enlargement document has mentioned the settling of tensions with neighboring countries as one of the criteria of joining the organization. We agree with this demand. However, in our interpretation, individual countries should be evaluated according to their own achievements and efforts. It would not be correct to punish a country because its neighbor has tense relations with it, or because some neighbor does not yet fulfill the requirements. Accepting new members in a package would delay EU or even NATO membership for an unforeseeable period of time.

[Granasztoi] The minority issue would not cause problem in accepting Hungary as a NATO member. These issues emerge when the West wants to prove that these countries are not yet ripe for NATO membership. The AWACS issue or the current U.S. and NATO presence on Hungarian territory show that the aforementioned reservations can be forgotten overnight if some strategic interest dictates otherwise. My argument with the heads of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry lies in the fact that, in connection with our peacekeeping role, they failed to deal with the fate of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders, although an opportunity for this should have been found. In principle, the national minority issue was clarified for the Bosnian region in Dayton but, as we know, this has not been done in the case of Vojvodina Hungarians or the Kosovo Albanians. This failure could have been partially remedied by extracting some kind of obligation, like the Antall cabinet succeeded in doing in the AWACS issue, albeit with delay and following very difficult negotiations. In my view, we could still make the world accept the special role of Hungary bordering the crisis situation. Aware of the historical past, we know what the Hungarian Government accepts and what provocations it might risk when it "enters the south lands" [reference to the border area with Yugoslavia], where 400,000 ethnic Hungarians are living in a situation of constant threat.

[Szent-Ivanyi] Hungary brought up the minority issue, as much as it could do so, because it was not a side in the Dayton agreement. We constantly informed the Americans and we were promised that the minority agreement would be made part of the peace process. This has not taken place. As for the IFOR bases, it is true that this is important for the U.S. and NATO troops, but our negotiating partners also told us very politely that Hungary is also interested in this, in addition to the immediate financial advantages, namely in view of possible advantages in NATO membership. And we are also interested in putting an end to the crisis in our neighborhood. Because, for years, we kept saying justifiably that the crisis is harming us threefold: the embargo, the refugees, and the pressure on the ethnic Hungarians living in that region.

[LIMES] Has Trianon uttered the final word? Or, now that the internal borders have changed in the former Yugoslavia, could modification based on ethnic and language conditions come to the fore?

[Granasztoi] These borders and these national state frames have developed, and this cannot be changed. The solution to the border problem is making them traversable, rather than modifying them. For this, democratic institutions should emerge and strengthen in these countries. Besides, Hungary would not be able to demand such a border modification because, although the ethnic Hungarians living in one bloc create a considerable closed unity in the Szekler Land for example, there is a long and wide strip of land between them that is inhabited by Romanians. So, these areas could not be united with Hungary at all. In other areas, the population is quite mixed. Border modification can only emerge in the minds of blind people who think superficially, people who are not aware of these realities.

**One Cannot Expect Anything Positive From Moscow**

[LIMES] How does the Hungarian public relate to the euro-atlantic integration? The nonparliamentary Workers' Party initiated a referendum on whether the population wants Hungary to be a NATO member, and the party collected 180,000 signatures for this referendum. Claiming that the proposed referendum is too early, the Hungarian National Assembly rejected the initiative with a considerable majority. The Workers' Party has turned to the Constitutional Court for justice. What arguments could speak against NATO membership?

[Csapodi] The Alba Circle, an organization that has been in existence for five years, did not join the Workers'

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Party collection of signitures, but the Circle thinks that the expansion of the NATO boundaries would create a new Iron Curtain, and we connect this with the issue of ethnic Hungarian minorities living beyond our borders. If Hungary became a NATO member without the neighboring countries, the situation of ethnic Hungarians forced into the diaspora would definitely deteriorate. The Alba Circle is not anti-integration or anti-Europe in general, because the European Union represents a number of democratic principles that would also be advantageous for a civil society. In our view, however, the two integrations should be separated, because we cannot accept the integration to take place through a military sphere, by preceding the civil sphere.

[Hajdu] As no positive impulse from the former Soviet Union will reach any system of ideological conditions in Europe, I am convinced that today's Hungary must choose the Western civilization. I would not argue with anyone who would call this the lesser bad thing, but I do not see any other alternative today, not even as a leftist. Of course, let the reservations and the extrapolations referring to possible dangers continue in the current Hungarian political thinking .

[Deak] I find it bad that the government and the National Assembly do not have an adequate PR activity to justify and popularize our Western integration efforts. Responsible politics cannot exist without winning the masses over. It seems that the public does not have a reassuring position on the NATO membership issue, and it does not support the efforts of the Hungarian Government in this direction. The government must compensate for this negligence.

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**B-H: IFOR Alert on Extremist Threat to U.S. Troops**

*AU2301081396 Paris AFP in English 0007 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Jan 23 (AFP) — IFOR checkpoints were put on alert late Monday over alleged plans by a U.S. citizen linked to Moslem extremists to attack U.S. forces serving in Bosnia, AFP has learned from an IFOR [Implementation Force] source.

Implementation Force camps were circulated with a poster, seen by AFP, of a man described as a U.S. citizen and named as Kevin Holt.

The poster carries a photograph of a moustachioed man of Afro-American appearance in his mid-to-late 30s.

The poster warns that Holt is allegedly linked to the Moslem extremist Mujahedeen in planning to attack U.S. soldiers serving in Bosnia.

Some 12,000 U.S. troops serving with the multinational peace implementation force are currently in the country, part of a U.S. contingent which will reach 20,000 at its peak.

Holt has previously been arrested posing as a U.S. service member, according to the poster, which warns that given his American accent and "the proper uniform and equipment, he could easily disguise himself as a U.S. soldier."

The alert Monday follows a change of policy by U.S. troops at checkpoints in the zone of separation between Bosnia's former warring parties. Press cars are now stopped and identified at U.S. checkpoints, in marked contrast to the first month of the operation when they were waved through.

A U.S. soldier at one checkpoint told AFP that his unit had received "new orders" on stopping and searching all non-military traffic.

An AFP vehicle was stopped and searched at a checkpoint manned by U.S. soldiers at Memici, near the northern Bosnian town of Kalesija late Monday.

The NATO-led force is charged with enforcing the Dayton peace agreement, which specifically demanded the withdrawal of the estimated 2,500 mujahedeen volunteers who joined the Bosnian war to fight with the mainly-Moslem Bosnian army.

Most of the Islamic fighters had come from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle-East to fight in elite Bosnian army units in the four-year war.

The United States stressed during the Dayton negotiations that the mujahedeen must leave in order to avert incidents with US troops serving with IFOR.

The accord calls for all "foreign" fighters to leave the country.

However, many mujahadeen have married local women and settled in the country, and a number are reported to be living around the central Bosnian town of Zenica, and in the areas of Zavidovici and Banovici.

The area is part of the sector controlled by U.S. troops, but is patrolled by soldiers from IFOR's Turkish battalion.

A Polish battalion is due to begin patrolling in the area later this week

**B-H: IFOR Media Projects Upset Bosnian Authorities**

*LD2001221996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 20 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] In a typically American manner, IFOR [Implementation Force] Commander Admiral Leighton Smith has launched a media campaign aimed at securing support for his soldiers in the field and making their task easier. The VOICE OF PEACE newspaper is being distributed throughout Bosnia. The newspaper is published at NATO's base in Naples and consists of identical texts in Cyrillic and Roman script.

In addition to the newspaper, IFOR has launched a radio station. Its studio, consisting of several cars and tents, is currently stationed on a plateau in front of the Kosovo sports center in Sarajevo. It is run by American marines, who are very helpful. [sentence as heard] Its programming is currently very simple — 18 hours of mainly rock music with occasional newscasts. According to Randy Simmons, the head of the operation, their goal is to promptly disseminate news important for the peace process and build new bridges among ordinary people who were at war until recently. That is why they plan to establish a network of transmitters in other towns, such as Tuzla, Zenica, and Banja Luka. This is a project that should be supported, above all because the freedom of press is already being exercised by the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, IFOR did not feel it was necessary to seek any kind of permission, i.e., it did not feel the need to respect the basic procedure envisaged by international regulations in the sphere of telecommunications.

[Begin recording, Arif Zulic, Bosnian assistant minister in charge of information] So far we have not been officially informed that IFOR launched its media, even

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though we are aware that they have launched a radio station and a newspaper. [end recording]

Therefore, the state committee for cooperation with the United Nations has lodged an energetic protest with Adm. Smith. In his reply, the IFOR commander explained by citing provisions or annexes of the Dayton agreement, whereby the signatories to the agreement will allow program broadcasts in principle.

However, it should be said that the key provision of the Dayton agreement provides for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This somewhat pirate manner in which IFOR began its media activity in our country could not be described as very firm support for its sovereignty.

**B-H: Paper Examines CIA, Army Intelligence Tasks**

*AU2001214996 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 96 p 4*

[Report by Sasa Rukavina: "Fascinating 'Peep' Into Espionage Files"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A brief agency report that "The CIA and the Pentagon are setting up a secret intelligence operation" in Bosnia-Herzegovina contains at least one stupidity. The operation is no longer "a secret" after publication and confirmation of the news. However, this does not really matter.

What matters is the objective of the operation: "The identification of political and military opponents of the Dayton accord." CIA and Pentagon officials will jointly collect all information about potential threats to the Implementation Force [IFOR] soldiers, they will cooperate closely with the local police and intelligence services, and the operation will be "more refined that the ones in Somalia and Haiti." In those countries, too, the CIA and Pentagon intelligence services safeguarded "the deployment of the American soldiers."

We all know what sort of a job they did there. A rather good one in Haiti, however, in Somalia.... Well, the pictures of a U.S. pilot tied to a car being dragged on the ground by the Somalis are still fresh. I guess, henceforth the expression "more refined." How much more, it was not published. There are very few details, for example, it is not known whether the Americans will send new people or whether those who have been puttering around Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning of the war will suffice. There is a question to what extent they will be engaged in the neutralization of dangers that they might detect, and there is also a question of methods that they will use.

**Powerful Services**

There is no doubt that these are powerful services. The tidbits connected to Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Americans occasionally publish from their spy files are fascinating. The pictures of Srebrenica or of the currently topical Ljubija are only a drop in the ocean of documents provided by spy satellites and aircraft. The Americans do not conceal at all that U-2 surveillance aircraft and the most up-to-date pilotless aircraft are "traversing" our sky. It is no secret that powerful bugging centers which are monitoring the electronic traffic in a substantial portion of the former Warsaw Pact and the former SFRY, are located in the Austrian Alps. The technology available to the U.S. intelligence officers is definitely without comparison in the world. In the hands of highly trained people it provides more information that is needed for "the safe deployment of the U.S. troops."

This also explains why "the secret operation" is being trumpeted about. The Americans devote fantastic propaganda coverage to IFOR troops on the ground. Any move that they make is calculated to demonstrate strength and undermine the morale of the (potential) enemy. Evidently, NATO psychological warfare experts built their strategy on the logic of "how could I stand up against such a superpower." Therefore, informing the entire world about the beginning "of the secret operation" has a clear message: Beware of your actions, we know well how the CIA fights....

**American Paranoid Fear**

The address to which the message was sent is also clear from everything stated above: Mujahidin, hardened Chetniks, extremist Ustashas, and the politicians who would like to play the global game for the sake of their local interests. They are, in short, the biggest threat to IFOR soldiers on the ground. It is clear that neither the CIA nor the Pentagon, not even the local authorities in both entities, will be able to ensure complete safety for IFOR soldiers; however, the risks could be brought down to "an acceptable level." In other worlds, the American paranoid fear of mujahidin can be reduced by watching their movements and information on their camps. Krajisnik's announcement that "a portion of the Serbian Sarajevans who have nowhere to go" will wage a guerrilla war on the territories around Sarajevo that are being returned to the Federation is "a good" piece of information. The operative agents now "merely" have to check how realistic this danger is.

The situation is similar regarding the recent shooting from a car at the British, between Vitez and Travnik: The soldiers need to know whether the perpetrators in

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question were drunks or harbingers of some serious trouble. Ultimately, the U.S. intelligence agents could also close another job, synonymous with "the identification of the opponents to the Dayton accord:" We are talking about hunting down war criminals. The people from NATO officially announced that they would not hunt down the candidates for the Hague tribunal; however, they would arrest them if they happen to run into them.

Those indicted by the Hague court match the picture of "the political opponents" of the Dayton agreement perfectly. It remains to be seen whether the American operatives will also have the mandate to do so. There are at least two ways in which the Americans could "secure information" about the future residents of the Hague. The first one was patented by the Israeli Mosad with the kidnapping of the Nazi war criminals. In the second, the intelligence officers could "help" Karadzic or Mladic for instance, to "stumble" upon IFOR patrols.

**B-H: Nordic Commander on Lack of Civilian Police**

*BR2301095296 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE SONDAG in Danish 21 Jan 96 (MAGASIN section) p 4*

[Report by Birgitte Vestermark: "On Patrol in No-man's-land"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sevarlije/Tuzla — Danish soldiers are supposed to separate the combatants in northern Bosnia, but they are also forced to do police work, because the international police force is not yet in place. [passage omitted]

**Inhabitants Positive**

"We must show the inhabitants that we are present in the area, because it is they, after all, who get scared when they see their own soldiers withdrawing," [Nordic brigade commander] Saermark-Thomson said, adding that the area's local population has so far been "very positive toward us." [passage omitted]

**Ray of Sunshine**

And things have been close to going wrong. In a little country village in the area south of Doboj, Muslim and Croat forces were recently very close to each other, aiming at each other over a distance of only 200 meters, and the atmosphere was, to put it mildly, quite tense. But fortunately Nordbrig [Nordic brigade] was able to avert a confrontation and achieve its first concrete success in peacekeeping work.

"We sent a platoon of 30 men out there, and the captain simply stood out in the middle of the firing line and asked the two groups' military leaders to pull their forces back — and they did," Saermark-Thomson said, who described this as a real ray-of-sunshine story.

**Soldiers Doing Police Work**

Then other problems came up later in this country village, because one of the sides has now sent its police force into the area, and it has been "behaving pretty provocatively," the Danish general said. However, he did not want to reveal whether it was Muslim or Croat police who were behind the trouble.

But whereas it is a military assignment to separate the parties, it is a police matter to prevent provocations and resolve conflicts before they develop into actual clashes. And the international police force should really have driven out to this country village in its white jeeps in order to assist the parties in resolving their internal problems, but it has not happened that way. The police force is still a long way from being in place, and therefore Nordbrig has had to deal with these matters.

"When there is no one else to take care of police matters, the inhabitants think we will do it, and this is unfortunate, because we cannot live up to their expectations," Saermark-Thomsen said. He feels acutely the absence of the civil authorities which the international community is supposed to be setting up — and most of all an independent police force. If the Nordic brigade, for example, drives out on patrol in one of the areas which are supposed to be transferred from one warring party to the other later in the year and sees that people are occupied in systematically burning down houses, the brigade has neither the men nor the obligation to intervene.

"What we should do in that situation is inform the international police force, but at the moment, there is no one to tell," Saermark-Thomsen said, pointing out that in the town of Doboj there are five men from Civpol [Civilian Police], who have no idea what they should be doing, because they have not yet received a mandate. Civpol was originally sent out by the United Nations but, as with so many other other parts of the UN mission, should now be transferred to IFOR [Implementation Force].

**Civilian Reconstruction Hobbling Along Behind**

Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, who bears ultimate responsibility for the normalization of civilian life in war-torn Bosnia, has been criticized — particularly in the U.S. media — for taking far too much time to set up his organization. This applies not only to the police force, but also to the people and coordinators who were supposed to take care of actual reconstruction in the war-torn country — reconstruction which, according to a joint report from the World Bank, the

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International Monetary Fund and the Eastern European Bank, will cost between 17 and 27 billion kroner just to get housing, office space, and infrastructure back into some kind of shape.

And although he did not want to join in personally in the criticism of Bildt, the Danish brigadier general pointed out that it is a real and major problem that the civilian aspect of IFOR's assignment is hobbling along behind the military part, because that means that the local population is losing faith in the peace agreement, thereby eliminating the basis for the much-needed reconciliation.

"It will be much worse than just very irritating if the military part moves along according to schedule, and the civilian authorities arrive too late," Saermark-Thomsen said. [passage omitted]

**B-H: IFOR Launches Campaign To Avert Serb Exodus**

*AU2201150196 Paris AFP in English 1417 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 22 (AFP) — IFOR [Implementation Force] commander Admiral Leighton Smith was Monday [22 January] to launch a media blitz to avert a Serb exodus from Sarajevo with the handover of power to the Bosnian Government stipulated under the Dayton peace accord.

IFOR spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Rayner said: "Admiral Smith is expected to offer all Sarajevo residents encouragement to remain calm during the upcoming transfer," set for completion by March 20.

"IFOR will provide military security during this time to allow residents to remain safely in their homes if they wish, or to exercise their right to move.

"We would wish that people stay in their homes, to enjoy them, to share the reconstruction of their country. One hopes we wi'l persuade more people to stay," he said.

Last week the U.S. admiral predicted 50 to 60 percent of the 70,000 Serbs living in Serb-held Sarajevo would flee the capital ahead of the handover.

Sarajevo's mayor Tarik Kupusovic visited the Serb-held Ilidza district on Sunday to discuss the handover with Serb officials.

**B-H: Krajisnik Urges Serbs To Return to Sarajevo**

*AU2201210496 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The Committee for the Implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Serb Sarajevo held a meeting in Vogosca today. Miodrag Stanisic has a report on the meeting:

[Stanisic] Judging by today's meeting of the state Committee for the Implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Sarajevo, the course of activity has become more intense and operative. Chairman Krajisnik and members of the committees for relations with the civilian sector of Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia at the city and republican level submitted reports on the contacts with IFOR [Implementation Force] and administrator Bildt's representatives. On the basis of these reports, it was decided that the issue of the position of the Sarajevo Serbs is not an issue of deadlines, but an issue in its own right, regarding (?permanent) human, civil, and ethnic rights of these people, the solution of which will be crucial for the survival of Sarajevo in the sense of the meaning and existence of the city, as well as for the existence of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Dayton Accord as an idea and [word indistinct] possibility.

The general opinion is that Messrs. Bildt and Steiner understand the importance of this problem, and that, as experienced diplomats, they will, step by step, propose and implement mutually acceptable solutions in the course of the implementation process. It is expected that within the next few days the first specific proposals will be presented by the administrator's office. The transitory period until the election in the (?union of the two entities), in which the present borders and the structure of power will be preserved (?by blackmail) was mentioned as a possibility.

[Announcer] The chairman of the Assembly of the Serb Republic, Momcilo Krajisnik, appealed to the people of Serb Sarajevo not to move out and for those who have already left to return.

Many of the things have been implemented as we planned and have appeased the Sarajevo Serbs, said Mr. Krajisnik at today's session of the Committee for the Implementation of the Dayton Accord in Serb Sarajevo, which was held in Vogosca. He specified that the international community representatives have promised a great deal in the recent talks, not because they have understanding for the Serb position, but because specific moves have to be made. He also expressed the hope that the talks would soon yield visible results.

I think that the solution will be quite good, and that it will have a positive effect on the Serbs in Serb Sarajevo, as well as make many who have left the area return, said Chairman Krajisnik. In his opinion, the Serbs in Serb Sarajevo have a future, and there is no reason to move out or be afraid.

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An appeal was also sent at today's session in Vogosca to the people with scarce skills who left the area to return to work as soon as possible.

The Committee also considered the problems regarding supplies and maintaining law and order in Serb Sarajevo.

**B-H: Pale TV on Krajisnik Appeal to Sarajevo Serbs**

*LD2201215696 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [RS], today appealed to the population of Serb Sarajevo not to move out and called on those who had already left to return. A great deal has happened as we planned and this has had a calming effect on Sarajevo Serbs, Krajisnik said at today's session of the headquarters for the implementation of the Dayton agreement in Serb Sarajevo. The session took place in Vogosca. He said that during the latest talks representatives of the international community promised a great deal — not because they understood the Serb attitude, but because they had realized that concrete moves had to be made. He expressed hope that the talks would soon yield tangible results.

[Correspondent Jelena Rajakovic] The headquarters for the implementation of the agreement on Serb Sarajevo resumed its work in Sarajevo today. The meeting was chaired by Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the RS People's Assembly, who spoke about the political activities over the last few days. The discussions over the next few days will help to bring about a positive solution for the population of Serb Sarajevo. Many of the headquarters members, who have had recent diplomatic contacts with both representatives of the international community and the Muslim-Croat Federation, said that they firmly believed that a solution will be found soon that would fully satisfy the Sarajevo Serbs' demands.

[Begin Krajisnik recording] We are in the middle of our negotiations with representatives of the international community who have been promising a great deal. They are promising not because of their desire to understand the Serb attitude, but because they have realized that concrete moves have to be made. We are on the way to have this announced very shortly. We think that this solution will be a rather good one, that it will have a positive effect on the people in Sarajevo and on the return of those who have left this area. In view of all this, the meeting today proceeded in a rather calm atmosphere, with well-argued proposals. My appeal to our people is that there is no reason for them to move out, there is no reason for fear, they must convince one another to stay here and I also call on all those who have left, perhaps due to the initial shock, to return so that we can build our Sarajevo together. I think that there is a future for the Serbs in Sarajevo. Our policy has not changed and we can look at what lies ahead with much more optimism and with more hope that the injustice committed in Dayton can be rectified. [end recording]

[Rajakovic] The negotiating commission, authorized by the state leadership, outlined its standpoints from the latest round of negotiations with the opposing side. Serb negotiators rejected the Muslim proposal for mixed police units and remained adamant that only Serb policemen could patrol Serb Sarajevo.

[Begin Mirko Sarovic recording, member of the Serb Sarajevo negotiating commission] We told the meeting that we had made it clear to the other side that we would take part in the work of subgroups only if there was progress in the implementation of the political side of the agreement, in other words if there are certain guarantees and progress regarding the status of the Serb part of Sarajevo and in the town of Sarajevo, in general. [end recording]

We expect that after the talks, over the next two to three days, a solution will be put forward. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Serbs Accept Return of Non-Serb Population**

*AU2201211596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The non-Serb population will be able to return to their homes in Ilidza. The guarantee for that was given yesterday by the representatives of the self-proclaimed Serb authorities in that part of Sarajevo. This was stated by Sarajevo Mayor Tarik Kupusovic at a news conference today.

This was the first meeting between the representatives of the legal city organs and the local Serb leaders from Ilidza. They discussed the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, the return of refugees, and the Serb population's stay in that part of Sarajevo.

The Serb delegation has told us that the Serbs have asked to move the population from Ilidza to the Bijeljina and Foca regions. They appear to have now abandoned this, as there is no more space there. The Serbs have decided to stay where they are, but are asking for an amnesty if they were to stay, the Sarajevo mayor explained.

During the talks, the Serbs side expressed the wish that Ilidza remain Serb, Kupusovic said. We have rejected the proposal. All features showing that Ilidza is part of

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Sarajevo and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be placed in that part of the town. The residents of Ilidza are the residents of Sarajevo and I am their mayor, too, Kupusovic said.

During the talks, which were also attended by Nedjeljko Prstojevic, mayor of the so-called Serb municipality of Ilidza, Velibor Veselinovic, his deputy and president of the Serbian Democratic Party, and Police Commander Vlatko Knezevic, it was agreed that the city delegation, accompanied by, television teams and journalists will visit other parts of Sarajevo that are currently under Serb control in the near future.

**B-H: Presidency Approves Muratovic as Prime Minister**

*AU2201200096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] At its session presided over by President Alija Izetbegovic, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina decided today to propose to the assembly Hasan Muratovic, minister for relations with international organizations, as the new prime minister-designate of the Government of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Muratovic has been nominated by the Executive Committee of the Party of Democratic Action.

The Presidency has also withdrawn the mandate that was given to Haris Silajdzic at the session of 8 January this year. The Presidency has taken into account the obligations undertaken with the signing of the Dayton Agreement regarding the deadlines to form the republican government, which cannot be postponed.

The Presidency has also concluded that, even after two weeks, the current Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has not started work on forming a government, nor has he return to the Presidency the offer of the mandate. Judging by his statements in the media, one can conclude that his condition for forming a government is a change to the law on the election of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Presidency could not accept this condition.

At its session today, the Presidency agreed to appoint Hamid Kursid as plenipotentiary ambassador to the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The Presidency has also discussed other matters from its sphere of competence.

**B-H: Muratovic on Accepting Prime Minister Post**

*AU2201200896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 2 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we have already said, Hasan Muratovic, head of the state committee for cooperation with IFOR [Implementation Force] has accepted the candidacy for the post of the future prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here is what Hasan Muratovic has told Bosnia-Herzegovina Television correspondent Jadranko Katana:

[Begin Muratovic recording] Yes, I have accepted this obligation. I consider it to be an honor that has been bestowed by the Executive Council of the Party of Democratic Action, as well as an obligation that has been imposed on me by them. I have not accepted this duty with great pleasure for two reasons: First, because of the circumstances in which this has happened. Prime Minister Silajdzic had in fact already been nominated as a new prime minister designate. I am deeply convinced that Prime Minister Silajdzic has still many things to do to end our struggle and our project.

On the other hand, we are entering a very difficult time in which the government will have to realize the peace agreement, start economic reconstruction, and solve all other problems, particularly those of the social nature. [end recording] [passage omitted]

**B-H: Izetbegovic: Silajdzic Resignation Based on 'Whim'**

*AU2201211496 Paris AFP in English 2035 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 22 (AFP) — Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said on state television Monday that outgoing Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic's insistence on trying to change a law on government, which eventually prompted him to resign, was a "whim."

His comments, in his first interview after Bosnia's collective presidency confirmed Hasan Muratovic's nomination as the new premier, showed how far the gap between Izetbegovic and his former favourite has become.

The row blew up after the Bosnian parliament passed a law two weeks ago to separate the government of the Moslem Croat federation, created in 1994, from that of the Bosnian republic.

Up to now, Silajdzic's government had acted for both, but the Dayton peace accord called for moves to speed up the separation process.

The law reduced the number of ministries in the government of the republic from 12 to six and effectively limits central authorities to representing the country abroad.

"The (Bosnian) Croats insisted the federal government be finally formed and then a tug-of-war regarding the

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number of ministries in the republic government started between Haris and the Croats," Izetbegovic said.

"In my opinion that was a caprice."

Silajdzic pushed for the republic government to have six ministers with full portfolio, but the Croats were against that idea.

"It was important to us that we finally have the federation government," the president added. "The difference (in ministries) was a nuance which practically has no significance whatsoever."

Silajdzic conditioned his acceptance to be the premier of the new government with changing the law, and when he failed, he said he would stand down.

Up to now, Muratovic was minister in charge of relations with the NATO-led Implementation Force and he is considered a close ally of Silajdzic.

**B-H: Izetbegovic on 'Wrangling' Over Ministries**

*LD2201205596 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, today granted a special interview to Bosnia-Herzegovina TV. We are now showing you an excerpt from the interview which will be broadcast in its entirety after the news bulletin.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Will central institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina be affected, or is such a government more in favor of the federal government or, as the prime minister himself said, in favor of the Croatian Democratic Union, i.e. that part of our partners?

[Izetbegovic] It was important for us finally to have a federal government and not to create complications in this respect. The Croats wrangled, to use that expression, with the prime minister regarding the issue of how many ministries the republic's government should have. He proceeded from one extreme, from 10-12 ministries. They started from the other, from three. They met halfway, six ministries. At some meeting they Croats agreed to give consent to five ministries, then after much wrangling they accepted six, provided that one should be without portfolio. They were a bit stuck over that decision; they could not decide.

Haris [Silajdzic] asked for six. I think that some caprice was at work here. Whether there was to be five plus one or six was a nuance, which in practice has no importance, apart from the issue of the army which I have mentioned. That has not been resolved in a satisfactory way, neither in Dayton nor now.

As you can see there is no [defense minister's] post in the republic's government. Haris has not noticed that this post does not exist in the Republic's government, even though it is a very important post. He claims that the issue of the sixth ministry is the question of to be or not to be of the republic. The question of to be or not to be of the republic was the issue of our army which defended this republic, and without which there would not have been this discussion in which Haris is involved. But there is not that post. [end recording]

**B-H: Izetbegovic Interviewed on Federation Issues**

*LD2201225496 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1910 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[Interview with President Izetbegovic by Mujo Delibegovic on 22 January; place not given — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Delibegovic] Good evening, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is our guest this evening. Mr. President, good evening and welcome [break in transmission] about the party or rather the coming elections and activities and some other topics.

[Izetbegovic] Let us see what we can do.

[Delibegovic] Can I suggest that you first tell us something about how implementation of the Dayton agreement is proceeding? It was two months yesterday since the agreement was initialed in Dayton and just over a month since it was signed in Paris. What is your view?

[Izetbegovic] Well, the two-month period is an opportunity to sum up the situation. It is one-fifth or one-sixth of the time in which they have to complete their task. My general assessment is that events are moving according to the plan. The civilian aspect is slightly behind, but as you can see the military side has been proceeding almost fully according to the plan. The sole exception is the POW exchange, for which the Serb side is to blame. They are not letting those people go. This is where the deadline has not been met. In my view, the deadlines in the military sphere have been fully met.

[Delibegovic] Would you sign the Dayton agreement today?

[Izetbegovic] Yes. If you are asking me if I regret signing it, the answer is I have not regretted signing it. I believe that even with all its shortcomings, all its ambiguities, all its imperfections, the Dayton agreement is the best that could have been extracted from the existing situation.

Sarajevo may be the best proof of this. We can ask what would have happened without the Dayton agreement,

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how things would have been resolved in Sarajevo. We would have to try again to liberate the city by force. The city would not have had electricity, water, gas, etc.

We set out in our program in September that if things had not developed differently, we would have to try another breakthrough of the siege of the city. We suffered considerable losses in manpower during the attempted breakthrough last spring.

[Delibegovic] Talking about Sarajevo, there are still those on the Serb side who are stubbornly defending the SDS [ruling Bosnian Serb party] policies, which brought about such evil. How do you see the integration of the occupied territories. Will the Serbs remain there or will there be an exodus as urged by their Pale leaders? [as heard]

[Izetbegovic] You see, we have, as you know, given amnesty, that is, passed a law on amnesty at the last assembly session. I want to say clearly that we are offering them a chance to stay. We are not begging them to stay. We will not beg anyone to stay. If they want to stay, let them stay. It is likely that people who do not feel guilty, will stay. I would like this to be a majority of the population there.

We also had a political reason to do this. I believe that our people understand this move. Namely, we want our people to return to Modrica, Visegrad, Prijedor, etc. today or tomorrow.

If there is a mass exodus here, then I believe that the doors will be closed to the return of our people to these places or their return will be made much more difficult. That is why Krajisnik [Bosnian Serb speaker] is trying to do that, why the Serb extremists are trying to get the people out of there so that tomorrow they could prevent our return to, for instance, Rogatica, etc.

So, we had perfectly clear humane and political reasons for the amnesty and for our appeal to the Serb population to stay there. As I said, we are not going to beg anyone.

Of course, I would like to say that we will do everything to ensure that our people will return to Ilidza, Hadzici, Ilijas, Vogosca, etc.

[Delibegovic] Precisely, here lies something illogical. Everyone is saying constantly that the Serbs should stay there but no one talks about our people who should return because...

[Izetbegovic, interrupting] Agreements do not talk, but we think about this a lot, and we will realize this. This is a part of that program. The Serbs who are not guilty and who did not commit crimes — our entire people will return there. We will do everything for them to return.

[Delibegovic] There is also a lot of talk about amnesty. You have just mentioned amnesty. A declaration was adopted. When will a bill be passed and to whom will it apply? There are those on the aggressor's side, but it will also apply to our draft-dodgers.

[Izetbegovic] Yes, I believe that a bill will be passed at the forthcoming assembly session in five to six days. It contains a regulation which caused some puzzlement, that is, dissatisfaction especially among our soldiers.

As it is known, we have said in the declaration that the amnesty will apply to our people who could be prosecuted for draft-dodging etc. And then a soldier, who has been fighting, justly asks why deserters are being treated with such care. We have done this for two reasons.

One, it is not logical to free from prosecution people who were in Chetnik units and people who collaborated with Chetniks, who did not commit war crimes but were in that army, and to prosecute our people who simply did not respond to the call-up papers, which is a considerable omission but it is a considerably lesser omission compared to what members of the Serb nation who joined the Serb units, paramilitary units, have done. So they would not be treated equally and fairly.

On the other hand, we should be rational enough and understand that we have to open doors for our people to return. We are a small nation and we cannot allow a large number of people to stay outside. A difference between a man who stayed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who fought for this country and a man who left this country at the critical time, will be always known. There will be a difference. But whether the door should be closed for them is a different issue. I believe that it would not be wise to close the door to their return. Let them return.

[Delibegovic] A short while ago you said that the civilian part of the Dayton agreement is proceeding somewhat more slowly than the military part. In this respect I would like to ask you about the main figure in charge of that part — Mr. Carl Bildt. Many greeted his appointment with distrust. How do you assess his performance so far?

[Izetbegovic] I can tell you that to a certain degree I became a victim of such prejudice towards that man too, i.e. of some reports and warnings I had in connection with him. I would not be able to say, I do not know what would happen in the future, but I would not be able to say now that my prejudice towards this man has been confirmed. I believe, according to what he has done so far, that his performance has been correct.

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[Delibegovic] In addition to Sarajevo, about which we have spoken, Mostar is also one of the big problems, we would say currently even worse than Sarajevo. How can these problems be solved?

[Izetbegovic] Mostar is really a very difficult problem. The other evening I watched, I think, an excerpt from a west Mostar TV news bulletin. It showed two people talking: one was a commander of a town, a soldier, whose name I do not know, and the other one was well-known, a man I know from before, [Smiljko] Sagolj [Bosnian Croat media figure from Mostar], who was putting leading questions to the soldier, and who managed to make the former come up with so many chauvinistic, unheard-of statements that I was dumbfounded.

I knew that the situation in Mostar is difficult, but did not know that Mostar is led by people who think in that way about everybody else except themselves. It seemed to me while we were watching that video tape... [pauses] then someone said this should be shown on TV. Maybe it should be shown with a decent introduction, but in any case it should be shown to schoolchildren with the introduction: Children here is for you to see how people should not speak, act, behave, how they should not think about the world and other people, because it is a perfect example of how hatred is created.

That man spoke with so much hatred that it is almost impossible to believe. I just wondered what inspired him. The fortunate thing is, I would like to say, that such people are in minority among the Croat people, I know that well. I know Croat intellectuals well, I know Croat opposition leaders very well, almost all of them — Mesic, Kucar. I know the Catholic church, I know the majority of leading clergymen and I know that they are not thinking along the same lines.

This is what gives us hope that coexistence and the federation as a political result of that coexistence and a political expression of that coexistence are possible. While watching that video report from Mostar that evening, it became clear to me why things were not functioning. If these people are going to stay in Mostar, it is not only that we cannot speak about the federation, we cannot speak about the chance of anybody staying alive if they are not a Croat over there — not the type of a Croat as that man in the video.

[Delibegovic] You mentioned the Catholic church. It is well known that there is no religious freedom in the western part of Mostar, of course for other nations, other religions.

[Izetbegovic] Unfortunately, a constituent part of this story that I have been telling you is the fact that we have an absurd case — that there is a place in Europe where even religious funeral services cannot be held — that place is west Mostar. I think that this does not exist anywhere else, nowhere in the world, I think, not even in Rwanda, or anywhere else; some religious freedom at least for the deceased exists everywhere. However, not even this exists there.

I spoke about this issue with some high-ranking Catholic clergymen [words indistinct] and asked why something was not done in this respect. He said he regretted it, but the church was not the government. My reply to them was that I knew it was not the government, it was not in the position of a power, but it was a moral power. Raise your voice against it, because this is a situation that the human being should not tolerate, whoever he is. Raise your voice against this. You have enough moral authority, use it, condemn it, do it frequently to improve the situation down there. Unfortunately, the situation is as it is.

[Delibegovic] The differences between the western and eastern part of Mostar are enormous in other aspects, too, in the standard of living, infrastructure, etc. Mostar is expected to be the place where the Federation will be born. However, this seems to be a problem. Do you have any hope in the Federation?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, as I said, my hope stems from what I told you earlier, from the fact that the majority of the Croat population both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and outside Bosnia-Herzegovina — I know, I have been in Dalmatia and I know the mood there, in Dubrovnik, in Zagreb, etc. — they not only support the federation, but also cooperation between the two countries on a sound and fair footing. This is what instills hope. But what throws doubt on it is the cases like the one I mentioned earlier.

The international community will most likely bring pressure to bear and this is perhaps an additional factor, in addition to what I have just said. The international community most probably will not tolerate such a situation in Europe. I think that it has taken measures, will take measures, and we will insist that it takes measures to help us, to help the Croat people, as well, to pull out of the abyss that some have thrown themselves in. In other words, I think that the Federation stands a chance despite everything and because there are many people who look at things sensibly.

[Delibegovic] The governments of the Federation and Republic have been separated. It is of crucial importance for the Federation that the government starts functioning. The prime minister-designate of the Federation has been named. Are things developing here as they should?

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[Izetbegovic] Well, I think that the prime minister-designate has almost completed work on forming the new government, his list of names. He is trying to form a government of experts capable of functioning, resolving problems, because, you see, we have entered a different period; we had the period of war that required a specific kind of people, a specific government. We now do not need leaders so much, we do not need politicians, speakers, we need more people who are managers, technocrats, so to speak, in the positive sense of the word. In other words, people who will have to solve problems, for instance the problem of pensions, an issue that we have objective difficulties in resolving, but has also been rather neglected. I have heard that there are people who have earned their pensions abroad but have never regulated their status. There is no justification for this since these pensions have been earned in countries with which we can easily find common language, for instance, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, etc. It is unforgivable that for two years, three years, since the government was formed, people have not been paid their foreign pensions. So, these are our problems.

We will very shortly be faced with the problem of demobilized soldiers. Thousands of them will return to our towns to look for jobs. This cannot be resolved by high politics. This has to be tackled by everyday work, small steps, practical work of, as I said, managers, businessmen, men of enterprise and action.

In other words, speaking about the federal government, about my personal reason for endorsing the separation of the two governments, my personal reason was the fact that I thought that such a government will be able, with much more success, to resolve problems of this kind, because it will be less preoccupied with the problem of high politics. It will tackle issues of so-called practical politics. This is what I told Professor Kapetanovic, our Federation prime minister-designate, and I think that he is moving in this direction in forming his government and from what I can see from the list, it seems to me that he will succeed. There are some difficulties in the case of one or two ministries, in the case of economy, finance, the issue is how to find resources and how to use them, how to revitalize the economy, I think that there are still small problems there, dilemmas about the choice of people, etc.

[Delibegovic] Will the establishment of a federal government automatically put an end to Herzeg-Bosnia?

[Izetbegovic] I believe that this is a very good question. Namely, formally, theoretically speaking, as agreed, this should be the case, but we will have to see it in practice. Because we have had several agreements saying if something is done, if something is achieved, then Herzeg-Bosnia will be abolished, etc.

I want to say, that when we talk about the participation of the Croat ministers in the federal government and even in the republican government, then their real power in these governments will depend on whether or not Herzeg-Bosnia exists. Because, if there is not, if we should rule only in areas under the control of the army, then we should do this alone without them. You know we do not need any ...[transmission interrupted]

**B-H: Media, SDA Criticize Silajdzic for Resigning**

*AU2301135296 Paris AFP in English 1156 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[By Jean-Luc Porte]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 23 (AFP) — Prime minister Haris Silajdzic has come under heavy fire since announcing his resignation in what is seen in some quarters as a bid to set up his own party in defiance of President Alija Izetbegovic.

Silajdzic, a professional historian and the darling of the intelligentsia of Sarajevo, resigned saying deputies had been manipulated during a parliamentary vote on the cabinet composition.

The premier had pushed in vain for a cabinet of six ministers with full portfolio, instead of the five plus one without portfolio that parliament decided.

His successor, the minister for relations with the NATO-led peace implementation force, Hasan Muratovic, said he had only reluctantly taken on the post.

Some observers think the real reason for the resignation may not only be in protest at weakening of government authority, but may also have to do with the premier's long-term personal ambitions. It is thought Silajdzic may even set up his own party and go as far as to challenge Izetbegovic's grip on power.

Since announcing his resignation, Silajdzic, popular for his special charm and elegant manner, has been pilloried in the Bosnian media.

The governing Party of Democratic Action (SDA), with whom he has always had difficult relations, has attacked him, and Izetbegovic himself joined in the fray, describing the resignation as "capricious."

Interpretations vary as to the real cause of the departure. Some observers see it as Silajdzic refusing to accept the reduction of his personal power due to new institutions being created in Bosnia under the Dayton peace accord. That hard-won agreement, signed in Paris in December, splits Bosnia-Hercegovina into largely autonomous

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Croat-Moslem and Serb entities, with the central government given only limited powers. The reduction of the government to a cabinet of six ministers, one without portfolio, effectively limits the government to representing the country abroad. Silajdzic had wanted a cabinet with six ministers with full portfolio. But others are surprised that a problem over one cabinet portfolio should be grounds for resignation.

Notable among those who believe the premier is really planning to set up his own party is the newspaper VECERNJE NOVINE, which wrote: "Taking into account his support in other countries, this option seems the most probable." The newspaper accused the premier of seeking to nullify the democratic process.

Critics have flung all sorts of accusations at Silajdzic.

The SDA said Silajdzic had been playing "the Croat extremists' game." The newspaper DNEVNI AVAZ accused him of being a dictator and asked: "What would happen if the head of the army and head of state started behaving like Silajdzic? This would be what is commonly called dictatorship."

In a particularly caustic outburst, Izetbegovic himself said on television: "I think the man is too concerned with himself. The problem is not in the party or the government. It's the personality of Haris Silajdzic."

Silajdzic is popular among the intelligentsia of Sarajevo for his modern ideas and passionate defence of multiethnic society. He previously offered his resignation in August, which Izetbegovic refused. Observers say it looks as though this latest resignation is final and will not be withdrawn.

One journalist, an admirer, said of the latest public attacks: "They're getting mad at him in the best communist tradition, forgetting the service he rendered to his country during the war."

**B-H: MBO Dissatisied With Silajdzic's 'Removal'**

*AU2201213696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] has issued a statement for the public.

The MBO expresses its dissatisfaction caused by the removal of Haris Silajdzic as prime minister of the Government of Bosnia- Herzegovina. The party considers his opposition to undemocratic methods of governing as a principled political stand. The MBO wonders whose interest it is in and who will benefit from the pressure on the prime minister, who is striving for the strengthening of the organs of authorities in the interest of preserving the integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Among other things, the MBO has always been in favor of a democratic and law-governed state and is opposed to everything that threatens the aforementioned attributes of the state.

This is why we were surprised by the behavior of the assembly when it adopted the law on the government, the statement points out among other things.

**B-H: Social Democrats Criticize 'Ruling Parties'**

*AU2201213796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina supports the efforts aimed at overcoming the government crisis and appointing a new prime minister-designate so that life could be breathed more efficiently into the Federation and all deadlines stipulated by the Dayton Agreement be met.

However, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina again protests most sharply with regard to this and warns that the situation and relations in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation must be changed most urgently. The two parliaments must not be places for the one-sided expression of the will of only the ruling parties, the unprincipled voting, and cheap compromises and manipulations.

Therefore, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina warns that the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community can no longer pretend to be the only ones that represent entire nations. They cannot reduce the fate of the state and its citizens to their absolutely unproductive discussions.

The Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina takes the view that all this should be thoroughly discussed at the next session of the assembly.

**B-H: LBO on Attempt To Establish 'One-Party System'**

*AU2201214496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The view taken by the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO] on the decision of the Executive Committee of the Party of Democratic Action to nominate a new republican prime minister-designate is that there are more profound reasons for this decision than those that have officially been stated.

We take the view that the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina should decide who should form the republican government. Until this decision has been made, in

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our view, this post is being held by Haris Silajdzic. This was stated at the party's news conference today.

The LBO of Bosnia-Herzegovina takes the view that an attempt is being made in Bosnia-Herzegovina to set up a one-party system. Salih Foco, vice president of the party, has mentioned several arguments to support this view. One of the arguments is the disrespect for parliamentary life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He mentioned the non-functioning of the assembly as a fact. Foco said that conditions have been created for the work of the assembly, but that despite this, the assembly is still not making important decisions. It has surrendered its powers to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At its closed session in Zenica, the Executive Committee of the LBO of Bosnia-Herzegovina discussed the possibility of a new political restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the LBO's answers to these processes. The committee has accepted a framework plan of the LBO's activities and the strategy in dealing with political partners.

**B-H: Opposition Party Criticizes 'Usurpation'**

*LD2101152696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] In response to the renewed controversy over the procedure to adopt the law on the government, and different assessments of the overall work of the parliament, (Sejfudin Tokic) the chairman of the club of deputies of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats in the assembly, has issued the following statement on behalf of his party:

The decisionmaking on issues essential for the functioning of the state and the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina have for a long time been taken out of the control of the highest legislative body of authority, which is the assembly of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The top leadership of the ruling parties have — following a logic of totalitarianism — identified themselves with the people and have suspended pluralism and parliamentary life to a very dangerous degree, the statement says.

The president of the assembly, Miro Lazovic, and assembly secretary Avdo Campara are directly responsible for all this, as well as for attempts — which have been going on for months — to prevent the formation of and the creation of conditions for the work of the assembly's commissions and committees and the continued usurpation of the assembly's competences by the presidency of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is what is said in the statement by the chairman of the club of deputies of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats in the Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly. Since the adoption of the law on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government presents only a cause for Prime Minister Silajdzic to resign, while the political reasons are much deeper and more serious, the Union of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats will request a thorough debate on these issues at the next session of the assembly of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tokic's statement says.

**B-H: Serb Republic SPS Expects To Win Elections**

*AU2101203096 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 21 Jan 96*

[Report by Vladimir Nikolic — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first conference of the municipal committee of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic in Brcko was held under the motto To Live Normally, and Petar Djokic was elected its president.

I am convinced that our people understand profoundly what peace means. Brcko, which sprang to life in a matter of only two months since the signing of the peace accord, is also proof of it, the newly elected president of the Brcko Socialists said.

Greeting all present, Dragutin Ilic, president of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, emphasized that all those who champion divisions are not motivated by the wellbeing of the Serbian people. If we want to unite with Yugoslavia we must sport a similar social setup. Ilic announced the victory of the Socialists at the elections in the Serb Republic elections, which are expected soon.

The first municipal conference of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic in Brcko was attended by the representatives of the military and civilian authorities, as well as the presidents of other municipal committees of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic.

**B-H: UBSD Presents Stance on Prime Minister**

*AU2301161196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[Report by Jasenko Krehic on new conference by the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats in Sarajevo on 23 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBSD], Sejfudin Tokic said, believes that it is not wise to cross swords on the issue of the prime minister-designate in the manner of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], whose Executive Council passed a decision that was immediately adopted by the Presidency.

The nomination of a new candidate for prime minister will not solve the accumulated problems, and there is

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now ample cause to establish the reasons which led to the resignation [of Haris Silajdzic], and for crucial Bosnia-Herzegovina factors to examine the issue from all angles.

What the USBD will do is see that the agenda of the next assembly session includes the issue of the prime minister-designate. There is a possibility that the UBSD will again propose to the assembly the original text of the Law on Government, in which case a new vote will have to be taken.

UBSD Vice President Sejfudin Tokic also addressed the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, and assessed that very little had been done so far, particularly on deblocking the media. He believes that the time has come when the terminology used by the media throughout the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina must be discarded. Changes are needed if the situation is to calm down.

If the Dayton [Agreement] is to succeed, war criminals should no longer be in power in the Serb entity, and all those in the Federation who have been indicted by the The Hague War Crimes Tribunal should be arrested immediately.

This year, the UBSD will work on creating [words indistinct] and civic initiatives in order to put up strong resistance to nationalistic programs, that is, ruling parties, in the elections. The UBSD will also work on linking up with democratic initiatives in the Serb Republic, Yugoslavia, and Croatia, and similar parties throughout Europe.

### B-H: Silajdzic Discusses Mostar With Koschnick, Susak

*AU2201200796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 180 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[Report by Mirsad Behran from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, we did not discuss Mostar but the six municipalities with one-nationality majority in each one of them. We also discussed the possibility of a central district that could link them. This was stated by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic after today's part of the talks between the Bosniak and Croat sides in Mostar. The talks were also attended by Gojko Susak, minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia, and Hans Koschnick, the EU administrator on behalf of the EU.

The EU has offered a solution that is based more on reality than European standards and criteria, the Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister said. He stressed that the Bosniak side is prepared to accept nay well-balanced solution. Asked what could happen if the agreement is not reached tomorrow either, Mr. Silajdzic said that both sides have agreed to international arbitrage.

Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak said that both sides accepted the district in principle, and that Mostar will in any case remain one town.

As we have learned, Roberts Owen, arbiter for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is arriving in Mostar tomorrow. He will also join the talks.

### B-H: EU's Koschnick Expects Decision on Mostar Map

*AU2301090096 Paris AFP in English 0238 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Jan 23 (AFP) — The EU administrator of Mostar, Hans Koschnick has vowed to settle by Wednesday the dispute on a new map marking out the boundaries of Croat and Moslem districts of the city.

Speaking after talks Monday with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Susak and the mayors of the Croat and Moslem sectors, he said discussions on the issue would resume on Tuesday. But if no agreement was forthcoming, he said he would use his prerogative to arbitrate.

Koschnick said he would announce a decision on Wednesday.

"They will accept it, or they will, let me say, bring all the people against me. But there is no more discussion about the units. On Wednesday the decision is made, and then we will see how we go further," he said.

Disagreement over the districts designated for Croats and Moslems has held up efforts to reunify the city which was put under EU administration in July 1994 after 11 months of bitter fighting between the two communities.

The reunification of Mostar is seen as crucial to the future of the Moslem-Croat Federation which itself is a cornerstone of the Bosnia peace accords signed in December.

Asked whether he believed freedom of movement would be restored in the city by February 8 — a dealine set by the EU — Koschnick said "If I am not killed after my decision, yes."

He said he would lunch Tuesday with Robert Owen, one of the team of negotiators headed by US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, the architect of last year's peace accords for Bosnia.

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Owen was named arbitrator for Mostar by US President Bill Clinton during the latter's visit to Zagreb on January 13.

Silajdzic for his part criticised proposals made Monday by the Europeans to settle the map dispute as being biased.

"What we saw today was not a balanced approach by the European Union. We need a balanced approach there," he said.

The Croats want three districts mainly for Croats and three for the Moslems while the Moslems would prefer districts with a mixed population.

The two sides also disagree on the boundaries for these districts.

"If we have six 'obshinas' — districts — with a national majority, Bosniak or Croat majority, then it must be balanced. If there is such a solution, then I think we can accept it. A solution can be found in the next week or so," Silajdzic said.

Meanwhile, the mayor of the Moslem sector of Mostar, Safet Orucevic said on television here Monday night that Koschnick should resign if he fails to reunify the city.

"Koschnick has become the instrument of someone," he said, echoing a criticism made earlier by Silajdzic.

Silajdzic notably said the EU was not in Mostar to take account of "realities" but to promote "European norms on human rights".

**B-H: Croat Refugees Complain About Muslim Behavior**

*LD2201194796 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The community of Croat refugees of Bosnia-Herzegovina today sent a letter to Hans Koschnick, the European Union [EU] administrator of Mostar, saying:

Dear Mr. Koschnick,

For the past year and a half we have been monitoring with interest all EU activities to find a just solution for all nations living in the area of our unfortunate homeland, Bosnia-Herzegovina. We were pinning all our hopes on the just and wise Europe which has been able to help and protect those who were denied the right to live in their own country, in which Germany and its broadminded and kind-hearted people took a leading role.

We, refugees who have found a new home in Mostar, thought that our suffering was over. At long last we were able to use our Croatian language without fear, we were able to practice our religion freely, and our children were not humiliated at school just for being Croat.

But now we are faced with the possibility of losing again our newly-found safety, because our federal partner's behavior is characteristic not of a partner but of a conqueror. You know that we are not allowed to return to Vares, Kakanj, Bugojno, Sarajevo, Zenica, Travnik, Konjic, and other places in the federation, and that a thousand reasons have been found to proclaim us personae non gratae.

In addition to all the towns in the federation over which they [Muslims] have total control without any Croat participation, they want to deprive us of this half of Mostar, which is the only guarantee of the survival of the Croats as a nation. It is only here that we have our own university, our TV and radio, our theater, our schools, and our cultural institutions. And now there are voices saying that all these arguments are insufficient for Europe, and that you have been selected to cut the Gordian knot.

We do not know, Mr. Koschnick, whether you are aware of the responsibility you have assumed. The Muslims want the entire urban area of Mostar where all traces of Croat identity are to be found, because they know very well that without them the Croats will not be able to survive in this area. Can you assume the responsibility to condemn a nation to eternal vagrancy, to ruin its roots?

Coexistence as desired by the Muslims means our disappearance from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before you reach your final decision, we would like you to listen to the voice of 16,000 Croat refugees living in Mostar and all 400,000 Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina who are currently refugees elsewhere, because it is much easier to make a decision than to put it into practice. Then you may realize what sort of unjustice has befallen us; your decision for us constitutes a question of whether we will remain in our homeland or decide in favor of a voyage of no return, the letter says in conclusion.

**B-H: Croat Police Fail To Withdraw From Kulen Vakuf**

*AU2201210396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia had not withdrawn from Kulen Vakuf, a town some 30 km from Bihac, by this afternoon, although the Dayton

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Agreement deadline for the withdrawal of all foreign troops has expired. Mirza Sadikovic has the details:

[Sadikovic] As we have been informed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (?and) the Bihac Security Center, the policemen are still in that area. A Croatian flag is still fluttering on a (?pole) in the center of that town.

Two days ago, the representatives of IFOR [Implementation Force] visited this area and held talks on the withdrawal of the Croatian policemen. General Jackson, commander of IFOR, has promised that all obligations will be meet in this case.

We have learned unofficially, however, that a protest has been sent to IFOR and that another protest will again be sent, most probably today or tomorrow.

Regarding the realization of the Dayton Agreement, all other obligations have been met in Una-Sana Canton. Cooperation between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Canadian IFOR is very correct.

There have been no incidents in Kulen Vakuf so far. Therefore, one should expect no incidents in the days ahead. This is why people in Bihac rightfully hope that several thousand residents of that town will be able to return to their homes.

**B-H: Croatian Army Remains as Police Despite Deadline**

*LD2001133996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1238 GMT 20 Jan 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 20 (TANJUG) — Troops of the Republic of Croatia have not left Bosnia yet, though the deadline for the withdrawal of all foreign troops under the Dayton accord expired on Jan. 13.

Croatian troops, who are wearing police uniforms, are deployed on the right bank of the Una river in the town of Kulen Vakuf, 30 km south of Bihac, said Muslim Radio Sarajevo.

At a meeting in Kulen Vakuf on Jan. 16, Croatian and Muslim representatives and the peace Implementation Force (IFOR) agreed that the deadline for the pullout be extended to Jan. 18, but the new deadline was not respected either.

Sandbags have been removed from the bridge over the Una, which flows through the town, but the Croatian flag is still hoisted on the right bank of the river.

**B-H: Commentary on Croatia's 'Hegemonic Ambitions'**

*LD2101213696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1933 GMT 21 Jan 96*

[Unattributed commentary — "pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 21 (TANJUG) — The causes for the outbreak of the Croat-Muslim war in Bosnia in the spring of 1993 have not been eliminated, said Muslim Radio Sarajevo in a commentary on Sunday.

Radio Sarajevo said for the first time that a cause was 'greater Croatian aggression' and accused Croatian President Franjo Tudjman for such a policy, whom the commentator referred to as the architect of the current greater Croatian policy toward Bosnia.

'He repudiates Bosnia-Herzegovina's right as a state and the Muslims as a nation and as long as he is in power and Croatian ultra-nationalists in his suite Croatia will have hegemonic ambitions towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, one way or another,' said the commentator.

Tudjman said in Paris last month, on the occasion of the signing of the Bosnia peace treaty, that Bosnia-Herzegovina was still a geo-strategic sphere of interest for Croatia and that it was the Yugoslav communists who had proclaimed the Bosnian Muslims a nation.

The tenacity of Croatia's hegemonic intents has been demonstrated in the recent events in Mostar and central Bosnia, said Muslim radio.

The secession of the Bosnian Croat state Herzeg-Bosnia is not possible at the moment, but, said the commentator, Croatian nationalists will seek out other ways to achieve their objectives.

Since the signing of the Dayton accord, tensions have been mounting between the federal partners in Mostar and central Bosnia, resulting in many casualties on both sides.

The Muslim-Croat war took thousands of civilian lives, razed dozens of settlements and drove 230,000 people from their homes.

The war ended after a year of fierce fighting with the signing of a Washington-brokered accord setting up a Muslim-Croat federation, which under the Bosnia peace treaty became one of the two entities in Bosnia.

The commentator said that the military operations conducted by Croatian troops and Bosnian Croat forces were accompanied by nationalistic euphoria in which

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the 'symbols and practices of ustashas' had been revived.

Ustashas were Croatian fascists and followers of Hitler in World War II who killed about a million Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, 700,000 of whom were exterminated in Jasenovac, the third largest concentration camp in subjugated Europe.

The Muslim commentator said that during the one-year Muslim-Croat war, the Croat forces systemmatically terrorized, killed and imprisoned civilians in concentration camps.

**B-H: Croats Torch Towns Before Withdrawing**

*LD2201155796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1425 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 22 January (SRNA) — A [Bosnian Serb] delegation consisting of representative of local authorities of Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, which has toured these two municipalities, has established that these two towns have been destroyed, and most buildings torched, Slavko Kopuz, the chairman of the executive committee of the Mrkonjic Grad municipal assembly, told SRNA.

"Units of the Croatian Army and the Croat Defence Council [HVO], which should leave Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo on 2 February, in line with the Dayton Agreement, have plundered all private and industrial property in these municipalities," Kopuz said.

He warned about extensive damage on the water and sewage systems and said that numerous water leakages caused additional damage on residential buildings.

"Some industrial facilities has been completely burned down — for example the Udarnik transport company and the Mladost clothing factory. The remaining facilities have been dissembled and taken to Croatia," Kopuz said.

**B-H: Muratovic Accuses World of 'Ignoring' Massacres**

*AU2201203996 Paris AFP in English 2000 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 22 (AFP) — Incoming Bosnian premier Hasan Muratovic accused world leaders Monday of ignoring what they knew of massacres committed during the bitter Balkans conflict.

"The whole international community was quiet for months, knowing where the graves are and knowing what happened. We expect now more progress on that," he told reporters here.

"The international community behaves very strangely toward mass graves," he added, saying that only in the last week had he noted "more promising activities" regarding the issue.

Muratovic, who said he would take up his new post replacing Haris Silajdzic by the end of the month, said Sarajevo was doing "everything possible" to have more prisoners released.

The three former warring sides were supposed to have released all prisoners by Friday midnight, according to the Dayton peace accord, but freed only 217.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, which supervised the releases, said over the weekend that some 650 people were still being held captive.

Muratovic said the Serbs could be holding thousands more Bosnian prisoners.

"If we release our prisoners and the Serbs do not — and everybody knows they have more than 150 — they will put only 150 prisoners on the list," he added.

"They must have thousands, and if not thousands at least hundreds alive if they have not killed them all.

"Of course we know who is missing. So if they don't release them now, they may kill them immediately after that. It's a very sensitive matter."

Bosnian authorities have linked the fate of the 4,000 Bosnians they claim are still held by the Serbs to the more than 24,000 people reported missing.

**B-H: Sarajevo TV Reports on Mass Grave Findings**

*LD1801220596 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 18 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] After Sanski Most, several mass graves of killed Bosniaks have been found in Vozuca. Thirteen bodies, 10 men and three women, were exhumed today. The commander of the international land forces, General Walker, has spoken of the possibility of Implementation Force members helping the Hague War Tribunal to inspect the places which are supposed to be mass graves. The example of the German police proves that the pursuit of war criminals continues. A more detailed report follows. [introduction as heard]

[Correspondent Sabina Trhulj] In the area of the municipality of Sanski Most, in the valley of the Sana, a new, ninth mass grave of Bosniaks has been discovered. Fourteen men aged between 21 and 60 from the village of Budina were killed by Serb criminals in June 1992 in the village of Kalenderi . The whole Alibegovic family was exterminated in a terrible crime. Having carried

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out the investigation, the competent bodies of the municipality of Sanski Most established these facts in the presence of the international observers.

Unfortunately, this is not the end. After the news was published of the existence of the mass grave of Croats and Muslims in the Ljubija mine, there are indications of new potential scenes of crime. The Croatian office of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights assumes that the mine pit near the town of Stara Rijeka is a mass grave. The road connecting the Ljubija mine and Stara Rijeka, the report states, was destroyed in three places so that access to the grave, which is 100 meters wide and 25 meters deep, is prevented. Access to the pit is impossible for the time being because it is under the control of Serb paramilitary forces.

After such beastly crimes, unimaginable to the human mind, the slow but unavoidable hand of justice can offer the only comfort. The German federal prosecutor has announced that an arrest warrant has been issued against the 34 year-old person of Serb nationality, Navislav D., who is suspected of having taken part in genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in executing 27 Bosniaks in the Foca region in 1992, and carrying out murders and attempted murders in the village of Djedjevo and Trnovac on 21 April 1992. The suspect has been in detention in Bonn since yesterday. One person, in spite of being injured, managed to survive one of the mass liquidations in which the suspect was alleged to have taken part as a member of a Serb paramilitary unit.

### B-H: Guarding Mass Graves Not Part of NATO Mission

*AU1901154196 Paris AFP in English*
*1409 GMT 19 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Jan 19 (AFP) — NATO would not be prepared to guard the sites of mass graves in Bosnia in the event of war crimes investigators deciding to dig them up, the Alliance's Supreme Commander in Europe said on Friday.

US General George Joulwan said the NATO-led Implementation Force would do its utmost to help the work of the UN War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, but that this could not take priority over IFOR's primary tasks in Bosnia.

In Washington, The Christian Science Monitor said Friday that two previously undisclosed mass graves of Moslem men massacred after Bosnian Serbs overran Srebrenica in July have been located at Glogova, Bosnia.

It said the graves were "large enough to hold hundreds of bodies". They were visited Wednesday by Monitor reporter Jonathan Landay who said he and three other western journalists skirted Bosnian Serb checkpoints on main roads and toook rougher mountain roads to the scene.

The UN War Crimes Tribunal is currently examing the possibiity of going to Srebrenica in northeastern Bosnia, a former UN safe haven where thousands of Moslems were massacred by the Bosnian Serbs last summer

"If there is a request to go to sites we will provide a secure environment, within our capabilities," Joulwan said.

But IFOR could not be expected to dedicate troops to guarding these sites. "I'd recommend against that," he said, indicating that this task should be left up to civilian authorities or the police.

The Tribunal's Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone held talks with Joulwan and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana on Friday in a bid to work out the details of IFOR's approach to individuals who have been indicted for war crimes.

Joulwan reiterated NATO's position that while it was unwilling to get involved in pursuing and hunting down war criminals, it would seek to cooperate with civilian authorities engaged in this task.

He said names, descriptions and photographs of individuals that have been indicted had been distributed to his troops. If they came across any of the wanted men, they were under orders to detain them and hand them over to the civilian authorities.

Joulwan's remarks reflect NATO's determination to stick to precisely defined military tasks in Bosnia to ensure that it is ready to leave by the end of the year.

"We will not sit passively by and watch an atrocity take place but we are not serving a police function either. There is a fine line there," he said.

Joulwan's comments came after he had announced that NATO's mission was firmly on track, 30 days after it took over authority for ensuring peace from the UN.

The operation now moves into a critical two-week phase during which NATO is tasked with securing areas of the country which are to be involved in landswaps.

### B-H: UN War Crimes Tribunal To Exhume Mass Graves

*AU1901155996 Paris AFP in English*
*1505 GMT 19 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Jan 19 (AFP) — Richard Goldstone, the chief prosecutor of the international war crimes tribunal, said Friday [19 January] he

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would be seeking to exhume mass graves in Bosnia as part of his investigation into war crimes in the country.

"We regard it as important in relation to some crimes to exhume mass graves," Goldstone, said after talks here on cooperation with the NATO-led peace implementation force in Bosnia on the apprehension of known war criminals.

Goldstone said the main reason for exhumations would be to provide corroboration of witnesses' accounts of what happened in places like Srebrenica, where thousands of Bosnian Moslems were massacred last summer by the Bosnian Serbs.

Goldstone also warned the Yugoslav Government that he would recommend the reimposition of UN sanctions if Belgrade did not start cooperating with the work of his tribunal, as it undertook to do in the Dayton peace accords.

**B-H: Serb Official: Croats Prevent Access to Mass Graves**

*LD2001180996 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Glogovac, a member of the [Bosnian Serb] state commission for the exchange of prisoners, stated that [Bosnian] Croats do not want to clear the mines around Bocac [hydroelectric power plant, south of Banja Luka] and hand it over because there are many mass graves containing the bodies of massacred Serbs in the area.

He said that similar mass graves exist in Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad and that the Croats have placed minefields around them in order to prevent access to the locations they should abandon and hand over to the Serb Republic. When expert teams clear the minefields, civilians will be allowed to enter the area and help identify the bodies, particularly near Bocac, Glogovac said. He added that local people had already discovered some mass graves.

**B-H: Serb Police Restrict Reporters in Srebrenica**

*AU2301091696 Paris AFP in English 0439 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[By Denis Barnett]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Srebrenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Jan 23 (AFP) — Srebrenica's snow-covered soil held fast to its grim secrets Monday as Serb police displayed their distrust of the Dayton agreement.

Journalists who reached this former Moslem enclave on Monday were detained by police and escorted to nearby Bratunac for questioning, despite Dayton's freedom of movement provisions.

Police have kept Srebrenica closed off from the glare of the world's media anxious to corroborate claims of mass executions since the enclave fell to the Bosnian Serbs last July.

"The rules of the game are different here," the police commander for the area, who refused to give his name, said. "You have freedom of movement, but you do not have the right to work."

"Freedom of movement" could only be allowed under Serb police escort, and even then, there could be no cameras or notebooks uncovered, no questions asked to the local population — up to 8,000 of them refugees from the former Serb Krajina.

Journalists' vehicles were searched and news agency photographers had their film confiscated.

He told the journalists they had been detained because they did not have the necessary paperwork from the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale.

"You must know that we are a separate country, with a separate government," the commander said, dismissing the Dayton peace agreement which considers both entities in Bosnia as one country.

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) had yet to patrol in the area, the commander confirmed, despite an undertaking by NATO commander Admiral Leighton Smith that IFOR would provide an environment of security for human rights investigators. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Japan Recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina as State**

*AU2301094596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Japan has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state so that it could start sending as soon as possible economic aid to the countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia.

The Japanese government endorsed this decision this morning. The decision takes effect immediately. The Japanese Foreign Ministry officials have stated that they have noticed progress in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the functioning of the state according to the new constitution.

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**B-H: Izetbegovic, Bulgaria's Zhelev Meet 19 Jan**

*AU1901175196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev today paid a [words indistinct] to Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Zhelev talked with members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation, which, apart from Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic, included president and (?vice president) of the federation [names indistinct], and Presidency members Ivo Komsic and Mirko Pejanovic. Senada Cumurovic reports:

[Begin recording] [Cumurovic] Today's meeting between the two presidents, Zhelev and Izetbegovic, officially began with the playing of the national anthems of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was followed by 40-minute long talks, after which the presidents addressed correspondents. Thus, the host, Alija Izetbegovic, said that it has not been forgotten that Bulgaria was the first of the 100 countries to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina. Calling this a friendly visit, Izetbegovic also said the following:

[Izetbegovic] I have acquainted President Zhelev with the political, economic, and social situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented some basic [words indistinct] consequences of the war, of course, the most basic data, and our expectations from the future, the first steps in peace, results already achieved, reasons for our optimism in this respect, and the need at that to have our friends in the world at hand and helpful, and among them we certainly also rely on the friendly Bulgaria.

President Zhelev expressed his support for the Dayton accord and Bulgaria's readiness to participate in IFOR [Implementation Force] [words indistinct] and to participate in the renovation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Cumurovic] As Izetbegovic said at the end of his statement, the forms of cooperation will be agreed on in further contacts between Bulgarian and Bosnian representatives.

Speaking in Bulgarian, Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic of Bulgaria, who is visiting Sarajevo for the first time, also stressed the friendly relations between the two countries:

[Zhelev, in Bulgarian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I congratulate the president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for his courage in accepting and signing the Dayton accord. I believe, and we all understand, that the Dayton accord will not solve all the problems at once or overnight. This is what makes the president's courage even greater, and we congratulate him for that.

Bulgaria was one of the first countries to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina, understanding its sovereignty and aspiration towards independence. Unfortunately, after that event, the war began, which lasted three and a half years and destroyed this country and this city, with all the victims and hundreds of thousands of replaced people, as well as the entire war tragedy.

We have come to this friendly country in order to confirm our desire to help, to express our solidarity, and extend to President Izetbegovic moral support that we are ready to help in any way.

We have applied to participate in IFOR and are ready to participate in various ways and forms in the support and efforts in reconstruction that will follow when the peace is established finally and permanently.

This is why we have come here to show and express our desire to help once again and as a friendly country to once again congratulate President Izetbegovic for all that he achieved and his great courage.

[Cumurovic] After the statements, there was only time for one correspondent's question which was related to the Dayton accord deadlines set to President Izetbegovic. We think that all Dayton accord deadlines will be met in full and without postponement. This was confirmed yesterday by Richard Holbrooke and representatives of the Contact Group, Izetbegovic said. [end recording]

**B-H: Bulgaria's Zhelev, Bildt Discuss Reconstruction**

*AU1901175296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev held talks today with Carl Bildt, senior UN representative for the implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton accord, about Bulgaria's participation in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and cooperation in the Balkans. We talked about the issue, which I deem very important, of Bulgaria's participation in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the general issue of cooperation in the Balkans and relations between the region on the whole and Bulgaria and the European Union, Carl Bildt told BH-PRESS.

President Zhelev talked with General Janvier about Bulgarian troops participating in IFOR [Implementation Force]. Bulgaria is ready to send its medical units and units for clearing mines to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before sending them, he wants to know IFOR's needs, who will finance these forces, and where they would be deployed.

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The international forces were also offered the use of Sofia hospitals for hospitalization and rehabilitation of the injured.

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**Croatia: 18 Charged With Spying for Yugoslav Army**

*LD2201165996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Zagreb military prosecutor's office has filed charges with the Zagreb military court against 18 persons on the suspicion that they spied for a foreign intelligence service, that is, the intelligence service of the so-called Yugoslav Army, the Zagreb military court said today.

Last 23 October, the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order of the Interior Ministry, together with the National Security Office, filed charges against the same persons, which if proven correct would result in fines.

The charges have been brought against Mihajlo Knezevic, Mirko Vuletic, and Mile Kosanovic, who are charged with forming and organizing a network of spies for a foreign country in Croatia during the state of war and the state of imminent threat of war. All three are on the run and it has been proposed that they be tried in absentia. [passage omitted]

The indictment says that following an investigation, it has been established both legally and factually that the defendants committed acts of espionage. It can be asserted with certainty that the defendants' behavior displays all the major objective and subjective chacteristics of the punishable offense of espionage, the indictment says. [passage omitted]

It is expected that the trial of this espionage group will be held in the Zagreb military court in March.

**Croatia: Terms for Demilitarizing Srem-Baranja**

*AU2201194596 Vukovar Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 17 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The demilitarization envisaged by the European agreement and the latest UN Security Council resolution will be an extremely delicate task, and we will perform it very carefully, considering the safety of people and the area most of all, Slavko Dokmanovic, president of the Srem-Baranja District Council, stated in Vukovar today. He said that the first requirement for the beginning of the demilitarization of the Srem-Baranja District is that members of the military part of the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] secure the border toward Croatia. Secondly, he added, UN Administrator Jacques Klein must address the population on television and guarantee their safety, which is his responsibility.

The first man of the Srem-Baranja District said that the functioning of the police is one of the most difficult problems in the implementation of the new UN peace operation. Apart from 5,000 soldiers, the international community will send 446 policemen to the district. Their activities will have to be coordinated with the activities of our police and it would best be done through joint patrolling, added Dokmanovic. He pointed out that the establishment of UN temporary administration did not abolish any Srem-Baranja District institutions and that the temporary administration would actually rely on those institutions.

Dokmanovic said he believes the right of the temporary UN administrator to request close NATO air support refers to Croatia, as the international community must have realized by now that Croatia is a very unreliable partner that does not keep its promises. The president of the Srem-Baranja District Council has announced that, in the course of this year, about 30,000 Serbs exiled from Croatia will settle in the district. The settlement will begin as soon as the weather permits.

Dokmanovic added that the Serb side would ask Administrator Klein that the term Eastern Slavonia be excluded from the name of the peace operation. According to him, the use of that name for the Srem-Baranja District is a Croatian trick designed to convince the world that Croatia had access to the Danube River via Slavonia, which is neither founded in geography nor in history. Dokmanovic confirmed that Vukovar would be the seat of the UN administrator as well as most of the temporary administration, regardless of the fact that the Croats are doing everything to have the seat in Osijek or some other place.

**Croatia: Zagreb Denies Bosnian Refugees Expelled**

*AU2201183696 Paris AFP in English 1614 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan 22 (AFP)—Croatian authorities confirmed Monday that they had moved Bosnians from a refugee camp in Zagreb, but denied UN assertions that they had expelled them.

Earlier in the day, a spokesperson of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Zagreb said that Croatian authorities had expelled several hundred Bosnians from a refugee camp in the capital.

The official Croatian body in charge of refugees declared that the departure of several hundred Bosnians from the camps in Zagreb "corresponds to the refugee movement in other camps in Croatia" and that those who left for Bosnia did so "voluntarily."

Last week, Croatian authorities forced about 200 Bosnians to leave Spansko camp, also in Zagreb. Several hun-

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dred Bosnian refugees fleeing combat had sought refuge in its shelters.

According to the UNHCR in Zagreb, "as in the past, Croatian authorities gave refugees the choice either to go to another camp in Gasinci (in eastern Croatia) or to go back home to Bosnia," said spokesperson Rajka Rusan, referring to around 600 Bosnian refugees in the Zapruzje camp.

"Eighty-six Bosnian Moslem refugees decided to return to Bosnia while several dozen families chose to go to Gasinci," she added: "We don't know where the other refugees went.

"The Croatian authorities justified their decision with economic reasons. In our opinion these are unjustified. They could have waited at least two more months for the arrival of spring," she said.

There are three refugee camps in Zagreb. According to the UNHCR, Croation authorities plan to close all three, including Kruge, where there are about 200 other Bosnian refugees.

**Croatia: Official on Prospects for B-H Federation**

*AU2301092996 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 96 pp 31-33*

[Interview with Hidajet Biscevic, assistant to the Croatian foreign minister, by Goran Rosic: "Where Europe Goes, Bosnia Will Follow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Rosic] Mr. Biscevic, after the Dayton agreement and its signing in Paris, it was expected that within the future state of Bosnia-Herzegovina the main problems would be the negotiations and relations with the Serb side. However, all of a sudden a series of unpleasant events occurred, which seriously endangered and worsened relations between the Croats and Bosniak Muslims within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. How can we explain this?

[Biscevic] Regarding the Croatian and Bosniak Muslim side's negotiations with the Serb entity within the implementation of the Dayton agreement, there are no particular problems. Namely, in reality, there are no direct negotiations between those two sides (the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and "the Serb Republic"), but international mediators are in charge of that within the whole package of implementating the Dayton agreement. Therefore, the public has the impression that there is a small number of problems. However, those who are better informed know that there are many problems with the Serb entity. One only has to mention the many questions regarding Sarajevo or, even more important, the question of the regional balance within the Viennese negotiations on arms controls, and things become clearer. On the other hand, what has caused the heated climate in Croat-Bosniak Muslim relations in the general public, is that the Dayton agreement creates a new framework for Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina a definite and indisputable framework for the life of the two communities. So we have reached the point where that common house of the Croats and Bosniak Muslims must be organized, that is, all the elements of that house have to be arranged. Metaphorically speaking, so far it has had a roof, but now the rooms, the attics, corridors, etc. have to be furnished. Furthermore, the present political framework for operating the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at this moment has reached a point where the many open or controversial questions regarding its essence, from its very conception to questions of its constitutional organization, have to be resolved. There are reasons for this negative feeling in the general public, but the very fact that we have come to the point where we are discussing everything concretely represents great progress.

[Rosic] In whose interest is it that it is precisely at this moment that these unpleasant incidents and misunderstandings are occurring?

[Biscevic] In any case, at this moment, when there is an unfortunate series of renewed conflicts that I hope will not grow into any kind of new distrust or, God forbid, something even worse than that, there is the historical memory of a couple of years ago, which warns us that there are different interests within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. It is clear that in a situation when the house has not been finished and completely fixed, there is some room for doubt, resistance, and even subversive activities from various sides. It is absolutely certain that any kind of weakening of the federal process can only reinforce the Serb position within the total negotiating process. Finally, regardless of our moral stands and assessments, "the Serb Republic" has entered the implementation of the Dayton agreement as a formed entity and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has only been created in concept and has to be confirmed in reality. Space to undermine the process is being made here and there is probably the interest that "the Serb Republic" would, if the misunderstandings between the two partners within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina increase, be compensated for the pressures to which it is exposed.

[Rosic] Can we also talk about the responsibility of foreign intelligence services for the recent disturbance in relations between the Croats and Bosniak Muslims? Might 1993 repeat itself?

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[Biscevic] Let us be realistic. Apart from all the international consensus, which has to a certain extent been established about resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are international forces that still regard the solution as ephemeral, fragile, and with opportunities for further processes that, in some new circumstances, after sanctions on Serbia are lifted and a loose union created within Bosnia-Herzegovina, would enable them to try to strengthen the future regional position of Serbia.

[Rosic] Unlike those who through the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina see an opportunity to restore some kind of Yugoslavia, there are those who would support the establishment of some kind of Islamic state (for instance, Kissinger). Alija Izetbegovic and part of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] are openly flirting with the idea, supporting the Islamization of life in all the territories under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Could this idea come about?

[Biscevic] The Dayton agreement has introduced a concept of arranging future relations in the territory of the former SFRY. This is a concept of respecting international borders and equality of the rights and responsibilities of all the states in this territory, but it still does not mean that all the processes that preceded Dayton and were full of various calculations were halted. So, there is a general principle, but in the example of eastern Slavonia and in different approaches to the future mandate, we can see that in the background there is still the unresolved question of the final definition and determination of various geostrategic interests in this region. Therefore, at the moment, there are still three concepts in our region. The first is based on the fact that future relations will be arranged on the basis of the integrity of the Republic of Croatia, the integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an union of two entities, and the territorial integrity of the so-called FRY. The second concept regards the dual character of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a number of other interests and tries to impose, under the guise of some kind of new economic or some other neo-integralism, compensation for those interests that Serbia has lost by its military defeat. The last concept starts from the premise that the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot survive in the future, that is, it will not be able to resolve the Bosniak-Muslim national question within the context of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and coexistence with the Croats. So, here and there is a smoldering, still existing and possible option of separating the Bosniak-Muslim entity within the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that the general public knows perfectly well what the formation of such an entity would mean for the Republic of Croatia and for future regional and European stability.

[Rosic] To what extent have the advocates of such an entity been encouraged by the change of the political authority profile in Turkey, which, with the United States, has been the main sponsor of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and what could the consequences of that change be?

[Biscevic] I think that it is the Bosniak Muslims' permanent interest above all to find a solution to their national question within the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and not in a separate entity. When we talk about Turkey, we must emphasize that it is the main sponsor of a realistic solution to the Bosniak-Muslim question, precisely through coexistence with the Croats and their turning to Europe together because then it is also in line with the Turkish interest in joining Europe.

[Rosic] Could we say that Turkey has all the time been a guarantee to the international community that Alija Izetbegovic will not tie himself to Islamic fundamentalists from Iran, Afghanistan, and so on?

[Biscevic] That is why I say that Turkey's interest is to be constructive about the European views of the arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Islamic question, complementary to the principle of solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina in line with the Western and democratic system. To that extent the rise of Islam in Turkey is in some way a warning to the West. But, all the same, the revival or the rehabilitation of communism in a large part of former eastern Europe is a very important message to the Bosniak Muslims in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina's wider geostrategic definition. If we look at what is going on with the return of communism, then I cannot see where and how the Bosniak Muslims can find their western European home other than in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Certainly not in some kind of new Yugoslavia, which would compensate for Serbia's losses.

[Rosic] What can the international community do to stop such processes and what is Croatia's role in all this?

[Biscevic] It will do anything to prevent Turkey from slipping toward Islam, but it is also clear that it would be even more drastic in preventing the creation of a more clearly expressed or more radical Islamic element in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That, of course, does not mean that, from the point of view of Croatia's fundamental interests, Islam's presence as one element of a wider pluralistic environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be realized. However, in no way can it be the skeleton of the future state organization, let alone the ideological framework within which Bosnia-Herzegovina's

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political system will be constituted. If, by some chance, that road were to be taken, it would result in such a process of parceling out the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, at least in the spiritual sense, that there would be villages divided five kilometers from each other without any mutual contact, tolerance, or so on. In that context, one should look at those unpleasant events from Usora to Mostar, unfortunately, only as a crude and rude strengthening of positions.

[Rosic] Following the work of the first session of the Joint Council for the Cooperation of Croatia and the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one could have had the impression that the Bosniak Muslim side, which brought up partial problems in the discussions, in fact filibustered the discussion on important problems. Is that also part of this strengthening of positions?

[Biscevic] It is not a political phrase to say that, just a month after the Paris peace conference was completed, a council was formed and a session was held. With this we finally had a firm institutional form through which we can resolve all the open questions, while hitherto we had noise on two channels. Therefore different interpretations of the same thing could have been possible.

[Rosic] However, avoiding discussion on important problems between the two states suggests that all three options are present in the Bosniak Muslims' game. Namely, one cannot see that they have firmly decided to choose the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

[Biscevic] It was precisely through all the different interpretations until now that one could have had the impression that all options were possible. However, through the internationally obligatory form—that is, the council—which will be particularly assisted by the international community over the next couple of months, we will be forced to deal with concrete questions. It is true that in the first stage there are differences in approach. First, we have proposed strengthening mutual trust and defining the package of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation so as to be able to start solving concrete problems in such a positive atmosphere. A large part of the Bosniak Muslim delegation, above all in that part in charge of the functioning of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, tends to want to tackle the problems one by one.

[Rosic] Such an approach is highly reminiscent of the practice of the Constituent Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation hitherto?

[Biscevic] I do not think that it is a productive way because it results in endless mutual accusations instead of building mutual trust.

[Rosic] How can we interpret the foundation, work, and function of the Joint Council compared with Alija Izetbegovic's and Slobodan Milosevic's common letter of intent which they sent to U.S. Secretary of State Christopher? This letter envisages almost the same cooperation between the so-called FRY and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as that between Croatia and the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What are the possible connotations of that letter?

[Biscevic] It belongs to the part I have already mentioned. There are still different options or it may be in this case indirect pressure on the Croatian side regarding the Federation.

[Rosic] Was that letter talked about perhaps in Sarajevo?

[Biscevic] During the talks themselves, the letter was not mentioned. However, it realistically reflects the existence of various options and calculations with the future direction of Bosnia-Herzegovina's development. I do not want to accuse anyone of any kind of calculation here because nobody in Europe or the world knows how the whole story of Bosnia-Herzegovina will end. It is only clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina's future development will influence the future development in Europe as much as the development of European relations will influence Bosnia-Herzegovina. To put it in simply, if the international processes lead toward a transparent Europe, also incorporating Russia in the democratic processes in the West, then it will also influence Bosnia-Herzegovina's future. It is the same with the possibility of Europe taking another direction. In that period political calculations of all kinds are legal and legitimate. Of course, it is precisely because of this that it is imperative for both the Republic of Croatia and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect their interests.

[Rosic] To what extent has the problem of the refugees' return from Kuplensko to Velika Kladusa created difficulties in relations between the two partners in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation?

[Biscevic] This is an exceptionally difficult problem, which burdens the whole process we are talking about. The problem of Kuplensko and Velika Kladusa has in some way started to become a symbol of this. First, on the level of organizing the return of the refugees. Second, on the level of achieving political coexistence among the various political orientations and views. Third, it has started to become a symbol of the real possibility of establishing mutual trust among the nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least among the Bosniak Muslims. Namely, if it is so hard, despite all Croatia's help and I must emphasize that the whole idea of returning refugees to Velika Kladusa is a

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Croatian idea, and it is precisely the Republic of Croatia that has won international support and attracted something unprecedented, that police units come in from a distant country (Turkey), to restore confidence within one nation, then one must really ask what the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina should expect from the Federation. Therefore, this process of building confidence is of crucial significance. As soon as it is possible to restore mutual confidence among the Muslims, the confidence of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina toward the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation project will grow. One cannot expect a thaw in Mostar when there is a chill in Velika Kladusa.

[Biscevic] And, finally, fourth, it has started to become a symbol for the help of the international community. The more mutual confidence there is, the more the political and administrative credibility of all the authorities of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation will grow. And without that credibility there will not be one German mark invested in any of the municipalities. Therefore the formation of a credible and efficient Government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and a genuinely consistent separation of functions between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation are really of crucial significance to all those processes, from the return of refugees and development to judicial issues and property relations.

[Rosic] The constitutional order and the principles on which the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been organized, according to the Dayton agreement, do not give it too much of a chance to survive as a whole state in the future. Namely, in the world it has never been proved that such a model can work. In your opinion, can it, nevertheless, work in the long term?

[Biscevic] With difficulty, but it is, first of all, linked to the character of future international relations. However, regardless of the development of those processes, one must find a solution that will remain within the bounds of international legality. Practical life can encourage centrifugal processes. After all, the Bosniak Muslim leadership agreed to them because in the principles upon which Dayton is based there is both the part from Geneva and the part from New York, which gives the right to establish parallel separate relations with the neighbors. That does not necessarily mean the dismemberment of the state, but the character of those relations has to be defined in the next period.

[Rosic] The most probable option for the survival of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is, it seems, as a lengthy protectorate of the international community.

[Biscevic] Bosnia-Herzegovina is already a protectorate within which processes must not take place by force. Bosnia-Herzegovina is under military protection so as to make those inevitable processes unfold in a civilized and political way. There are a number of instruments to achieve that and one of the elements is the Joint Council.

[Rosic] To what degree is it acceptable for the Croatian people, from the point of view of overall Croatian interests, to live in such a protectorate?

[Biscevic] If we call it a NATO protectorate, in military vocabulary, then it can cause negative feelings, considering how much the Croatian nation has invested in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, insofar as it provides peace and to the degree to which through various other institutions, including the Joint Council, the interests and the position of the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be affirmed, this kind of protectorate is only one of the auxiliary means of preserving the survival of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina peacefully.

**Croatia: Daily Criticizes B-H Government Attitude**

*AU2201182896 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 96 p 4*

[Commentary by Josip Jovic: "Knocking One's Head Against a Brick Wall"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has said that recent events in Usora and Mostar show "that something is deeply wrong," blaming, of course, the Croat side for that and, I am afraid, immediately continuing with acts and words to illustrate the main reason why something is deeply wrong. This is what Silajdzic said: "When you enter Bosnia-Herzegovina, until you reach Mostar, it seems that you are in a greater Croatia and not in Bosnia."

With this stand, Silajdzic demonstrates complete disregard of the situation in the state whose government he heads, and this disregard and blindness to the political situation may really be the key reason for something being "deeply wrong." By the way, there have been many examples lately of the implementation of policy according to the antiquated principle of knocking one's head against a brick wall, with which, of course, the heads were more likely to break than the walls. The first example of this was ensured by Mr. Silajdzic himself, who built his European and world image on his nice smile and good English, which obviously does not suffice.

**They Say We and Mean I**

What Silajdzic seems to see, what he wonders about, what he advises against, and what he would obviously like to change is not an illusion but hard reality. This is where tough problems develop and eventually

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lead to new aggravation and conflict. And then the Federation will come to nothing. For instance, Silajdzic neglects the simple fact that there is no Bosnia until Mostar nor has there ever been. This region is called Herzegovina. Is it possible that Silajdzic does not know that? He is probably astonished by the fact that, while travelling through Posusje or Siroki Brijeg, or Neum or Medjugorje, he saw no mosque, not a single woman wearing oriental clothes, and no Arabic script. What he sees as a continuation of Greater Croatia is only the Croat people, who did not arrive there just yesterday—where neither Serbs nor Muslims lived before them—and who, in compliance with the idea of a free state and free people, do not want to live according to cultural and political models imposed on them by somebody else and, at the same time, do not want to impose their own models on anybody else. And what to do now? To move Bosnia, such as Silajdzic sees it, a little to the south and a little to the west?

It is now clear that, although the idea of a Greater Serbia was the main reason for the long-lasting and bloody war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it has also been maintained by this internal syndrome in Bosnia, by which the fanatically religious section of the Muslim political leadership adheres obstinately to the line of an exclusively Muslim Bosnia. Hence the idea of the name of the people who have, since yesterday, been called Bosniaks, by which one considers Bosnia as belonging to the Muslims by definition, in the same way that the Serbs tried to create the Yugoslav nation as a model for merging non-Serb peoples and the Croats were taken in in an extremely naive manner. Thus we reach the absurdity of having Bosniaks from Stolac or Capljina, which is approximately the same as having Dalmatians from Osijek.

From Washington via Dayton to Mostar a project is being worked on that aims to reduce the Croats to the position of a national minority. In a Bosnia divided into two entities (the Sarajevo newspapers regularly write about Serb and Bosniak ones) there is obviously ever less space for a third entity. The borders of cantons or counties in the Federation have been drawn in such a way that the Croat part blends into the Bosniak one. The theses about the Federation's multicultural diversity as the basic goal and about a unified Mostar, which is heard increasingly often, serves the same purpose. And words such as multicultural diversity and unity are part of the hegemonic vocabulary of the stronger and bigger side, which always says we and thinks I. Those weaker and more threatened always favor detachedness, independence, and individuality.

The constant accusations against Croats for every incident, the selective treatment of war crimes, and the summoning of leading Herzeg-Bosnians to The Hague Tribunal have the same goal: to tailor Bosnia from the natural three into the easier two entities. All in all, today, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have ceased to be an entity and, tomorrow, they will no longer be an ethnicity either.

**From Entity to Ethnicity**

The fate of the Herzegovina people is obviously not magnificent. Tens of thousands of Croats have been killed in Herzeg-Bosnia, about the same number as the Croats in Croatia. Moreover, in their conflict with the Muslims and even with the Serbs, the Herzegovinians have been constantly treated by a part of the domestic opposition and a considerable section of the press as the main initiators of evil. The Croatian state has failed to meet their expectations, it has rather sacrificed them as pawns in order to solve somewhat broader geopolitical problems. The expectations that the Muslims would be able to reintegrate peacefully into the Croatian national corpus through confederation is totally unrealistic. Fantically religious Muslims consider mujahidin from any country whom they do no understand at all to be much closer to them than Croats from the same birthplace.

True, the most important thing is that the war has stopped. Precisely to avoid a new war, one should respect everybody's right to his distinctiveness. One should also respect it in the case of the Croats as an equal nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and one should not treat them as a national minority that has arrived on foreign soil from somewhere. By the way, it can be seen now how damaging it was to put—out of electoral pragmatism—this part of the Croatian national corpus under emigrants. If there is anything we have learned from this war, it is that old problems on these territories arose from forced unities and artificial unions that were tailored far away from real life. One should know exactly what belongs to whom and one should respect everybody's elementary right to be master in his own home. This is the only way in which real cooperation and a natural community can work. Anything else is temporary.

**Croatia: Presidential Adviser, Bosnian Serbs Meet**

*LD2201230796 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Slobodan Lang, adviser on humanitarian affairs to the [Croatian] republican president, visited Banja Luka on 20 January, where he had talks with [Bosnian] Serb leaders. Dr. Lang's office issued a statement on this through the Croatian news agency HINA.

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Among other things, the statement welcomes the signing of the Dayton peace agreement and the onset of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stresses the need to create preconditions for normal life and the establishment of economic and other relations. It stresses the importance of the freedom of movement of all citizens especially with the aim of reuniting families. The exchange of all prisoners and reappearance of all those who have disappeared, were singled out as special preconditions for peace.

An interest in the establishment of economic relations, for instance the purchase of ore for the Sisak iron works and the sale of Pliva [pharmaceutical company] medications in the Serb areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was expressed at the meeting. A mutual desire to establish traffic over the bridge in Gradiska and Banja Luka-Zagreb rail traffic was also expressed.

Dr. Slobodan Lang said the statement reports they will contact both economic chambers about future economic cooperation.

**Croatia: E. Slavonian Serb Wants Border With Croatia**

*AU1901085396 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Slavko Dokmanovic, president of the council of the Srem-Baranja province, has said in Vukovar today that the demilitarization anticipated by the Erdut agreement and the latest UN Security Council resolution will be an extremely delicate job and we will be approaching it with much caution, taking into account the safety of the people and the territory. According to Dokmanovic, the first condition for the beginning of the demilitarization of the Srem-Baranja province will be that members of the military part of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] secure the border with Croatia well and the second that UN administrator Jacques Klein guarantee security to the people in the province, for which he is responsible.

The number one man in the Srem-Baranja province said that the work of the police forces will be among the most difficult problems in the implementation of the new UN peace operation. Apart from the 5,000 troops, the international community will also be sending 446 policemen here. Their work will have to be coordinated with the work of our police and it would be best if the cooperation is implemented through joint patrols, added Dokmanovic. He emphasized that no institution of the Srem-Baranja province had been abolished with the introduction of the temporary UN administration and that the temporary administration would in fact have to rely on these institutions. Dokmanovic said he believed that the possibility of use of close NATO air support, which the temporary administration could use, related to Croatia, since the international community must have realized that it was precisely Croatia that was a highly unreliable partner, not abiding by the promises that it makes.

The president of the council of the Srem-Baranja province announced that about 30,000 Serb refugees from Croatia would be settling in the province in the course of this year. The settlement would be starting as soon as weather permitted. Dokmanovic added that the Serb side would be demanding of administrator Klein that the syntagm Eastern Slavonia be removed from the name of the peace operation. According to him, the use of that name for the Srem-Baranja province is a Croatian fraud, aimed at convincing the world that Croatia had access to the Danube River through Slavonia, which has neither geographical nor historical foundations.

Dokmanovic confirmed that Vukovar would be the center where the UN administrator and most of the temporary administration would be located, even though the Croats are doing everything for them to be transferred to Osijek or some other town.

**Croatia: Serb Radio Calls Tudjman 'Brutal' Dictator**

*AU2201201196 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 15 Jan 96*

[Unattributed commentary from the "Ogledalo Stampe" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb people in Krajina have felt on their own skin that Mr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, is a dictator. How is it possible for a general to be any different, anyway? We, however, cannot understand why the Croat people do not see that but instead praise him as a democrat and their father. A reporter from Rijeka NOVI LIST nevertheless dared speak up and say that the emperor was naked.

By crushing the right to freedom of speech and declaring open season on the freedom of the individual the state obviously shows that is precisely that which the Croatian Radio and Television uses in its editorial to strike a reporter and a paper, and thus shows that it is heading towards becoming a brutal dictatorship [sentence as heard].

We mentioned one of the introductory statements made by Roman Latkovic, a banned commentator who fiercely responded to the ruthless attack by the Croatian state authorities with the aid of the sorry subservience of the Croatian Radio and Television, on NOVI LIST. In

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reaction to the Stalinist evolution of the Croatian Radio and Television, the servant of the servant's servant, and remarking that it took the professionals of the court three days to edit their pseudo-documentary monster, the columnist of the only independent Croatian daily specified the following:

They served one master yesterday; today they are licking the hands that will whip them tomorrow, they are serving another master. Tomorrow they will, humble and forgotten, serve yet another, if they are needed. In the sad TV Daily News of 10 January 1996 it was evident that the authorities are trying to turn the state into a Milas-like [Ivan Milas—guard of the Croatian state seal] swamp inhabited by idiots or frightened subjects in order to be able to continue to do what they have been doing—stealing and cheating people all the way. Not having [words indistinct] of the Zagreb regime, Tudjman is a brutal dictator leading us into a disaster, and he has to be urgently removed from his position of authority.

[Words indistinct] in the conclusion of his article, Latkovic again thanks the Croatian Radio and Television and the Croatian state authorities for having lost all the criteria, in which condition they are going to lose power all the faster.

**Croatia: Zagreb Said To Threaten B-H Federation**

*AU2201210096 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 15 Jan 96*

[Unattributed commentary from the "Ogledalo Stampe" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] It will be difficult to achieve peace in Bosnia. The wounds are deep, and it will take much willingness, time, and money to make things as they used to be. After all, Bosnia was calm when it was in Yugoslavia.

The analysts of events in Bosnia were right to point out that the post-war reconstruction of the former central Yugoslav republic would not follow the anticipated rhythm particularly because of the deep division among the three warring sides. That their warnings were not unfounded can best be seen in what is now happening in Sarajevo and Mostar. Politicians' signatures may be enough to stop bloodshed, but reconciliation will be much more difficult, and without reconciliation one cannot count on the success of the international action for reconstruction of the economic and social life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The international community's representative for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton and Paris peace agreement, Carl Bildt, faced this problem at the very beginning of his mandate. He admitted that the current situation in Bosnia, taking into account the good start of the NATO-conducted military part of the action, is not satisfactory. There is still no solution for the situation in Sarajevo, created by Serb threats of mass exodus unless the unification of Serb municipalities in Sarajevo with the part of the city that is under Muslim control is postponed. There is also no solution for the situation in Mostar, in which hostility between Croats and Muslims has resumed.

It is precisely the situations in Sarajevo and Mostar that indicate what the essence of the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina is—lack of trust. After the three-and-a-half-year war, which claimed thousands of lives on all the three sides and destroyed thousands of towns and villages, it is hard to believe that it is possible to forget everything overnight or wipe it all out with the stroke of a pen. The fear of the Serbs about remaining in the city on the Miljacka River once it is in the hands of the Muslims is therefore understandable. No promises or guarantees from the international community can keep them in Sarajevo any longer because they fear Muslim revenge. The same international community that is now offering them alleged protection did not want to meet the Serb demands to stay in their parts of Sarajevo, and does not intend to postpone the transfer of Ilidza, Grbavica, Hadzici, and other Serb districts in Sarajevo to the Muslims' authority.

In view of the situation, a great number of Serbs decided to move out, and Sarajevo may soon become purely Muslim. If that does happen, and all the indications are that it will, it will be a great defeat for the international community. On the other hand, the intention behind the whole thing may be to please Alija Izetbegovic.

Relations between Muslims and Croats are similar. They, particularly in the summer of 1993, fought heavily between themselves, and then, in early 1994, the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was created on the order of the United States. The most important task of this federation was the front against the Serbs. This artificially created federation has never been brought to life, the loosest link in the chain being Mostar, which is divided into the eastern Muslim part and western Croat part.

There has been shooting in Mostar for the past 10 days or so, but it is not the only place in their federation in which Muslims and Croats open fire on each other. It all indicates that it is not possible for Muslims and Croats to coexist, and the possible breakdown of their shaky alliance may cause another war in Bosnia. This is the reason that the international community is fighting so frenetically to keep the phantom federation alive. The

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U.S. troops and the others may stop the war, but they cannot bring peace. The international community will not be able to do much unless all three warring sides are prepared for reconciliation. It is their country, their peace, and their responsibility. Foreigners can help a great deal, but they cannot impose peace unless the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims really want it.

Mostar and Sarajevo are the crucial points for the future decision about war or peace in Bósnia. If these issues, which are the most important, are resolved, Bosnia will also be peaceful.

When the former mayor of Bremen took over the administration of Mostar on behalf of the European Union in order to reconstruct and unite the town divided between the Muslims and Croats, he soon noticed that it was not only friends he was making. When a shell landed in his office, the official report said that it was probably mafia that was behind the assassination attempt. However, the people close to Koschnick suspected the followers of the firm hand in the Croatian Army.

According to information available to Western intelligence circles, there is not much difference between them. Smuggling, crime, gangs, and the army are closely intertwined in the eastern Muslim part of the town. Neither the hawks in the two armies nor the smugglers care too much about reunifying Mostar. Even the senior Croat officers occasionally state it is mostly army members who take part in organized crime.

A classic example is armed carjacking. Two jeeps a month disappear this way. Armed persons stop cars on open roads and throw the passengers out, most often on the road from Mostar, or else the thieves wait by the car until the driver returns, point a gun at his head, and demand the keys to the car, said an officer, a member of the EU forces. The suspicion is that the jeeps are being stolen on the order of the Croatian Armed Forces. In this way a car was stolen from a German youth organization called Students Help Life.

Moreover, Croatian Army provocations have been registered; they stop EU patrols at night and keep them for hours. Car thefts represent the greatest problem on the Muslim side also, but its scope is much smaller than in the western part of the town. Western officials and officers fear that the Croats are waiting for a large-scale incident to happen to prevent the process of the reunification of Mostar. When several days ago a Croat policeman was killed, Croats responded with artillery fire.

Another war could start on 20 January, when the men able to fight are also given complete freedom of movement in Mostar, and are able to cross from the eastern to the western part of it. The greatest question is what will happen when they meet with those who were their enemies until only recently, says Koschnick. He is considering postponing this measure.

Mate Boban, former president of the self-declared Herzeg-Bosnia, still has a great influence on events in the most Croat part of the world. Is Mate Boban blackmailing Tudjman?

IFOR [Implementation Force] tanks were removed from the Mostar streets, but exchange of fire, mostly from heavy machine guns and rifle grenades, is a daily occurrence. Mostar seems abandoned, like a town falling apart somewhere at the end of the world.

European administrator Hans Koschnick has been given more support from Americans and Germans for creating a united city. However, in order to do that he should have the support of Muslims and Croats, which he does not have.

In the Mostar cafes, in the hidden part of the world, it is possible to hear everything, including well kept secrets, which are confirmed or rejected in Zagreb, regardless of if they are made up or there is not enough proof. The war in Mostar, which started when this year did, is ascribed to Mate Boban, once the number one man in Herzeg-Bosnia and now a powerful man in Zagreb. The war with the Muslims is also ascribed to him, as well as attempts to renew the war, despite the Washington Agreement, which grants the Croats in Bosnia some rights, but not state ones. Boban was convinced, as he is now, that Croats should create their own little state in Bosnia, which they would then join to the mother state Croatia.

The Americans' attempts to stop the latest conflicts in Mostar through Zagreb have not succeeded because Tudjman has less and less influence on events in Herzeg-Bosnia, which are being dictated from Zagreb by Mate Boban. We have learned from reliable sources that Mate Boban is in possession of documents heavily compromising Franjo Tudjman, which, in turn, means that the hands of the Croatian president are tied as far as Herzeg-Bosnia is concerned. This detail speaks of other different interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, after Tudjman leaves, Mate Boban will most likely be the new Croatian president.

The Herzegovinian lobby in Zagreb has not issued such a statement yet, but unless a deal is made with Tudjman, this will happen very soon. Namely, the Herzegovinian Croats have been demanding clear demarcation with the Muslims with ethnically clean cantons and their own army. Only then will federation with

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the Muslims be possible, but as a loose confederate relation. The policy of concubinage, conducted by Jadranko Prlic, is a Tudjman-like orientation, and has firm strongholds among the most powerful Croat cadres in Herzeg-Bosnia, or Zagreb, where they have taken all the key positions. Namely, the roots of the dispute lie in Tudjman's Dayton Agreement, in accordance with which Mostar is to be a unitary town, and the Federation is also to be unitary, without Herzeg-Bosnia. However, the Herzegovinians do not accept this formula, according to which they are to lose in the first half of the game. The Catholic Church is also on Boban's side. During his recent visit to Sarajevo, Tudjman did not meet with Cardinal Vinko Puljic. This was the first sign of great misunderstanding among the Croats.

**Croatia: Daily Views Realignments Within Ruling HDZ**

*AU2301092696 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jan 96 p 4*

[Article by Davor Butkovic: "HDZ Leadership Claims: 'Dr. Franjo Tudjman Can No Longer Be Nominated for President of the Republic!'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 10 days ago a high-ranking Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] official called GLOBUS, and in conversation with the editors let slip by chance that the president's legal advisers had recently explained to Dr. Tudjman that he will not be able to be a candidate in the 1997 presidential elections!

President Tudjman allegedly reacted impatiently to this, saying that the job has not been finished and that there had to be a way which would allow him another nomination.

The news that the very top of the HDZ, and even the Presidential Palace was examining the possibility of not nominating Franjo Tudjman in the next presidential elections mostly testifies to the nervousness again present among the HDZ leadership. At first glance, it seems that this is the beginning of the race for a presidential successor. In reality, however, this is about a new division of power in the ruling party since Tudjman this year managed first to destroy the techno-managers and then the rightist faction as serious and influential political groups.

The claim that Tudjman would not be able to be a candidate in the 1997 presidential elections appeared in the Croatian public several months ago, with the explanation that Tudjman was president for the second term running, and that the Croatian Constitution envisages two presidential mandates at most.

It is true that after proclaiming the Christmas Constitution of 1991 Tudjman became president for the first time and that his convincing electoral victory in August 1992, which made him president for the second time running, justify the claim that he will no longer be able to be a candidate in 1997.

However, the Constitutional Court believes that Tudjman's initial eight-month presidential mandate does not limit his right to a nomination next year, since during his first mandate he had not been elected in direct general elections but was elected by the Sabor [parliament].

It is the opinion of our interlocutors in the Constitutional Court that Tudjman, since he did not use his right to run in the general presidential elections twice, has the right to run in 1997.

**Three New Groups**

Considering the opinion of the judiciary's top representatives, it is almost certain that no one will place legal obstacles before Tudjman if he again tries to run for president. It is, therefore, quite clear that the real reasons behind the renewed conflicts within the HDZ are not about the beginning of the race for Tudjman's successor (at least not as early as 1997), and that a new party hierarchy is being established because the former one was completely destroyed at the HDZ third convention in September 1995, and as a result of Tudjman's decision regarding candidates for the Sabor in recent parliamentary elections.

In place of the former radically nationalistic, leftist, and techno-managerial groups, each of which had significant political influence, three new groups are now being formed at the top of the HDZ.

The first group is represented by the president's most loyal associates who either never belonged to any of the three former factions, or demonstrated unconditional loyalty to President Tudjman in party disputes.

These include Gojko Susak, the undisputed leader of the former radical group; Franjo Greguric, one of the leaders of the former techno-managerial faction; and Mate Granic, who never openly sided with any faction and who in the course of four years continuously stressed his loyalty to the president, even in the case of the controversy regarding the confirmation of the Zagreb mayor.

The true political power of Susak, Greguric, and Granic was clearly manifested in the past few weeks.

Thus, Gojko Susak definitely came out the victor in the conflict with General Anton Tus regarding the organization of the Croatian Army and relations

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between the Defense Ministry and the Croatian Army General Staff, which ended in Tus's retirement and the announced removal of a number of other high-ranking officers.

Franjo Greguric's present, unexpectedly high political status, when it seemed that he would retire from professional politics after the elections, is confirmed by the fact that Greguric was the HDZ's most likely candidate for Zagreb mayor.

Foreign Minister Granic's political power is best evident in the unexpected appointment of Dr. Miomir Zuzul, until recently Tudjman's main negotiator, as ambassador to Washington. This indicates Zuzul's political downgrading for two reasons.

First, Ambassador Zuzul had much greater ambitions. It is common knowledge that he wanted to be foreign minister.

Second, diplomatic circles consider the ambassadorial post in the United Nations in New York to be much more important than the post of ambassador to Washington.

That the same line of thought is pursued in top Croatian politics is clear from the fact that in Washington, Zuzul will replace Petar Sarcevic, one of Croatia's less important diplomats, who in the course of his mandate drew attention to himself with an extremely compromising stint on an NBC talk show.

Zuzul's departure for the United States is Mate Granic's direct victory over his only contender for the leading post in Croatian foreign policy.

**A Battle for Tudjman's Successor**

Tudjman's closest associates, among whom we need to add Hrvoje Sarinic, are currently establishing two new factions which will in many ways succeed the defunct radically nationalistic, leftist, and techno-managerial factions.

Judging by everything, the factions will be headed by two relatively young politicians, Ivic Pasalic and Zlatko Canjuga.

Pasalic should become the leader of the new HDZ right wing. The main feature of the faction which is currently being established is the political battle against crime.

Pasalic is the loudest in the political campaign against economic crime, with which the HDZ is generally trying to change the image of the party which compromised itself during the transformation of property. The HDZ right wingers are also using this campaign to try to suppress those of their party colleagues with whom they have been in conflict for a number of years.

The HDZ's current right wing faction wishes, therefore, to make accusations of immoral conduct against many influential HDZ members who are not on their side and thus claim the most influential role in the party.

The new HDZ right wing faction is as radical, extremely nationalistic, and intolerant as the group headed by Vice Vukojevic, Gordana Turic, or Vladimir Seks, but it employs a much more moderate rhetoric.

It has the support of the majority of former leaders of the rightist faction.

On the other hand, Zlatko Canjuga, former HDZ secretary general, has the clear support of people like Franjo Greguric and Mate Granic. Canjuga believes that one of his main tasks is to define HDZ ideology along the lines of German Christian democracy.

Canjuga opposes all radicalism, including national radicalism. He opposes political campaigns against crime and fiercely espouses political tolerance.

Canjuga's influence on President Tudjman is best illustrated by the fact that Tudjman appointed him organizer of the HDZ interparty elections.

If Ivic Pasalic and Zlatko Canjuga succeed in becoming the heads of the new HDZ factions, in time political differences between them could escalate into a conflict reminiscent of political showdowns between Josip Manolic and Gojko Susak.

The strengthening of factions and the development of their leaders into truly influential Croatian politicians—we must stress that at the moment Pasalic is a lot stronger than Canjuga—will depend on several elements: from the degree of success of Pasalic's campaign against crime, to the possible success or repeated failure of the HDZ in the new Zagreb elections, for which Canjuga will be personally responsible.

And in the HDZ's new division of power and the possible taking of positions for the battle for Tudjman's successor (either in 1997, which is less probable, or later), Canjuga and Pasalic could have almost identical chances as Greguric, Susak, or Granic.

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**FYROM: Crvenkovski Congratulates Greece's Simitis**

*AU2201200696 Paris AFP in English 1852 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Jan 22 (AFP)—The prime minister of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], Branko Crvenkovski, sent a message of congratulations to Costas Simitis on his election as Greek premier, an official statement said here Monday.

Crvenkovski looked forward to a resumption of Greek-Macedonian cooperation "which should be fruitful in a variety of areas of common interest," the Foreign Ministry statement said.

Relations between the two Balkan republics have been thawing since last September when they signed an accord normalising relations which had been frozen in a dispute over the name of the former Yugoslav republic, the same as that of an adjacent Greek province.

Last week the two countries opened liaison bureaus in their respective capitals.

Simitis became Greek prime minister last week in succession to Andreas Papandreou who stepped down for reasons of ill-health.

**FYROM: Article Analyzes Gligorov Rescue of Liberals**

*AU2201131396 Skopje FOKUS in Macedonian 19 Jan 96 pp 4-5*

[Article by Zoran Dimitrovski: "Why Is President Gligorov Rescuing the Liberals?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I recently asked a high-ranking person very close to Ljubomir Frckovski [interior minister] whether the first Macedonian policeman's aggressive, decisive, and arrogant PULS commentary on the final split with the liberals was just his personal view or the unanimous opinion in the Social Democratic Alliance and, moreover, whether it was also the opinion of their "biggest investment"—President Gligorov. At first, the "source" told me he was ready to acknowledge any of Minister Frckovski's words or ideas from the "commentary in PULS." He then added that "unfortunately, President Gligorov does not share this opinion, or if he does, he thinks that this is not the time for political resolution and turbulence of this kind."

**The President—the Absolute Master**

Whatever happens now, when the so-called assessment of the government coalition's first year in office is being made and when (perhaps while this edition of FOKUS is being printed) Prime Minister Crvenkovski is making public the announced reconstruction of the government, one thing is certain: President Gligorov does not want to let the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia]-LP [Liberal Party] coalition break up dramatically. He does not want the Alliance for Macedonia to disappear just a year after its formation, particularly not with the current domestic and international political juncture. So, according to him, Prime Minister Crvenkovski can carry out the reconstruction of the government as he pleases, but the Liberals should (at least formally) stay in power, as well as Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov, although there are discussions about a confidence vote on him within the ranks of the SDSM.

Although these conclusions may anticipate a political solution, that for now is just one of the options, it is very important to indicate that this is a logical epilogue to events if we take into account the following thesis about the present situation in the Macedonian "Court": —After the attempt to assassinate the president and his surprisingly fast recovery and comeback, Gligorov is the only and absolute master of executive power, and political solutions in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] depend on him. It is precisely because of the unanimous "repentance" regarding the scandalous security of the president that the government, that is, Prime Minister Crvenkovski (who accepted responsibility for Frckovski's offered resignation), must make a bow, succumb, and obey the president. In our traditional Macedonian society, to be honest, not even the arrogant Frckovski can "ruin his, the president's, efforts" and "do on his own" what he intends to do—in this case, to definitely cause a split with the Liberals, not because Minister Frckovski is not "insolent" enough to do it, but because the president would severely punish all independent moves that he has not approved.

If the president's view is clear (even before the assassination attempt, he was the only person who decided the most important matters, and because of the constitutional authorities that are projected for the semipresidential system and the established political practice, he is taking over some authorities himself), then it is easy to understand and anticipate what Mr. Gligorov can do. Here we should note his high (even higher after the assassination attempt) standing among the people who are ready to approve of every political decision he makes.

There are several possible explanations for the aforementioned assumed attitude of the Macedonian first statesman in the conflict between the coalition partners, among which as follows: —His style of ruling, which can be briefly characterized as compromising, as determined not to cause additional conflicts, as steering

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away from risky political moves and solutions that are unpredictable, as ready to discuss and negotiate, and as to digest matters a long time before making decisions. —Like every other statesman who wants and can hold the strings, Mr. Gligorov unwillingly accepts politicians with ambitions for independent political decisionmaking, even if they accept responsibility for political resolution. —The unpredictable political determination of the Albanian political parties in government and parliament—will they definitely abandon the coalition and whom will they lean toward after a possible split between the SDSM and the Liberals?

**SFRY Syndrome**

Mr. Gligorov's ruling style these days is covertly being attacked by those in the SDSM who are affiliated to Minister Frckovski's angry alternative for a definitive split of the coalition with the Liberals. These views and contemplations go so far that, although compromises, negotiations, and discussions are evaluated as virtues of the president, particularly in his foreign policy activities, his loose attitude in the present conflict with the Liberals is evaluated by these circles as scandalous. Namely, Gligorov is proclaimed to be an indecisive politician, a statesman who does not have the "guts" to make historic decisions, an absolute ruler who does not care about the political future once "his star has faded." Moreover, in the event the president sticks to his view "on maintaining peace in the house at all costs," this political current in the SDSM projects a scenario for the political future of "Macedonia after Gligorov," which is very similar to the one of former Yugoslavia. They recall the days of the post-Tito period in former Yugoslavia, when ethnic, religious, ideological, political, and social animosities came to light in a particularly severe form that later resulted in a bloody resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

The 50 years of sweeping the "political garbage" under the carpet of "brotherhood and unity, equality, self-management..." under the sponsorship of Josip Broz [Tito] led to an express military scenario for the breakup of the state. This "ex-Yugoslav syndrome" is now attributed to Gligorov. The political current in the SDSM that is close to the first Macedonian policeman assesses his ruling abilities as even worse than Josip Broz's. Gligorov is inferior to Broz, these new "radicals" claim, regarding his virtue for making historic decisions. "Tito knew how to cut off, to say 'no,' to say 'that is enough.' Gligorov is not able or is unwilling to do this, he does not have enough courage and political sense." That is why his present attitude is assessed as voluntary, absolutist, ultimately irresponsible toward Macedonia's future and fate. According to these people from the SDSM, after Gligorov's departure from the political scene, sooner or later, a new "14th Extraordinary Congress of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia]" is possible at which the "Alliance for Macedonia" will collapse like a house of cards, immediately followed by the breakup of the "common ethnic house," which will lead to conflicts or at least a peaceful political secession or federalization of Macedonia.

**Andov Against Frckovski or Vice Versa**

The second possible explanation for Gligorov's conciliating sponsorship over the coalition partners, as I mentioned before, comes from his unwillingness to accept politicians with ambitions for independent political decisionmaking, even if they accept responsibility for the political resolution.

The president is aware that after a number of years have passed since the formal introduction of political pluralism in Macedonia, after he has "temporarily" removed a political figure (a possible rival) with leadership ambitions and wishes for independent political decisionmaking, Mr. Vasil Tupurkovski, two political figures remained on the political scene who had became particularly strong following the assassination attempt—Stojan Andov and Ljubomir Frckovski. Both have strong ambitions for political power. Both have the psychological constitution of exclusive rulers. The former—Stojan Andov—is a wise, experienced, cunning person who is waiting to punish every excursion of his victim, Ljubomir Frckovski, who is preposterous, aggressive, and pugnacious, but arrogant, narcissistic, and biased in evaluating his political power and inexperienced in balancing the power of the adversary. In the present political situation in Macedonia, particularly after last year's elections and the removal of the opposition (VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the DP [Democratic Party]), these two "outstanding" personalities wanted to strengthen their struggle for domination "in the house" after they felt that the air was clear and that there was no one standing in their way either behind them or in front (with the exception of President Gligorov). However, let us not mention all their struggles, let us stick to the latest ones—the post-assassination-attempt struggles. Frckovski, who in the meantime had become the cornerstone of the government in which Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski could not stay for a moment without his support, was pardoned, his resignation after the assassination attempt against the president was rejected. On the other hand, Andov immediately profited from the "favorable position" and he moved into the presidential

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cabinet to "strengthen his rating among the people," particularly by releasing the information on his own and the Liberal Party's merits for the "survival of Macedonia" after the assassination attempt. Andov radicalized the political showdown with Frckovski with the publication of a number of texts in his party newspaper LIBERAL, in which he launched a severe attack against the first Macedonian policeman for manipulation and false information regarding the investigation into the assassination attempt, and he criticized the inadequate results of the investigation. The question was even raised "whether someone was hindering the investigation." In accepting a showdown with a politician much more experienced than himself, Frckovski responded in typical style with the following words in a commentary for PULS last week: "...Considering the LP's base (which is actually the same as Vasil Tupurkovski's), there is a serious danger of identifying constant behavior of the mentioned 'lobbying' of the northern neighbor...."

**While Two Argue, the Third Benefits**

In doing this, the minister was not only trying to kill two birds—Andov and Tupurkovski—with one stone, he was also making serious allegations about the "northern link"—between Serbia and the "base" of his two adversaries (the former is current, the latter is the future), which is an equally "dangerous political identification" considering one of the possible subtexts of this scenario. Namely, at the well-known news conference on the assassination attempt, Minister Frckovski leveled accusations against a "multinational grouping from a neighboring country." Later, the media reported a possible plot of the Serbian-Bulgarian-Russian Mafia and underground, which, it said, wants to change the "political course in Macedonia" by "reconstituting the political elite." What was Frckovski alluding to? What is this "identification of constant behavior of the mentioned 'lobbying' of the northern neighbor about?" Does he possess any arguments or evidence, and if he does not expose them, is this not a scandalous political speculation with the intention of settling accounts with his political adversaries?

President Gligorov, it seems, is not prepared to encourage a political struggle for domination in the court, of which he is still the ruler, between Andov and Frckovski. Frckovski wants the struggle, Andov is wisely avoiding it, but it is certain that they would both like to settle accounts, and, if possible, for one to emerge as the winner, for which he certainly needs the President Gligorov's support. At this political moment, the first Macedonian statesman does not want to choose one or the other. Ultimately, a third person could benefit from a possible choice of the president (for many it is a politician whose star is yet to shine)—Vasil Tupurkovski. Is Mr. Gligorov aware of this, and if he is, is this his personal choice?

In any case, here is the third but no less important explanation for President Gligorov's "conciliating mission," and it is that this is not the right time for settling political accounts, which could have long-lasting repercussions on Macedonia's future. Nobody knows how the Albanian political parties will respond to the resolution in the "Alliance for Macedonia" and whether they will speed up their "stepping out of the common house" as they resolutely announced recently. The president is not prepared to take such a risk, because it could disturb Macedonia's more-or-less good reputation in the world as a multiethnic state in which conflicts are solved peacefully within the institutions of the system.

These are just a few of the possible explanations why the president will undertake (or has already undertaken) the aforementioned activities in the conflict between the SDSM and the Liberals. That is why he will, or has already, settled the dispute. According to some connoisseurs, this will have, or already has had, the biggest influence on the definitive location of the conflict within the framework of a government's reconstruction that will not change relations in the authority to a radical point. According to reasonable assessments, everything else would represent a political adventure at this time.

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**Poland: Oleksy Links Resignation, Prosecutor's Decision**

*LD2301085296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy has said that, if the military prosecutor's office starts an investigation [into his case], he will put himself at the disposal of the coalition that very day. In an interview in the latest issue of POLITYKA, the head of the government added that he does not rule out his resignation.

Interviewed today by Polish Radio, Oleksy admitted that the current political situation in Poland is difficult for the coalition—in particular for the Polish Peasant Party [PSL].

[Begin Oleksy recording] We established together that the situation is difficult for the coalition and especially difficult for the PSL because it is being subjected to a special kind of ridicule, brazen-faced ridicule... [pauses] and I am not particularly surprised that the PSL is looking at the situation analytically and taking its image into consideration and wondering how to behave. [end recording]

**Poland: Pietrewicz Ready To Become Prime Minister**

*LD2301100196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0900 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Miroslaw Pietrewicz, head of the Central Planning Office, has confirmed that he has received a proposal from Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the PSL [Polish Peasant Party—junior coalition partner], that he assume the portfolio of prime minister should Jozef Oleksy resign. Miroslaw Pietrewicz is taking part in a Cabinet meeting that has started in Warsaw:

[Correspondent Andrzej Kruszynski] Asked by reporters before the meeting of the government, Miroslaw Pietrewicz said that he had voiced his agreement to this proposal and that he would take on the job of head of government should this be politically necessary. He did not specify, however, what this phrase means. In the opinion of Pietrewicz, the restructuring of the government, should it happen, need not mean just a new prime minister.

Asked if he might think it necessary to replace certain ministers, Pietrewicz said that one would have to think really hard about such changes. Before the government session, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy accused the television of being one-sided. In the prime minister's view, Television Chairman Wieslaw Walendziak did not provide an opportunity for two months for a stance to be presented as regards the accusations leveled against Jozef Oleksy.

[Announcer] That was Andrzej Kruszynski reporting from the Cabinet office.

**Poland: Editor Denies Working for Special Services**

*LD2201200096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Marek Krol, editor in chief of the weekly magazine WPROST, who has been accused by DZIENNIK POZNANSKI of working as an agent for the special services for many years, has firmly denied that.

[Begin Krol recording] I have never been and am not anybody's agent. Perhaps I should also add that, had no investigative articles appeared in the WPROST weekly, such material would not have been published in a local paper either. Please also note that that publication is or was connected with the Elektromis company, about which we had published quite a lot of material, of course not favorable. This, in fact, was mentioned in the article in question. In a way this is a natural outcome or a price I have to pay for materials that were published in WPROST.

I regret that the credibility of WPROST has also been undermined. I would like to assure the readers and radio listeners, that, contrary to what is being written, we have had no links to any security services. [end recording]

**Poland: Author of WPROST Article Interviewed**

*WS2201140996 Poznan GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in Polish 18 Jan 96 p 3*

[Interview with WPROST journalist Stanislaw Janecki by Slawomir Kmiecik; place and date not given: "We Do What We Are Supposed To Do"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kmiecik] Is it true that you had gathered the materials on the spies from the Democratic Alliance of the Polish Republic [SdRP] before the Oleksy case was publicized?

[Janecki] No, it is absolutely impossible. It would have meant that I had had information from the secret services. This argument is eagerly raised by TRYBUNA. We are not working as journalist Marek Baranski did under martial law, when ready materials were delivered and he played prosecutor.

[Kmiecik] After the story was printed or before it, were you under any political pressure?

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[Janecki] At present, it is inconceivable. What is symptomatic is that President Kwasniewski, who has started on a new journey abroad, recognized that the most important problem is not the essence of the matter or that the state is affected by the most profound crisis in years, but the fact of how WPROST can be so well informed. What journalists are for is to get information, and politicians exist to solve crises. Anyway, we do what we are supposed to do.

[Kmiecik] Who is behind the code names of the KGB Polish agents Minim and Kat that you uncovered?

[Janecki] As authors of the story, we know who these people are, but I do not want to disclose that now. Because as much as the file on the informer nicknamed "Olin" is thick and quite detailed, the new data are only a splinter of that case. Since legal institutions have not taken up this case, I cannot see any reason why a journalist should play prosecutor or investigative judge. If they pick up the case, then it will be our turn.

[Kmiecik] Will information of similar significance be published in a week, as was announced, after the story is completed?

[Janecki] Some information may be equally important.

[Kmiecik] Following the disclosure of all data, can we talk about a "Polish Watergate"?

[Janecki] I am afraid nothing is going to rule out a politician from public life in Poland if he is stubborn and has his own consolidated supporters. It would not be good if it did happen. That is why we have published this material in order to change this terrible habit and make the politician responsible for what he has done. In a political sense, such responsibility must be taken immediately because such people are incredible to the world from a political point of view; they harm Poland every day that passes.

[Kmiecik] Are you scared now that the material has been published?

[Janecki] I have received some signals that someone may harm us. But I am not scared. I think there is a big difference between 1996 and, say, 1986. I have no reason to be scared. If I were in the shoes of foreign special services or someone who is interested in killing the case, I would rather make sure that we stay in good health—not even slip on ice.

**Poland: New Presidential Spokesman Interviewed**

*WS2201131996 Poznan GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in Polish 17 Jan 96 p 3*

[Interview with Antoni Styrczula, press spokesman of the president of the Poland, by Przemyslaw Wenerski; place and date not given: "I Have Not Double-Crossed Anybody"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wenerski] Your name was mentioned in earlier speculations concerning the candidates for press spokesmen for President Walesa, Prime Minister Oleksy, and even the Office of State Protection [UOP]. You must admit that this is a broad political spectrum. Does that mean that you do not have any opinions of your own, or that anybody can buy you?

[Styrczula] That is correct. As a spokesman, I do not have any opinions of my own. In my contacts with the press, I represent exclusively the head of state. Earlier—I want to emphasize this clearly—no formal proposals came from either Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Oleksy, or UOP. These were just ideas. Yet the fact that such ideas appeared, and from so many directions, only proves that I have been perceived as an impartial journalist, a journalist of the center. I do not conceal my roots; I do not conceal my work at Radio Free Europe and Solidarity radio. Nevertheless, taking the post of the president's press spokesman, one should forget about one's own opinions. And this is what I did on Monday.

[Wenerski] "The policy of open doors" is a declaration that all press spokesmen should now follow. Later, it turns out that their role boils down to leaving the door ajar, giving evasive answers, making allusions, making access to politicians harder. Why should it be different in your case?

[Styrczula] Until Sunday I was a journalist—some say quite a good one. Therefore, I am sure I can tell important matters from less important ones. I will always inform about the former—that is, about the issues directly related to President Kwasniewski's work and opinions. However, I will absolutely refuse to comment—a previous practice often—on other officials' statements and actions, or to embark on stylistic polemics. I do not intend to conduct an information policy of my own. I will be loyal to the president and work in line with him.

[Wenerski] "A man for hire," after all?

[Styrczula] That is how I see it.

[Wenerski] Following Karol Modzelewski, Andrzej Drawicz, and Barbara Labuda, you are just another man who has left the Solidarity milieux for the spotlight of power. Are you comfortable with it?

[Styrczula] Yes, I am. This is a free country, so I recognize someone else's right to express such an assessment of my behavior. It does not mean, however, that I agree with this assessment. I have not double-crossed anybody. I was aware of the decision I made.

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[Wenerski] The office of presidential press spokesman, in the previous term, was being constantly reshuffled. Are you not afraid of that?

[Styrczula] Such appointees run the risk of recall. Those are the normal rules of the game. I would like others to understand that. The president has appointed me, and the president can recall me, if he finds it appropriate.

[Wenerski] Will you have a place to return to afterwards?

[Styrczula] I do not know.

**Poland: Appointment of Defense Deputies Expected**

*WS1901145796 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Jan 96 p 2*

[Report by "PW": "Siemiatkowski to MON and BBN? The Defense Connection"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Zbigniew Siemiatkowski may be appointed deputy defense minister soon. He will keep his current position of deputy head of the National Security Office [BBN]," a politician from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] told us.

Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski announced on 17 January that new deputy ministers would be appointed. The minister would like two new deputies at the Ministry of National Defense [MON] in addition to the two already there. One would be responsible for contacts with parliament, the other for economic issues. He did not give any names. He said that he consulted on the decision with, among others, Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the Polish Peasant Party, and Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the Sejm Defense Commission of the SLD.

"Mr. Siemiatkowski would make a good candidate," a high-ranking SLD leader told us. "By keeping his position at the BBN, he could coordinate contacts with MON." Our interlocutor pointed out that two years ago Jerzy Milewski was simultaneously head of the BBN and deputy minister at MON.

Among the candidates mentioned is also Longin Pastusiak, who was at one time the SLD candidate for defense minister.

**Poland: Personnel Changes in UOP Envisaged**

*WS2301115596 Poznan WPROST in Polish 17 Jan 96 pp 24-25*

[Article by Miroslaw Cielemecki: "Internal Affairs Minister Konieczny's New Model for the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services Will Be an Occasion for Introducing Decisive Personnel Changes in the Office of State Protection"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Lists of Office of State Protection [UOP] functionaries that are expected to be discharged are circulating in the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. First place on the lists are taken by those in charge of the proceedings against Prime Minister Oleksy and other politicians of the Left. Jerzy Zimowski, deputy minister of internal affairs, is already preparing to leave the office. Changes in the management will probably bring about a reshuffle at the lower levels of the department, as well as of the subsidiary services—especially the police, the Border Guard, and Nadwislanskie Military Units of the MSW. Up until now, the only formal representatives of the ruling coalition within the MSW were Deputy Minister Zbigniew Sobotka (Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]) and Zbigniew Skorza, the deputy of the head of UOP (recommended by the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]). Now, to the concern of many (in exchange for the dismissal of General Henryk Jasik), Andrzej Anklewicz has returned. In the 1980's he was an officer of the [former] Security Service [SB] and recently one of Prime Minister Oleksy's close supporters. Zimowski's replacement is expected with equally great concern. The PSL is still unable to decide about the right candidate. Within the Sejm corridors, two names are being mentioned: Marian Krol and Andrzej Grzyb. The first of these men—a deputy of the Polish Peasant Party, well known in business circles and currently head of the Wielkopolska Food Foundation—was spoken to by Prime Minister Oleksy in Poznan. Andrzej Grzyb, a gardener by profession, is deputy head of the Parliamentary Commission on Administration and Internal Affairs.*

**The Position of UOP Head Gromoslaw Czempinski Seems To Be More and More Stable**

He was viewed as "Wachowski's man." He most certainly took part in the informal sessions of heads of the most important state and military services that were organized by Wachowski (for example, in Magdalenka). Sometimes there were also disagreements between [former] Minister Milczanowski and him. After the charges against Prime Minister Oleksy were presented, UOP issued a statement stressing that the office was remaining free of any political pressure. Some observers have considered this to be an attempt by the special services, especially their head, to wash their hands of the case. Others believe it was meant to protect UOP against the consequences of a political upheaval. A rumor has also appeared that Czempinski was kept away from the proceedings in the Oleksy case. The question is: Why?

After the departure of Konstanty Miodowicz, the head of the Counterintelligence Directorate, it was generally

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expected that his post would be assumed by Professor Colonel Stanislaw Hoc (Miodowicz's deputy), who is a friend of Jerzy Konieczny. To the surprise of UOP employees, the minister has chosen another deputy of Miodowicz's, Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski, who is considered to be one of the most experienced workers in the counterintelligence service. It is not known whether Col. Kapkowski will be able to stay in office for a longer time inasmuch as it is no secret that politicians of the ruling coalition approach the Counterintelligence Directorate with deep aversion. It is worth recalling that, in the middle of 1992, Aleksander Kwasniewski, Leszek Miller, and Tadeusz Iwinski complained that they were being investigated by the 8th Section of the UOP Counterintelligence Directorate. Also endangered is the position of still another deputy of Miodowicz, Captain Andrzej Sadlowski, who began his service in the MSW together with a group of former opposition activists. Some politicians of the Left regard him as the initiator of the so-called controlled leaks to the press. From among the Solidarity men in the MSW, the only ones who remain in office (although no one knows for how long) are: Jan Wegrzyn, the director of the Ministerial Cabinet; Piotr Szczypinski, the spokesman; and Lieutenant Colonel Wojciech Brochwicz, deputy head of the Border Guards.

**If It Comes to General Purges in UOP, They Will Undoubtedly Start With the Dismissal of the Head of the Intelligence Directorate, General Bogdan Libera, and the Head of the Investigation Directorate, General Wiktor Fonfara**

It is also not difficult to anticipate the fate of their deputies, as well as that of the heads of some departments. The career prospects of General Marian Zacharski, adviser to the head of UOP, remain undoubtedly uncertain. In the MSW it is believed that the deputy head of UOP, Jerzy Nozka, who held that position when Konieczny was the head of UOP, has the best chance of all to remain in office. Decisive for this could be Nozka's professionalism, as well as his intention to save the appearance that nothing exceptional is going on in the special services or in the ministry's center. For the same reasons, it is also possible that the head of the Border Guards, Colonel Jan Wojcieszczuk, who is connected with the Freedom Union, will retain his office. Nonetheless, the dismissal of Chief of Police Jerzy Stanczyk, who was supported by [former] Minister Milczanowski, is more and more often talked about.

The coalition wishes that changes like the removal of Deputy Minister Zimowski come about "in an evolutionary way" and remain virtually unnoticed. An occasion for general restructuring of UOP will be provided by the [introduction of the] new model of functioning of the intelligence and counterintelligence services that is being prepared by Minister Konieczny. One thing remains certain: After the final defeat of the post-Solidarity group, its place in the MSW will be taken by former SB functionaries.

**Poland: Tribunal To Defend 'Moral Order' Proposed**

*LD2001214196 Warsaw PAP in Polish 2030 GMT 20 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Jan—Representatives of right-wing political parties and people linked to the former government of Jan Olszewski [1991-92] have proposed the creation of a national tribunal whose "mission would be to defend the moral order in the face of the discrediting of the basic institutions of public life." The politicians called on Poles to unite around a jointly adopted declaration, which was handed to PAP today.

"Sensing the threat to Poland's independence from domestic and foreign agencies," the politicians proposed "depriving former PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] dignitaries of the right to hold posts in parliament, the government, and the economic administration, completing the vetting begun by the Olszewski government and taking foreign agents to court." A demand was also made for parliamentary elections to be held as quickly as possible. Society was also called on to participate in mass protest actions, which "will soon be organized against the governments of communists and traitors."

The declaration was signed by eight politicians: Adam Glapinski, a minister in the Olszewski government; Krzysztof Wyszkowski, a member of Olszewski's team of advisers; Piotr Naimski, head of the State Protection Office in the Olszewski government; Jaroslaw Kaczynski, chairman of the Center Alliance; Jacek Kurski and Antoni Macierewicz of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [party led by Jan Olszewski]; Jan Parys, chairman of the Movement of the III Republic; and Zbigniew Romaszewski, Solidarity senator.

Olszewski has announced his association with the appeal.

**Poland: Parties Suggest Joint Drafts of Vetting Law**

*LD1901214096 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 19 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The parliamentary floor groups of the Freedom Union [UW], the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and the Union of Labor have undertaken a joint initiative to present drafts for a vetting law for

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the consideration of the Sejm speaker. In the view of Professor Bronislaw Geremek, the head of the UW parliamentary floor group, a climate of responsibility reigns in the PSL and the whole of parliament, and that is why it is possible to harbor the hope that the vetting problem will be positively resolved this time.

The UW draft envisages, among other things, that the president, deputies and senators, and people appointed to state posts will be obliged to present a statement regarding work in the state security agencies that functioned from 22 July 1944 to 12 September 1989 or on conscious collaboration with these agencies. If someone makes a false statement, he will be subject to a punishment of deprivation of public rights for a period of two to 10 years.

**Poland: Poll Indicates Confidence in Government Fading**

*LD2301115896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The political crisis brought about by the accusations against Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy has distinctly reduced people's confidence in how long the current government will last. This is what emerges from a poll carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center.

In response to the question in December of how long the present Cabinet will last, more than half of those questioned said that it will last more than one year. Now, 30 percent of those polled share this opinion. The number of those who think the government will not last more than three months increased from 4 percent in December to 13 percent in January.

The poll showed that there was a 15-percent drop in confidence in Jozef Oleksy as a politician, but 46 percent of those polled still trust him. The assessment of the government's work has not changed: In January, just like a month ago, more than half of those polled said that the results of the work done by the Cabinet were very good or fairly good.

The poll was carried out between 12 and 16 January.

**Poland: Poll Shows Rising Support for SLD, PSL**

*WS2201145896 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 20-21 Jan 96 p 2*

[Report by "WEST": "CBOS on Elections and Coalition; Accord Will Be Our Slogan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The ordinary Pole would most readily vote for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. However, it is not very important to him who will have seats in the Sejm—he wants everyone to reach an agreement and form a government together.*

Politicians are again beginning to talk about the possibility of holding early elections. The Center for Research on Public Opinion [CBOS] asked us whom we would elect to the Sejm. As many as 28 percent would vote for the SLD. The Oleksy affair did not negatively affect the popularity of the party. On the contrary, support for it has gone up by 3 percent since last month. The same goes for the popularity of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]—now it also has 3 percent more supporters than a month ago. As a result, it occupies third place, with 10 percent of the vote.

The opposition has lost support since December: Solidarity is supported by 12 percent (previously 15 percent) and the Freedom Union [UW] by 8 percent (previously 11 percent). The Union of Labor [UP] is enjoying 7-percent support and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] 5 percent. The remaining groups would fail to enter the parliament because they would obtain less than 5 percent of the vote.

We are a little bored with the present coalition. It is defended by 27 percent of the respondents, and 33 percent would like to change it. Change it and replace it with whom? Only 3 percent of those who are determined to see changes would back a coalition of the SLD and UW. Seven percent would support a new coalition of the SLD, UW, and UP, and 18 percent would back a coalition of the PSL, UW, and UP. However, most people (43 percent) would prefer a "coalition of all of the parties and groups that have their seats in the Sejm."

"Despite the experiences in democracy that we acquired over the past few years, the principle of making a clear-cut division into the government and the opposition is still alien to many people," CBOS comments.

The poll was conducted by CBOS between 12 and 16 January 1996 on a representative random sample of 1,177 adult inhabitants of Poland.

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**What Sejm Would We Elect in January?**

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| SLD | 28 |
| Solidarity | 12 |
| PSL | 10 |
| UW | 8 |
| UP | 7 |
| BBWR | 5 |

NOTE: The Christian-Democratic Union, Union for Real Politics, Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Accord, and the Confederation for an Independent Poland would not have enough support to be in the Sejm.

## Poland: Jagielinski on EU, Agricultural Issues

*96EP0010A Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish 19 Nov 95 No 47, pp 11-12*

[Interview with Roman Jagielinski, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, by Pawel Kapuscinski and Maciej Kledzik; place and date not given: "There Will Be No Strawberry War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Should we declare a strawberry-and-beef war against the European Union, emulating the chicken war waged between the EEC and the United States?

[Jagielinski] No. This is no longer necessary. For seven months now I have been watching over our trade interests in Brussels, and I have found there partners who are inclined to make concessions. The EU has abandoned restrictions on entry into its market—the concessions have been even greater than was assumed in preliminary negotiations. But that required participation in all those treaties and loud and explicit articulation of our needs. For half a year now I have been trying to appoint two assistants to Agricultural Attache Jerzy Wieczorek, one an expert on phytosanitary affairs and the other an expert on veterinary medicine, but so far the Ministry of Finance has withheld its approval.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] But our balance of trade with the EU is getting worse and worse—from plus $861 million in 1990 to minus $111 million last year.

[Jagielinski] That is not the fault of the EU's "customs admission valve." It is happening chiefly because after 1990 our farm output plummeted by 30 percent. We are now slowly raising it, by 6 to 9 percent.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] What particular accomplishments have you scored in Brussels?

[Jagielinski] Our entire exports were unblocked, principally the exports of calves for the slaughter and horse meat, with the duties on the latter having been reduced. The duty on lambs has been abolished. There is no problem with exports of apple concentrate, and the cherry season has ended well. The problem with strawberries is not due to a high so-called entry or threshold price. The Germans purchased strawberries somewhere. Right after the harvest, when exporters bought strawberries at low prices, they expected to earn well on them, but the prices within the EU dropped. Such is the market.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] You state that relations with the EU have improved, don't you?

[Jagielinski] I definitely say so.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Even though this year the EU has introduced entry prices for imports which, in the case of apples and pears, are much higher than on our market?

[Jagielinski] What of it? We too last summer similarly imposed additional customs fees as a kind of insurance that eventually could be employed in the event of imports at prices or in quantities that would destabilize the market. Let us speak rather of domestic competition. I favor mandatory membership in chambers of business or handicrafts that would allow us control over what is happening on the domestic market. If you keep track of new legislation, you'll notice that we are now speaking of licenses and franchises. That would provide legal possibilities for restricting domestic competition, which is ruinous to exporters.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] What extent of financial assistance can be expected from the EU for the modernization and restructuring of our agriculture? The amount of ECU4.5 billion has been mentioned, but recently ECU3.3 billion has been mentioned.

[Jagielinski] We will be able to avail ourselves of preaccession funds. But it is as yet premature to discuss the extent of structural funding. We shall determine next year the funding needed by Poland, after the results of the rural census become public. We shall begin negotiations during the second half of 1997, and they will last for about three years. Now is the time to consider what we ourselves can accomplish in Poland. We must establish farmer self-governments and a wholesale market—in this respect a great deal is already happening. We must streamline cooperative banks and restructure the Bank of Food Industry, while at the same time providing assistance to other agricultural banks. We must reform agricultural

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counseling, focusing emphasis on training in economics and marketing, and we must reorient instruction at agricultural schools by making it broader and less specialized so as to enable graduates to qualify for nonagricultural jobs as well. We are making great advances—compared with the era of real socialism—in building the economic infrastructure, and especially roads. We receive PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] aid in road-building. The agricultural and food industry, along with suppliers, is yet to be privatized. Lastly, we must work on ways of gradually placing surplus farm manpower in nonagricultural jobs.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Lately there has been considerable publicity over efforts of the farm lobby to "grab" greater subsidies from the budget.

[Jagielinski] In 1995 2.6 percent of budgetary funds will be spent on agriculture and agricultural education (650 schools)—this is less than 1 percent of GDP. The current budget subsidies are needed to maintain, more or less, parity between farm and nonfarm family incomes. These subsidies do not have to be as big as they are in Western Europe, where one-half of farm incomes derives from subsidies, compared with 17-18 percent, inclusive of retirement pensions for farmers (according to OECD classification), in this country. But the need to subsidize Polish agriculture is chiefly due to the extremely high interest rates on loans.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Could you specify which subsidies will be increased?

[Jagielinski] Subsidies for anything that constitutes so-called biological progress and building the market infrastructure will increase in real terms.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] And what would be the applicable cap on these subsidies?

[Jagielinski] I would be happy if the cap were set at 3 percent of budgetary spending. That would suffice to continue the expansion of the infrastructure. That 3 percent would also satisfy Jacques Santer—it has been agreed upon with British Minister of Agriculture Douglas Hogg—and even Balcerowicz would applaud. Perhaps Pawlak would not be quite satisfied.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Hugo Dicke, an expert at the Institute of the World Economy in Cologne, outlined in this periodical a rather black picture of the consequences of entry into the EU: Farm incomes will increase but food consumption will decline drastically. Are we being threatened by another shock, such as the one in 1990?

[Jagielinski] The expert exaggerates. Our power and coal prices already are higher. You can pay the same price for dinner in Warsaw as in Brussels. Even now the prices of many foodstuffs in Poland match those in Brussels. At the same time, in Poland the prices of raw materials do not have the same relationship to retail food prices as in the West. It may turn out—as in Spain—that the prices of certain items will even drop. Currently our retailers set their profit margins with impunity, owing to the lack of a market structure. We shall be granted a 10-year adjustment period during which certain instruments for protecting the market and consumers will be retained. Until then, much will change anyhow. Recently I visited Kalisz Voivodship with its 14 dairy cooperatives. I believe that in the future, four that are strong in capital will survive, and altogether the dairy industry will no longer have to carry such high overhead in the form of salaries of the 14 cooperative chairmen and 14 accountants.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Is it true that you want Poland to join the EU with 700,000 farms? What about the remainder, the two million farms?

[Jagielinski] First, let us correct these figures. In Poland there exist formally 1,950,000 farms that exceed a hectare in size. However, only 1,450,000 farmers are paying their farm insurance premiums, with the remaining 500,000 paying premiums connected to operating small businesses or holding nonfarm jobs. The group of farms permanently linked to the market, i.e., farms operated for commercial purposes, will in the future amount to 700,000-1,000,000, along with half a million prospering farms operated for personal consumption or supplemental income. This will enable us to stem emigration from the countryside.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] So then a change in agrarian structure is not a requirement for joining the EU?

[Jagielinski] Absolutely not. Besides, the average farm size in Portugal is about six hectares and in Greece four hectares, yet these countries have long been members of the EU. With an average farm size of seven hectares we would not be ranked at the bottom.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] We would like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to ask you, as a member of the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] leadership, about the consequences of the outcome of the presidential elections to your party and to the farm policy of the PSL.

[Jagielinski] The farm policy of the Polish Peasant Party is defined in its program and does not depend on this or that kind of elections. I see no reason why it should be changed, regardless of who wins the presidency. As

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minister of agriculture and food industry I translate this policy into reality, because it has been accepted by Sejm as a policy of the government of which I am a member.

As for the consequences of that election to the PSL.... The outcome of the first electoral round, in which our candidate met with no support from the rural community, is already known. This matter has yet to be considered; we must thoroughly analyze the course of the electoral campaign and assess, among other things, the consequences of its outcome, and also take a decision on how the PSL should proceed. For the present, this is still premature.

[ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE] Thank you for the interview.

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**Romania: 2 Euro MP's Say Romania Not Ready for EU**

*AU2301131796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 23 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] We have received from the European Commission delegation in Romania the following statement on media reports about the European Parliament's position on Romania's admission to the European Union. Regarding these reports, the delegation wishes to make the following clarification:

In the 19-21 January period, European Parliamentarians Glenys Kinnock and Glen Ford, representing the British Labor Party, paid a private visit to Romania at the invitation of the British organization Health Aid United Kingdom. At the end of the visit, the two European deputies held a meeting with a group of journalists. The European Commission delegation in Romania wishes to emphasize that the two deputies' statements were made in their own name and do not represent either the party or the parliamentary group to which they belong, and even less, the European Parliament or the European Union. Therefore, any attempt to attribute personal opinions expressed by the European parliamentarians to one or another of the European Union institutions is erroneous, reads, in conclusion, the communique received by our editorial bureau from the European Commission delegation in Romania, the embassy of the European Union in our country.

We mention that, according to several dailies published today, the two Eurodeputies declared that, quote, Romania has the poorest economic performance among the Central European countries that have submitted applications to the European Union, end quote, and therefore it will not be among the first wave to join the community. As justification for this assessment, the two Eurodeputies cited the nonfulfillment of economic criteria and the absence of civic society structures and lack of correct treatment of minorities.

**Romania: 'Personal Autonomy Statute' Guidelines Issued**

*AU2301113996 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 16 Jan 96 pp 1, 3*

[Unattributed report: "The CRU Wants Parliament To Acknowledge the Ethnic Hungarian Community as a Distinct Political Subject"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the session of the Council of UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] Representatives [CRU] concluded in the town of Odorheiul Secuiesc, they issued the following document:

After debates on the draft of the Personal Autonomy Statute, which was presented by Dr. Jozsef Csapo, the CRU reached the following conclusions: On the basis of the draft passed as a working document, the team in charge of codifying the final document is to observe the following principles:

1. The Personal Autonomy Statute of the ethnic Hungarian community in Romania is a set of regulations bestowed with the power of law of the community self-administration.

2. The Personal Autonomy Statute is a juridical statute, which by its stipulations, regulates, in a precise and detailed way, the functioning and configuration of the autonomous institutions, various procedural mechanisms, the system of relations with the state authorities, and the way in which they comply with the current and future juridical system.

3. We consider as exceptionally essential the setting up of the following basic institutions: —a decisionmaking body at the community level; —an executive body at the community level; —autonomous institutions in the domains of culture, education, information, and social issues, as well as bodies overseeing the activity of the latter.

Point 4 in the basic principles, passed by the fourth UDMR Congress, is to be used as a guideline in codifying the competence of the institutions to be included in the statute.

4. Regarding the material resources of the self-administration, both at the national and community levels, as well as their utilization, we suggest the elaboration of detailed regulations.

5. The relation between the community self-administration based on the principle of personal autonomy and the state authorities is a juxtaposed one. Setting off from the fact that the institutions functioning within the personal autonomy intend to exercise certain prerogatives which, by virtue of the sovereignty of the Romanian state, are currently exercised by public authorities, it is necessary that the relations of the personal autonomy institutions with the state authorities should be described in detail, and that the stipulations referring to control and guarantees should be rigorously codified.

6. The CRU proposes that the first chapter of the document should begin with the following juridical principle:

Romania's Parliament acknowledges, in a juridical form, the ethnic Hungarian community in Romania as a distinct political subject and as having a public

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juridical personality, according to its community statute. The autonomy of the ethnic Hungarian community is stipulated and regulated by a statute, which, being passed by Romania's Parliament, is bestowed with the power of law.

Its codifying is to be carried out by a group of experts appointed by the Executive Presidium within three months from issuing this decision. The elaborated document is to be submitted to debate during the CRU's May session.

We suggest that experts should be involved in the work, both from the country and abroad, including experts of the Council of Europe.

**Romania: PUNR Asks Iliescu To Discuss Reconciliation**

*AU2201165996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], sent an open letter to Romania's President Ion Iliescu in which he asks the president, regarding the Romanian-Hungarian historical reconciliation, that the Hungarian response and counterproposals to the initiatives proposed by the Romanian head of state be sent to all parliamentary parties.

Likewise, the PUNR leader asks President Ion Iliescu to hold a new meeting with the representatives of the parliamentary political parties before the negotiations resume between the Romanian and Hungarian delegations on this issue and on the treaty of good neighborliness between the two countries.

In the letter that was faxed to our editorial office, this move is propelled by the PUNR's wish to make an active contribution to the finalization of these important documents on the basis of Romania's Constitution and the framework convention of the Council of Europe issued in Strasbourg on 1 February 1995.

**Romania: Cluj Mayor Calls OSCE Commissioner 'Ghost'**

*AU2201150596 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 16 Jan 96 p 1*

[Report by Cristian Mihai Chis: "Cluj—Funar's Plaque Is Breaking the Wall"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gheorghe Funar [Cluj mayor and leader of the Romanian National Unity Party] struggled all day yesterday to fit one of the few things that have been left unfitted in Cluj, namely, a plaque on the house where Matei Corvin [Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus] was born. An initial attempt to fit the plaque failed at around 11 o'clock local time. Hoisted up by a crane, owing to the bad handling of the equipment, the plaque, which is 1.9 meters long, 1.2 meters wide, and weighs 540 kilograms, started to swing and hit the wall, destroying the supporting archway. But at 14 hours, everything was prepared for the ceremonial unveiling of the plaque. Apart from Gheorghe Funar, the event was also attended by Grigore Zanc, the prefect of Cluj County, and deputy prefect Liviu Medrea. Lajos Molnar, the head of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] Cluj branch, said that he was going to sue Gheorghe Funar for the "illegal act of fitting the plaque." The leader of the UDMR Cluj branch also said that the mayor did not have the approval of the local council to fit this plaque, and that shortly the OSCE high commissioner, Max van der Stoel, would be informed about the situation created in Cluj.

Gheorghe Funar showed no fear of the UDMR threat, saying that he was convinced that he would win the case. Referring to Max van der Stoel, the mayor said: "Anyway he will not live long. He is a ghost, walking around Bucharest frightening the citizens, and, for this reason, he should be declared persona non grata."

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## Federal

### FRY: Proposal for Cooperation With Italy Drafted

*LD2201231396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2242 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 22 (TANJUG)—A draft proposal for the paths of future economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Italy was delivered to an Italian economic delegation here on Monday.

The draft was handed to the head of the delegation, minister plenipotentiary Mario Persigili by Deputy Serbian Industry Minister Zivota Cosic, the Serbian Information Ministry said in a statement.

The draft envisages commodity exchange, technology transfers, the purchase of raw materials, semimanufactures and equipment from Italy and the establishment of various forms of long-term industrial cooperation and joint investments with Italian firms.

These require appropriate inter-state accords and financial and banking arrangements that will be discussed during the three-day visit of the Italian delegation.

The two sides agreed that bilateral economic relations be renewed as soon as possible and raised to the level before the imposition of the international sanctions on Yugoslavia in 1992.

### FRY: Marjanovic Wants Enhanced Ties to Italy

*LD2201222496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2154 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 22 (TANJUG)—Serbian Premier Mirko Marjanovic said on Monday he hoped Yugoslavia would soon achieve the level of exchange it had with Italy before the sanctions were imposed in 1992, when Italy was Yugoslavia's leading western partner.

In talks with Italian Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade Francesco Bascone, the two officials agreed that as the sanctions were suspended the moment was appropriate for promoting bilateral economic cooperation, said a statement released by the Serbian Information Ministry.

Italy is prepared to become engaged in setting up joint firms in spheres of mutual interest.

### FRY: Ports Designated for International Traffic

*LD2201171496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1246 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 22 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government has designated Bar, Budva, Kotor and Herceg-Novi to be the ports for international maritime transportation, it was published in the latest issue of the Yugoslav official gazette.

In the international river transport, under the same decision, the docks on the Danube—Apatin, Belgrade, Backa Palanka, Novi Sad, Pancevo, Prahovo and Smederevo—and Senta on the Tisa were designated.

The decision took effect on Jan. 20, thus invalidating the regulations on designating ports and docks for the international transport adopted in the former Yugoslavia in 1984 and 1989.

## Serbia

### Serbia: Seselj: Milosevic Controlled Military Operations

*AU2301122196 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 23 Jan 96 p 4*

[Statement by Serbian Radical Party chairman Vojislav Seselj; place and date not given: "Witness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is true that I have established contact with The Hague Tribunal, and that I have said that, if they have anything against me, I am ready to go there immediately to be put on trial. Not as a witness under protection, that has not even been mentioned in these talks.

I established my first contact with The Hague Tribunal mid- December. I had no previous contacts. I spoke to a man there who told me that they had no information on me, and that they were not interested in press statements. I also told them that I was ready to come as Radovan Karadzic's defense witness.

The mere fact that I am going to be defense witness for Radovan Karadzic means that I am going to be a witness against Milosevic. I am the witness that Radovan Karadzic has never commanded a single army unit in the war, and that the army has never listened to him. Both the Serb army of the Serb Republic [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [Croatia] were always under the command of Slobodan Milosevic.

Throughout the entire war Radovan Karadzic, Milan Babic, and Milan Martic never had any effective command over the Serb army. That army has always been under Belgrade's direct command. All the military operations were coordinated by Belgrade. Richard Goldstone said that to participate in war is not a crime, to start a war is not a crime, to supply men and weapons is not a crime, but it is a crime to kill civilians, to kill prisoners of war and the wounded.

Most of the orders were verbal, issued by telephone. As far as I know the CIA has tapes of all these telephone

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calls. Whether they have written documents for each operation I do not know, but I do know certain hard facts: I know that Milosevic, apart from commanding the Serb army, also dispatched police units to the front, and I know that all those generals and high-ranking officers are still on the payroll of the [Yugoslav Army] General Staff. What further proof do you need?

**Serbia: Official Defends Treatment of Refugees**

*LD1901185196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1805 GMT 19 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 19 (TANJUG)—Muslims from Srebrenica and Zepa, who fled to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on August 1, 1995, have been cared for directly by the U.N. High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Serbian Commissioner for Refugees Bratislava Morina told TANJUG Friday.

Referring to reports by some Western media and statements of several of the Muslims who were later granted asylum in some European countries that they had been treated badly and even harassed in refugee centers Mitrovo Polje on Mt. Goc and Slivovica near Uzice in Serbia, Morina said the two centers were supplied from the very first day with food by UNHCR and with medicines by ICRC.

ICRC representatives also visited regularly the Muslim refugees and enabled them to send messages to their families, she said.

Several hundred Muslims who fled last August from Srebrenica and Zepa to Yugoslavia, where they were received and accommodated, had at that time expressed gratitude to Serbia for saving them from revenge by their leaders, pointing out they no longer wanted to fight in a senseless war.

At that time, Associated Press reported that Muslims who had sought shelter in Serbia received medical treatment there and that the food they received from Serbian police in the Sljivovica camp was their first meal in many days.

UNHCR had then expressed gratitude to Serbia for receiving and accommodating Muslim refugees, Morina underlined.

In camps in Mitrovo Polje and Sljivovica, nearly 800 Muslims are provided with food sent by UNHCR and enjoy full health care—like all refugees—with medicines being provided by ICRC, Morina explained.

The statement of UNHCR representative Ilija Todorovic that some food shipments had not reached Mitrovo Polje is unfounded, Morina said, as Muslim refugees are visited by UNHCR and ICRC representatives whenever they wish.

Those who were granted asylum in Ireland said Wednesday they had been inhumanly and ill treated in Serbia. They should be reminded that Serbia had welcomed them when their lives were in danger. It is not up to Alija Izetbegovic to grant them amnesty, Morina said.

Out of the 796 Muslims who arrived in Serbia from Srebrenica and Zepa last August, 75 have meanwhile left—24 to Ireland, 50 to United States and one to Sweden. UNHCR continues seeking asylum for the others.

**Serbia: SPS Leader on Minority Rights, Albanians**

*LD2201201296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1907 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Jan 22 (TANJUG)—The governing Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) confirmed on Monday that it would demand the full respect of the principle of securing the constitutionally warranted rights of all citizens of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) and the rights belonging to the national minorities.

President of the SPS Provincial Board for Kosmet Vojislav Zivkovic said at the party's public discussion in Pristina that all citizens, especially the ethnic Albanians, had to be provided with protection from Albanian separatists' torture.

'Of no avail are all Albanian separatists' strivings to create in Kosmet an Albanian state of sorts, and equally futile are pleas to have the province regain the status it had had according to the 1974 constitution,' Zivkovic stressed.

The ethnic Albanians' strong separatist movement has been active in Kosmet for decades. It proclaimed a 'Republic of Kosovo' and was trying to merge Kosmet with Albania.

According to the 1974 constitution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Serbia's two provinces—Kosmet and Vojvodina—had had the state prerogatives, thus substantially impairing Serbia's sovereignty in its entire territory.

Zivkovic said that the SPS was pledging itself fof the full suppression of outvoting under the conditions of admitting members of the Albanian national minority to Serbia's political life or else, as Zivkovic specified, that would be the major instrument of Albanian separatists in Kosmet.

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Ethnic Albanians contribute around 82 per cent of the 1.95 million population in Kosmet.

**Serbia: SPS Spokesman Outlines Congress Agenda**

*LD2201171396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1257 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 22 (TANJUG)—Spokesman of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) Ivica Dacic has said that the 3rd SPS congress to be held March 2-3 will not deal with changes in the party programme but only with slight statutory changes.

Speaking in a TANJUG panel discussion, Dacic said the congress would be an opportunity to make personnel changes in the party leaderships at all levels.

The changes will affect those who have failed to identify with the SPS as the party of the left, those who have used the party for their own goals and have obstructed the party policy, he said.

They who have always been more inclined to dispute positions of the leftist parties close to the SPS rather than of the rightist parties, doing great harm to the SPS and the left in general—will also have to go, he said.

The congress should once again reaffirm the party's consistent and principled peace policy which has shown that peace is the best way to protect and defend national and state interests without the needless suffering of the people, he said.

Dacic said that after the signing of the Bosnia peace accord Serbia's opposition parties had once again resorted to their old ways of fighting against the SPS, obstruction of parliamentary activity, and threats that they would rise to power by force.

He pointed out distrust and envy among opposition leaders, their dictatorial behaviour, and the absence of democracy in their parties, and the fact that they changed their political positions much too often.

'A party that has such an opposition should not worry about its future,' he said.

Socialists are willing to cooperate with leftist and democratic centre parties but not with rightist parties, he said.

The SPS has always viewed a change in the ownership structure as a means of boosting the country's economy and creating a richer and more just society, he said.

Dacic rejected accusations of the SPS slowing down privatisation, saying the party had preserved national resources from destruction and the selling off that had happened in eastern European countries.

He said the differences in positions on privatisation between Serbia's and Montenegro's ruling parties were not substantial and it was therefore possible to overcome them.

**Serbia: Percevic Notes SPS's 'Political Energy'**

*AU2201204096 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[Statement by SPS Vice President Goran Percevic at the party rally held in preparation of the SPS third party congress in Medvedja on 22 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Percevic] I believe that the rallies held in the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] prior to our congress show that a positive political energy is present around our party that will contribute to the congress fulfilling its main goal and that is the creation of a program for an economically developed, culturally prosperous, and internationally affirmed Serbia; the goal of the congress is to focus on a better future for Serbia and its prosperity.

The fact that a great number of citizens, young people, are joining our party shows Serbian citizens' interest in participating in the creation of a better future.

It is particularly important that our party is being joined by citizens, young people of all nationalities. This was evident once again in Medvejda tonight, and I believe that this is more proof of the correctness of our policy of civic and national equality.

**Serbia: Markovic Calls Nationalists Enemies of Peace**

*LD2201230496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2216 GMT 22 Jan 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vranje, Serbia, Jan. 22 (TANJUG)—A member of the Board of the Yugoslav Left (JUL) said on Monday that the Bosnian peace accord had its enemies among the nationalists, chauvinists and war profiteers.

'Peace has its foes not only in the nationalists and chauvinists, but also among those who have grown rich in the war and acquired positions they will lose in peace. Those are enemies of peace and of the entire development of Yugoslavia,' said Mira Markovic.

Markovic, the wife of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, was speaking in Vranje, a town in southern Serbia. She said the Yugoslav left was committed to peace and the equality of the peoples in multi-ethnic Yugoslavia.

Markovic said JUL called for the equal treatment of all forms of ownership in Yugoslavia, and added that

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'a society with solely private ownership does not exist anywhere in the world.'

JUL President Ljubisa Ristic said in the town of Sombor on Monday that Yugoslavia did not have to live according to another country's model in order to develop.

He said 'we can see all around us the fatal consequences of loss of independence and living by someone else's recipes.'

**Serbia: Croatian TV Said To Muffle Belgrade Stations**

*AU2201165496 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20-21 Jan 96 p 16*

[Report by TIKER: "Croatian TV Signal Muffling Palma, Politika, and Studio B"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—The disturbances in the broadcasting of the programs of three Belgrade TV stations—Palma, Politika, and NTV Studio B—with the picture disappearing off the screen or Croatian, Romanian or Hungarian programs appearing, has been caused primarily by the amplified signal of Croatian TV in eastern Slavonia.

At Palma TV, they say that the Croatian TV has positioned a strong transmitter in eastern Slavonia, which is what has been causing the disturbances. The Palma officials say that they are impotent since they cannot amplify their signal without the approval of the state.

The disturbances in TV Politika and "the chaos in the ether" happened two days ago owing to the problems and loss of electricity at the Kosutnjak transmitter, Vladimir Marinkovic, technical director of RTV Politika, says. To judge by the TV reception, there are also indications that the Croatian TV has amplified its signal in eastern Slavonia, but we do not have any official information about that, Marinkovic says.

Zoran Matic, editor in chief of NTV Studio B, says that the disturbances at this TV station have been caused exclusively by the loss of electricity at the Kosutnjak transmitter.

## Kosovo

**Kosovo: Rugova Says 'Peaceful Solution' Favored**

*AU1901214096 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 18 Jan 96*

[Telephone report by Leke Musolli from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, received Mr. Gert Ahrens, chairman of the Group for Kosova at the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.

The Kosova Information Center reports that President Rugova briefed the German diplomat on the grave situation in Kosova and the systematic repression that the Serbian regime is perpetrating against Albanians. However, President Rugova stated, Albanians are challenging the situation with a non-violent resistance and an independent political and state organization.

The people and leadership of Kosova have declared themselves in favor of a peaceful solution and the independence of Kosova, Rugova stated, adding that this solution finds support in the ethnic, historical, territorial, and judicial identity and the new reality created in Kosova after the disintegration of the former Yugoslav Federation.

Gert Ahrens, presiding over the Group for Kosova at the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, confirmed that the group in question will commit itself to a just solution of the Kosova issue.

After the meeting with President Rugova, Ahrens met the representatives of several Albanian political parties in Kosova.

**Kosovo: Ethnic Albanians Urge International Involvement**

*AU1901213196 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 19 Jan 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] German diplomat Gert Ahrens, leader of the Group for Kosova at the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, met the leaders of the Albanian political parties yesterday afternoon.

Dr. Fehmi Agani, Hydajet Hyseni, Edita Tahiri, Academician Mark Krasniqi, Bajram Kosumi, Luljeta Pula, Gjergj Dedaj, and Ramush Maviqi briefed Ambassador Ahrens on the current situation in Kosova, particularly on the Serbian regime's systematic repression against Albanians, institutions, and the forms of their political organization.

The Kosova Information Center reports that, at the meeting with Mr. Ahrens, representatives of the Albanian political parties stressed that the people of Kosova have declared themselves in favor of independence through a referendum and that a failure to respect this will can only delay but not avoid a conflict in Kosova.

At the meeting, they also discussed possibilities for the Group for Kosova to be engaged in resolving the existing problems.

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